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PEASANTS IN UNIFORM: THE TSARIST ARMY AS A PEASANT SOCIETY

A colonel in the Tsarist army by the name of A. Rittikh wrote in 1893 that service in the army turned ignorant peasants into civilized human beings. The peasant conscript's military career began "with a bath and a haircut," then proceeded to "cleanliness and neatness in dress." At the same time, conscripts were "taught to speak, look, turn and move with military precision." They learned new words and concepts. In sum, "the wholly rough-hewn and rude [peasant conscript] receives, in the broad sense of the word, a human finish."¹ This has a familiar ring. What Col. Rittikh thought of as the civilizing process we have lately called modernization, and it has been argued that service in the armed forces is one of the routes through which peasants in underdeveloped countries are modernized. To take just one example, Lerner and Robinson have observed that the Turkish army performed a modernizing function in the 1950's because for the army to absorb large quantities of sophisticated weaponry Turkish soldiers had to be educated in its use and maintenance. An important byproduct of this military schooling was that Turkish soldiers "acquired new habits of dress, of cleanliness, of teamwork. In the most profound sense, they acquired a new personality." The army became "a major agency of social change precisely because it spread . . . a new sense of identity — and new skills and concepts as well as new machines. Young Turks from isolated villages now suddenly felt themselves to be part of the larger society."²

It might be conceived that the Tsarist army played a similar modernizing role in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Following its defeat in the Crimean War, the Russian army under the leadership of Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin embarked on an ambitious program of reforms. One of Miliutin's many goals was to upgrade the army's weaponry, but because the change in weapons technology was undramatic by mid-20th century standards, the starting point for a modernization process cannot be located here. On the other hand, we might look for a similar ripple effect from the implementation of Miliutin's principal goal, the capstone of his reforms: the conversion of the Tsarist army from long-term (25 years) to short-term service (6 years as of 1874, reduced to 3 by 1906). One immediate consequence of reducing the conscript's term of service was that military training had to be greatly compressed: the leisurely development of military skills possible in the pre-reform army had to give way to more intensive instruction. To this end, Miliutin introduced compulsory schooling in the 3 R's for all conscripts, and for a time the Tsarist army became the single most important source of literacy for Russian peasants (25-30 percent of all males of draft age went into the army in the last quarter of the 19th century).³

Since the intended effect of all of the many military reforms introduced by Miliutin was to make the Tsarist army a more modern and more professionally competent institution, it is reasonable to ask how these reforms affected peasant conscripts. Was the Tsarist army a modernizing institution, did it instill the habits of discipline and regularity, a sense of abstract order, an openness to change, an orientation toward the future, and all those other traits we associate with modernity? Was service in the army at the least a qualitatively new experience for peasants, bringing them — even if against their will — into contact with a world beyond their villages?

It must be noted at the outset that after Miliutin's retirement in 1881 the army high command lost interest in educating soldiers, and many officers shared the feeling of their new chief, Vannovskii, that education was positively harmful. Junior officers who continued to think of themselves as educators were suspect and were occasionally ordered to cease teaching the rudiments of literacy to conscripts. While some peasants who came into the army with a semblance of literacy — reading newspapers rather than smoking them, as the saying went — did receive further instruction if they were chosen to be NCO's, the mass of peasant soldiers left the army no more literate than they had entered it.⁴

However, the lack of a program of formal education need not mean that the army failed to impart modern attitudes. The civilizing experience described by Col. Rittikh could proceed whether or not soldiers could read and write, and many officers shared Col. Rittikh's perception that military service in and of itself was an educational experience.⁵ At any rate, service in the army, with its formal hierarchy, its abstract rules and complex patterns of behavior, seems at first glance a world away from life in the village and might be presumed to have undermined the traditional mentality of peasant soldiers. Furthermore, in the late 19th century Dragomirov's precepts on training were gospel: soldiers were not simply to be drilled, they were to be made to internalize military discipline, to think about and understand the rationale behind the military system.⁶ We might add that it was precisely in this period — from the 1880's on — that the army became a predominantly urban institution. While before, many regiments had been scattered about the countryside and soldiers quartered in peasant huts, units were now concentrated in the cities and housed in proper barracks.⁷ Military society thus became more self-contained, while what extra-military experience soldiers had was now urban rather than rural.

