According to Palmer, in the objectivist (or, I might say, modernist) view of truth, there are objects out there that can be fully known as they actually are by experts.  Here, truth is a proposition.  In the process of discovering truth, experts study the objects, a process in which the experts do various things, but the objects are inert.  These objects really exist, and it is possible for the understanding the experts have in their heads of these objects to match up perfectly with those objects as they actually are.  These experts can then relay their knowledge of the truth about these objects to others.

Palmer doesn’t spend as much time talking about relativism, but it’s worth relating that model here.  In the relativist (or, I might say, post-modern) view of truth, truth doesn’t depend upon objects that are really out there.  Instead, truth relies solely upon what goes on inside the head or heads of the person or groups who knows something.  Here, truth is an experience or a belief.  Truth isn’t discovered, it’s constructed.  A person might study things or might talk about others about something, but what’s important is not what a thing is actually like or what other people say it’s like, but what each individual thinks a thing is like.  Because truth is inherently subjective, one can never really convey one’s understanding of truth to another.

The model of truth for which Parker advocates, he names the relational model of truth, or knowing in community.  In this model, the individual knower, the community, and the thing known all contribute to the formation of a set of relationships that defines truth.  This model does not say that truth is whatever a community defines it to be.  That’s just a less individualistic version of the relativist model.  Instead, truth is not an individual or group belief; it’s a relationship between the individual, the community, and the thing known.  The thing that’s known is an important and active part of the process that shapes and guides the path to truth.  Yet, there’s no assumption that we can know all there is to know about the thing “as it is” in a way which can be boiled down to a set of propositions.

I believe this relational view of truth represents the emerging view among what-comes-next.  It rejects the relativism of postmodernity without going back to the absolutism of modernity.  It acknowledges the reality of the things known while still recognizing the limitations of our knowledge and the ways in which personal and communal factors influence our understandings.  It focuses on community and relationships, which I think will be important parts of the ethos of what-comes-next.  Because of its focus on community and relationships, I think it also fits well with a dynamic understanding of truth.  I think what-comes-next needs to have some dynamic, creative force to it which isn’t just critical, as postmodernity has mainly been.  Yet a focus on community and relationship, while accounting for growth and change, is less oriented toward a particular understanding of the end goal of that change than modernity usually is.  I think what-comes-next needs to be more open to many possibilities for the future so that many people with diverse beliefs and values can buy into the system and all have a creative part to play.

Right now, I think Palmer’s view of truth is a minority.  But I don’t think Palmer is alone in putting forth such ideas.  Instead, I think he’s a sign of what’s to come in terms of how we may increasingly come to think about truth.

Now, many people might not draw a distinction between the two.  Merriam-Webster.com gives the following definitions of “pluralism”:

1: the holding of two or more offices or positions (as benefices) at the same time

2: the quality or state of being plural

3 a : a theory that there are more than one or more than two kinds of ultimate reality

b : a theory that reality is composed of a plurality of entities

4 a : a state of society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in and development of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common civilization

b : a concept, doctrine, or policy advocating this state

Definition 3a might sound a lot like relativism to some – it’s a denial of a single, universal, capital “T” truth, as is relativism (which Merriam-Webster defines as follows: “1 a : a theory that knowledge is relative to the limited nature of the mind and the conditions of knowing b : a view that ethical truths depend on the individuals and groups holding them”).  These two are not, however, the same – one says that there is more than one kind of ultimate reality, and the other says that each person defines her or his own ultimate reality.

It’s not really Merriam-Webster’s third definition that I want to defend or discuss, though – it’s the fourth.  This definition has two parts which fit perfectly with the two ways I wanted to talk about pluralism even before I went and looked up that definition.

On a first and most basic level, pluralism describes a state of society, without passing judgment on that state one way or another.  Pluralism at this level is a recognition that diversity exists – religious, ethnic, racial, gender orientation, and other types of diversity.  At this basic level, we can say that America is a pluralist society, and that’s a hard statement to argue with.  We could even further say that globalization increasingly knits us all together into an interconnected, pluralist, global world.  These are facts, not value judgments.  They may provoke value judgments and present certain challenges and opportunities for societies that call for critical evaluation, but that’s a second level of analysis.

Pluralism as a value can be a part of that second level analysis, though, and this is where Merriam-Webster’s definition 4b comes in.  This definition refers to “a concept, doctrine, or policy advocating” the state described in the paragraph above.  It seems to me that there are two versions of such a position: an active pluralism which seeks to encourage the creation of such a pluralist society and a passive pluralism which accepts the existence of such a pluralist society.  I’ll probably spend time later in this blog defending at least a passive pluralist position, but for now, I just want to draw the distinction between that and a relativist position.

