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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2018 (expected)

Dissertation Title: Three Essays in Microeconomics

Dissertation Committee: Jawwad Noor, Bart Lipman and Juan Ortner

M.A., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2016

B.S., Applied Mathematics – Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI, 2013

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomics, Game Theory

WORKING PAPERS

“[Social Network of Indirect Favor Exchange](#),” Job Market Paper, September 2017

“[Payoff-irrelevant Traits in Asymmetric Coordination Games](#),” September 2017

PRESENTATIONS

Canadian Economics Association, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2017

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Professor Louis Putterman, Department of Economics, Brown University, Summer 2011

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Behavioral Economics, Boston University, Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2016

Teaching Fellow, Game Theory, Graduate Level, Boston University, Fall 2014, Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Fall 2016, Spring 2017

Teaching Fellow, Game Theory, Boston University, Spring 2015, Spring 2016, Spring 2017

Teaching Fellow, Intermediate Microeconomics, Boston University, Fall 2015, Fall 2017

Teaching Fellow, Introduction to Health Economics, Boston University, Fall 2015, Spring 2016

LANGUAGES

Native in Chinese; Fluent in English

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, SAS, MATLAB, LyX, R, SQL

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: China/F1

REFERENCES

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Social Network of Indirect Favor Exchange

I develop a game theoretical model of indirect favor exchange networks where one can request favors through a chain of contacts based on Jackson et al (2012)'s model of direct favor exchange where one can only request favors from his direct contacts. I study the cooperative behavior fostered by potential sanction in a network. First, I provide a full characterization of ‘renegotiation-proof’ networks and then propose a robustness condition. I find that unions of closely connected units remain an important class of robust networks. In particular, under this specific robustness refinement, when maximum length of contact chains is larger than 3, only star-shaped networks achieve highest robustness. I utilize data from Indian rural villages to provide empirical evidence for the disassortative feature of star-shaped networks. I study the different assortativity levels of household and individual networks of different functions.

Payoff-irrelevant Traits in Asymmetric Coordination Games

I study how traits that have no effect on payoffs change the long-run equilibria of asymmetric coordination games in an evolutionary setting. In particular, a 2-by-2 game is played by randomly matched pairs from a finite population, where each agent has one of 2 recognizable traits. The expansion and contraction of strategies are determined by a deterministic update rule based on relative payoffs while mutations are present. Without such traits, the long-run equilibrium is the one that satisfies risk dominance. When traits are not fixed, the set of long-run equilibria now becomes the set of Pareto efficient equilibria. Furthermore, in majority of these equilibria, a trait is completely absent and agents have different inter-trait and intra-trait strategies.