The case for modernization by way of military service can be taken one step farther: the conscript's initial experience in the army was utterly unlike anything he had ever known. During the first four months of service the conscript was immersed in an intensive process of military socialization. It was during this period that the soldier was taught, none too gently, to "speak, look, turn and move with military precision," that he memorized the intricate grammar of the military hierarchy, and that he was catechized on the duties of a soldier and the military virtues. It was in this period, too, that soldiers were introduced to the complete spectrum of the Tsarist army's vices — beatings, extortion by non-coms, outright theft, and so on. Naturally enough, this was for the conscript a time of extreme disorientation, depression and homesickness; he frequently wasted away bodily, and occasionally maimed himself for the sake of a discharge.⁸ The severity of the psychological stress was proportionate to the abruptness of the transition from village to barracks. The conscript was well on the way to being modernized, or at least uprooted.

At that point, however, the modernizing process — if that is what it was — ended; of his initial military experience only the vices carried over in any mayor way to the remainder of the soldier's term of service. The case for socio-psychological modernization breaks down as soon as it becomes clear just how unmilitary life in the Tsarist army was. The soldier's duties, his *byt*, were functions of the economic rather than the properly military life of his unit. In fact, the Russian regiment's economic functions left little room for martial matters. Not only did the regiment cook its own food and bake its own bread; where possible it grew its own fruit and vegetables and even kept some cattle. The regiment produced its own uniforms and boots. (As of 1907, 150,000 soldiers — 12 percent of all enlisted personnel — spent their duty hours tailoring.) All regiments produced or otherwise provided for themselves — at no cost to the government — blankets, coats, *valenki*, utensils and other military accoutrement. Every regiment maintained a production complex — *masterskie* — staffed by soldiers permanently detailed to provide for its economic needs. However, soldiers from line companies as well did duty as tailors, cobblers, carpenters, carters, cooks, and gardeners. They also served as stable hands, singers, musicians, church attendants, batmen and lackeys in the officers' club. (If this incomplete list calls to mind the organization of a large estate before the emancipation, it should.) During the 8 or 9 months a regiment spent in its barracks, 40 or more of the 100-odd men in a company were performing these unsoldierly duties. Since most other soldiers were on guard duty or serving as duty orderlies, the total number of men free for the training that was called for in the regulations was low. One estimate put it at 1 or 2, rarely as many as 10. This figure is surely too low, but just as surely, after the first four months of intensive training, roughly half the strength of the company on any given day were on details that were in no way military, while most of the rest were simply standing guard. What military training a soldier received was episodic, and it is not difficult to believe a report that a Russian soldier's military skills deteriorated the longer he was in the army.⁹

The unsoldierly life of the Tsarist soldier was due above all to the fact that, once provided with some working capital by the commissariat, regiments were expected to be economically self-sufficient. However, the commissariat was stingy, and the regiment's capital was insufficient to provide for its needs. The only resource the regiment had in excess was labor, so in order to make good the deficit in material soldiers were dispatched to earn money in the civilian economy, a practice known as "*vol'nye raboty*." General Dragomirov observed that

In July enlisted personnel fan out in hay-mowing, in forests, along railway lines, in town for building; they sew clothing; they acquire an external aspect entirely unsuitable [for military service], they become unaccustomed to discipline and lose their military bearing.¹⁰

The soldiers' migratory labor was so obviously detrimental to the army's military mission that there was frequent discussion of ending the practice. Yet as one officer noted, his men needed blankets, the blankets had to be paid for, and the only recourse was to collect the money soldiers earned at their civilian work.¹¹ *Vol'nye raboty* were built into the military economy.

If the money earned through migratory labor balanced the regimental budget, it did not entirely balance the individual soldier's budget. Prior to 1906, soldiers were required to provide their own soap, spoons, boot brushes and polish, oil and rags for cleaning rifles, bed linen, shirts, in many instances blankets, and on and on. Equipment that was issued to the soldiers was so inadequate that considerable expense was involved in keeping it up to specifications. Army-issue boots, for

instance, were of such poor quality that they lasted no more than three months. Soldiers had either to purchase their own or pay for repairs — and repairs, even if performed by the company cobbler, could easily cost the soldier as much as four rubles a year — yet before 1906 soldiers were paid only 2r. 70k. a year. The soldier's minimum monthly budget ranged anywhere from 90k. to 1r. 74k. a year. However calculated, it far exceeded his monthly pay of 22½k. (raised to 50k. per month as of January 1906).¹² Soldiers were allowed to keep for themselves some of the money from their *vol'nye raboty*; roughly half the soldiers received money from home; and in addition soldiers sold part of their daily bread ration to civilians, this providing up to 30 extra kopeks per month.¹³ In any event, in addition to the regiment's involvement in the civilian economy, soldiers as individuals were also peripheral participants in the market.

