

EVAN J.D. GEE

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2013 (expected)

Dissertation Title: *Analyzing the Economic Effects of Net Neutrality Regulation*

Main Advisor: Michael Manove

Dissertation Committee: Michael Manove, Ingo Vogelsang, Albert Ma

B.A., Economics and Computer Science, Williams College, Williamstown MA, 2004

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory, Health

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2012

Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2012

Instructor, Modeling Business Decisions and Market Outcomes, School of Management, Boston University, Spring 2012

Instructor, Economic Statistics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2011

Head Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2011

Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2010

Teaching Fellow, EC101 and 102, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2007 to 2010

Teaching Assistant, Intro to Computer Science and Data Structures, Computer Science Department, Williams College, 2002 to 2004

WORK EXPERIENCE

Senior Consultant, International Business Machines Corp., Fairfax, VA, 2004 to 2006

- Aided in the design and creation of a micro-simulation model of the time and cost of complying with US tax law
- Helped design and execute a survey of thousands of taxpayers and then perform econometric analysis, matching, and forecasting
- Created a tool to estimate the complexity of various sections of the tax code by parsing the code itself as well as IRS forms and instructions.
- Extensive experience with proposal work

PUBLICATIONS

Bradburd, R., Sheppard, S., Engler E., and Gee, E. (2005) The Distributional Impact of Housing Discrimination in a Non-Walrasian Setting. *Journal of Housing Economics*. 14, 69-91, 2005.

WORKING PAPERS

“Examining Net Neutrality Regulations for Subscription-Based Content,” September 2012
“A Model of Net Neutrality with Competition and Congestion Sensitivity,” April 2012

WORK IN PROGRESS

Prioritizing Wireless Broadband: Competitive Edge or Cartel Enabler?
Examining the Health of Virtual Economies through Auction Data

COMPUTER SKILLS: JAVA, C/C++, STATA, SAS, SQL, HTML, Mathematica, LaTeX, Microsoft Office

OTHER: Ultimate Frisbee, Golf, Brewing, Travelling, Dog Training

CITIZENSHIP: American, Canadian

REFERENCES**Professor Michael Manove**

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EVAN J.D. GEE

Examining Net Neutrality Regulations for Subscription-Based Content

Previous investigations of the economic issues surrounding net neutrality have assumed that content providers on the Internet obtain their revenue solely via advertising. While some businesses need not obtain revenue from consumers directly, an enormous number rely on either direct sales or a subscription model. I use a Hotelling model of competition with congestion to explore how a direct connection between content providers and consumers might change the incentives for all involved. I show that while priority service can increase efficiency, if the Internet Service Provider can charge for priority it has a strong incentive to distort the content providers' market and little incentive to increase investment. As a result some kind of regulation is surely needed but strict net neutrality seems unjustified.

Modeling Net Neutrality with Congestion and Competition for Advertising Revenue

How we choose to route information on the Internet has strong implications for everything from content creation to investment in infrastructure. Of particular interest are the policies of so called last-mile Internet service providers who deal directly with consumers and are often near-monopolies in their geographic area. A number of these service providers have been lobbying for the ability to offer priority service directly to content providers, essentially charging a fee for preferred access to their consumers. Content providers who rely on advertising are particularly vulnerable to this kind of intervention because the quantity of traffic is directly proportional to their income and they have no other way to get to consumers. I use a Hotelling model of competition and an M/M/1 queuing model of traffic to explore how such prioritization might change the incentives for everyone involved.