Relativism is essentially about truth, ethics, and values.  Pluralism (in the 4b sense) is essentially about social relations.  Relativism says that each person or group of people defines their own truth, establishes their own ethics, and chooses their own values, and none of those truths, ethics, or values are inherently any more true, ethical, or valuable than any others.

Pluralism doesn’t really comment on the trueness of others’ truths, the ethicality of others’ ethics, or the valuableness of others’ values.  Even in the definition 3a sense, which says there’s more than one aspect to ultimate reality, doesn’t comment on the validity of others’ perceptions of ultimate reality.  And pluralism in the 4b sense isn’t about judging other’s truths, it’s about granting the legitimacy of their right to pursue those truths.

Indeed, there are reasons why you might think another person or group of people have missed out on some important aspect of the truth, but still think it very important that they be allowed to pursue their own understanding of the truth.  Ethics is a bit more tricky, since ethics impacts other people, and values can a bit, too, and part of pluralism is trying to create a system where all can live and let live.

Still, even if there is some negotiation around ethics or values, pluralism in general tries to leave people alone to pursue their own ends as long as they’re willing to play nice with others.  Part of playing nice with others for pluralism is not trying to coerce others into adopting your truths, values, and ethics, even if you think you’re right and the other party is wrong.  That live and let live attitude may be the same practical result as relativism, but it is reached by starting at a different philosophical standpoint.

Three caveats: 1. All of my answers for “what comes next” are just guesses.  Since it comes next, it’s only partially here now and thus hard to discern.  2. I’m using the definition of postmodernity from last week that sees it as a transitional period between modernity and what comes next (though the answers also draw on postmodernity as critique).  In many cases, there will be a lot of overlap between the answers for postmodernity and one of those other two periods.  3. The answers below are brief and therefore simplistic.  If you’d like to see me elaborate on a question, indicate that in the comments.

What are the important sources of authority?

Christendom: “Traditional”, hierarchical authorities such as kings, bishops, etc. along with tradition.  You do and believe what tradition or the authorities tell you to do and believe.

Modernity: Individual reason.  You do and believe what your own individual reason tells you to do and belief.

Postmodernity: Calls into question the universality of reason, but keeps the influence on the individual as the arbiter of authority.  You do and believe what you want to do and believe.

What comes next: I think the answer here is going to be communal norms.  You do and believe what those in your social reference group do and believe.

What are people like?

Christendom: People are part of a great hierarchy of being.  People are inherently sinful.  Individuals are less important than humanity as a whole.

Modernity: People share in universal human reason.  People are either good or perfectable.  Individuals have increasing worth.

Postmodernity: People are limited by their own context.  Individuals have ultimate worth and, to some extent, define their own realities.

What comes next: People are social beings and part of social networks.  Individuals have freedom to choose their networks, but are then shaped by those networks.

What is truth, and how do you know it?

Christendom: Truth is knowledge of the eternal and unchanging known through tradition and revelation.

Modernity: Truth is logical propositions about the laws of the universe known through reason and the senses (interpreted by reason).

Postmodernity: Truth is relative and known through cultural background and personal experience.

What comes next: Truth is understanding contexts correctly, known through individual selection of communities of reference and subsequent communal consensus (think Wikipedia or the birthers as instances of truth defined by communal consensus).

Who are theology’s important dialogue partners?

Christendom: Philosophy, to help recover truths that have already been known

Modernity: Physical sciences, to determine the true nature of the world through experience and reasoned reflection

Postmodernity: Cultural studies, to help identify cultural contexts shaping worldviews

What comes next: Social sciences, to make sense of human diversity and human connectivity

How should we read the Bible?

Christendom: Literally (to get the basic sense of the words), allegorically (to see what they have to say about the salvation narrative), tropologically (to derive moral lessons), and anagogically (to find what they say about the ultimate ends of life).

Modernity: As a collection of logical propositions that can be selected apart from context and arranged to create logical arguments on any topic, or as a collection of myths not literally true because they contradict experience, though imparting some deeper truth (depending on where you shake out theologically)

Postmodernity: As a collection of stories that we give meaning to based on the personal experiences and beliefs that we bring to the texts as readers

What comes next: It will be interesting to see – perhaps as a source for a shared set of languages and stories that help shape and define the Christian community