It should be evident by now that as an economic entity the Tsarist regiment functioned in a way quite familiar to the peasant soldier. Like the peasant household and village, the Tsarist regiment aspired to self-sufficiency, but was bound up in a larger market system. Individual soldiers sold what surplus they had in order to cover the expense of maintaining their military household. But since the regiment's marketable surplus was meager, soldiers joined the migratory labor force and sent their earnings "home."

The similarity between the peasant and military economy extended to the seasonality of the military-economic cycle. Units set off for their summer encampments in early May. Field exercises — the most exhausting part of the yearly cycle — were over by the end of July or early August. At that point, soldiers who had completed their term were discharged from service, others were given home leave, and most of the rest went off in search of civilian work. The regiment withered from 1800 to roughly 300 men, with no more than 20 present in a company. Military duties were supposed to resume in mid-October, but with soldiers off doing one thing or another no start could be made until mid-November — at which point end-of-the-year holidays intervened. What training there was during the winter was confined to the four months between the new year and the onset of field exercises — but as we have seen, training was hardly regular even then.¹⁴ Not only was military life as cyclical as peasant life, the modulations of the two cycles were virtually identical.

Relations between officers and men, too, were congruent with the peasant experience. It was not just that officers thought of their men as the rude peasants they had been prior to service, though this was an important element of the overall pattern. Denikin remarked in 1903 that officers just could not conceive of their soldiers as fellow men.¹⁵ This attitude came through most clearly in the distinction officers drew between ordinary conscripts and the educated volunteers: striking a simple soldier was a matter of course, but it was unthinkable to strike a volunteer, who came from a social world much like the officer's own and might actually file charges. The simple soldier was quite aware of his inferior standing, which was entirely independent of his subordinate position in the military hierarchy. That he could be beaten was as natural to him as it was to his officer. Soldiers drew the line only at officers from other companies — their own officers could strike them, but the *barin* from another company who did so was violating the social proprieties.¹⁶

These attitudes were of course reminiscent of the master-serf relationship, but they were rooted more in the socio-economic reality of the unit than in tradition. The structure of which such attitudes were a part was most exposed to view in the *vol'nye raboty*. General Dragomirov commented that

so-called "civilian work" is in essence *forced labor*, with overtones of serfdom. Formerly the *pomeshchik* hired out his own peasants, now the military commander does the same . . . Such an application of authority sometimes leads to an individual who does not want to do civilian work being court-martialed.¹⁷

Another officer added that not only did *vol'nye raboty* "accustom the commander to view his men as serfs; from this it is not far to the use of soldiers as free labor."¹⁸ And indeed, officers employed their men not only to sustain the unit, but also for personal labor and other services. The attitude of officers toward the regimental shops was frankly proprietary: outfitting an apartment with new table, desk and curtains was as simple as issuing an order. Setting soldiers to constructing comfortable summer cottages at the regimental camp was just as easy. In Saratov in the early 20th century, one enterprising regimental commander ran a funeral procession business, employing in this enterprise the men and horses of his unit. Less imaginative officers merely used their men as household labor.¹⁹

Like peasants, soldiers were at the mercy of the strong of the world, and the world was one in which formal regulations against striking soldiers or exploiting them for economic gain — formal regulations of any kind — were irrelevant. Custom alone counted, and Tsarist military custom was weighted heavily against the soldier. Yet the soldier's peasant *persona* was more deeply rooted in military society than that. Even where regimental custom conformed to military regulations, the ordinary functioning of the unit recalled for the soldier the familiar peasant world. The officer was not just the soldier's military superior, he was simultaneously master of the unit's economy. If nothing else, this was a situation ripe for abuse. There was ample opportunity — indeed, necessity — for officers to divert money intended for provisioning soldiers to other needs of the unit, or to their own pockets. (To the soldier, of course, it made no difference whether money meant to purchase their food was gambled away by the company commander or was spent repairing barracks.) Furthermore, whether or not officers were in fact "stealing" from their men, they could be doing so, and it was impossible for soldiers to complain — because the officers' economic functions were vested in their authority as military superiors. This may seem a minor point. But if officers had had primarily military functions, if they had not controlled the finances for feeding and clothing their men, if they had not allocated their men to production duties, they would not automatically have been perceived to be living at the expense of the soldiers. (As one contemporary observer put it delicately, the fact that the officer's military and economic functions were indivisible undermined his moral authority.) As things stood, there was nothing more natural than for soldiers to view their officers as economic drones, or at least as competitors for scarce goods.²⁰ Certainly, officers alone were not responsible for this situation — in the military economy was in fact one of scarcity. Yet the socio-economic pattern that derived from the army's scarcity economy could only reinforce the prototypically peasant "image of limited good." Given the economic reality of peasant (and military) life, one man's gain was indeed another's loss. While this image was obviously congruent with the distribution of material goods, it also held — in the peasant's view — for the distribution of psychic goods.²¹ Since the image of limited good was fundamental to the peasant way of looking at the world and was reinforced by life in the army, it is scarcely credible that military service could have done much to reshape the peasant mentality.

Officers, then, employed their peasant soldiers to maintain the regimental estate and to benefit themselves, and if they did not, no matter — soldiers

suspected them of doing so. To complete the picture of the army as a peasant society, it remains only to consider the officer's role as outsider, a role that was, again, built into the daily routine of military life. The fact is that officers, junior officers included, spent very little time with their men. Much of their time was given over either to management and related paperwork, or to verification of the management of other officers. Officers sat on countless commissions that checked the books of the various economic subunits, revolving funds and permanent capital that made up the regimental economy. Officers were rated more for their proficiency as economic managers than for their ability to train and lead men — which, given the predominance of the regiment's economic functions, was logical enough. Little wonder, then, that the road to success lay through the company and regimental offices. It was there that junior officers came to the attention of their superiors, it was there that they could perform services genuinely useful to the regiment and its commander and could hope to reap a suitable reward. Whether or not their formal duties called for them to be in the offices, that was where they congregated at every opportunity. It was anyhow boring to spend time with soldiers, much more interesting to be involved in the social life centered on the offices. Little wonder, again, that a company commander's contact with his men was ordinarily limited to a cursory look-through (and that not every day), or that lieutenants — when forced into the barracks against their will — idled on the sidelines, smoking, gossiping and telling jokes.²² Lack of contact between officers and men was certainly detrimental to training, but then a regiment's economic functions had priority. Since the economic life of the unit was routine, only routine dispositions had to be made.

If officers were distant, periodically intrusive figures, who was in day-to-day charge of the men? Obviously, the NCO's. However, after the Miliutin reforms the Tsarist army had proportionately fewer long-term NCO's than any other European army, because few soldiers reenlisted after completing their appointed term. From the 1880's on, there were at most the company Sgt. Major and perhaps one or two long-term senior sergeants — but only perhaps. All the other non-com slots were filled by literate conscripts given some extra training, but only on the company roster could these be distinguished from privates. The Sgt. Major was certainly the most important authority with whom soldiers regularly came into contact, but he was the *only* authority with whom they were in regular contact. The Sgt. Major kept no closer track of the men under him than was necessary to satisfy the company commander, or alternatively grossly abused his authority because the company commander had so little knowledge of what went on in the unit.²³

Mostly, in fact, soldiers were left to themselves, the Sgt. Major merely maintaining a patina of proper military order and discipline. Since soldiers were more or less free to organize themselves, it is not at all surprising that they fell back on the type of social organization that Russian peasants away from their villages had employed for centuries, the *artel'*. (The recrudescence of familiar civilian patterns was made all the easier by the fact that most soldiers in a unit were, due to the recruiting system, *zemliaki* — *Landsleute* — often from the same or neighboring villages.) The company chose an *artel'shchik* who was responsible for purchasing food and sundry other of the soldiers' necessities with funds provided by the company commander, and it was the self-constituted soldier *artel'* that concluded contracts for *vol'nye raboty*.²⁴ It seemed so natural to the soldiers that they should manage their own affairs — because that was their experience as peasants, and because that was the norm in the army — that invariably the most

detested officers were those who actually attempted to supervise their men. It was the very principle of officer intrusion in the barracks that soldiers resented, not the results. It made no difference that units in which officers played an active supervisory role were the best clothed, the best shod and the best fed. Soldiers preferred — and performed best for — the officer who let his unit run itself, even if they suffered some privation in consequence.²⁵ In the soldiers' view, the officer's proper role was that of an outsider — the improving officer was as much resented as the improving landlord.

Yet the Tsarist officer was not simply an outsider, he was a mediating outsider, a necessary part of the soldier's world. Only he could provide the link between the relatively autonomous, unit-level soldier community and the larger military world. And like mediating outsiders in peasant society, the Tsarist officer combined in his person the roles of socio-political middle man, economic intermediary, intercessor, and patron.²⁶ In anthropological terms, the relationship between officer and soldier was multiplex rather than single-interest (i.e., specialized) — a distinction in modes of authority that has been called the watershed between traditional and modern society.²⁷

Other analogies can be found between peasant and military societies, but surely enough has been said to demonstrate that the Tsarist army was not a modernizing institution. In defiance of formal tables of organization and the prescriptions of training manuals, the soldier's socio-economic experience replicated that of peasant society, the similarity extending even to types of contact with the non-peasant (or non-military) world. Though the army had on paper a hierarchy of command and discipline that had no analogue in peasant society, in practice the pattern of officer-soldier relations was familiar — even if by the late 19th century it was somewhat archaic by civilian standards. The peasant remained a peasant even while in uniform.

This is not to say that service in the army had no impact on individual Russian peasants. The peasant soldier was, after all, stationed far from home and in an urban environment. Still, this sort of contact with the modern urban world was itself part of the Russian peasant's ordinary experience. Millions of peasants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were engaged in migratory seasonal labor (and had been for generations), and other millions were engaged in non-seasonal, but temporary, labor in the cities. Yet the urban setting had a muted impact on peasant migrants, because urban peasants had traditional social institutions that set them apart from the city proper.²⁸ If the urban peasant was in but not of the city, how much truer must this have been of the peasant soldier, whose urban experience was mediated by the peasant structure of his military unit? Whatever new experience came to the peasant soldier while in the army was being more efficiently acquired by other peasants in the civilian world. As all contemporaries reported, it was the returned peasant migrant who brought change to the village, not the ex-soldier.

In the final analysis, then, answering the question posed at the outset — was the Tsarist army a modernizing institution — does not contribute very much to our understanding of socio-cultural change in the Russian peasantry. It has, however, been a useful way to get at what a soldier's life in the Tsarist army was really like. This in turn throws some light on other aspects of Tsarist military experience, and suggests new approaches to some old issues. These can only be briefly adumbrated here.

We are in a better position, first, to understand the behavior of the Tsarist army during periods of civil turmoil. For instance, the mutinies of 1905 and 1906 exhibited similarities at a number of levels to contemporaneous peasant disturbances. Allowing for differences in the organizational framework within which they occurred, mutinies and peasant disturbances had a very similar internal dynamic — the way they started, and the way they worked themselves out. They coincided, too, in their timing (responding to the same external stimuli) and in their frequency curves (they peaked at roughly the same time both in 1905 and 1906). Finally, the ultimate objects of mutiny and peasant riot were similar. Given what we know of soldier society, it would be strange if it had been otherwise — yet the mutinies have ordinarily been treated as political demonstrations, or as responses to military conditions narrowly construed.²⁹

We may also be in a better position to understand the Russian soldier's performance in battle. Russian soldiers were renowned for their endurance and bravery — for their stolidity — but were also renowned for their lack of initiative and their tendency to deteriorate into a helpless herd as soon as their officers were put out of action.³⁰ The virtues of the Russian soldier were characteristic of peasant society. His defects, too, were rooted in peasant social organization, which was entirely inappropriate on the battlefield. A Tsarist military unit was cohesive so long as its officers were present — but a unit without officers had lost not just its appointed leaders, it had lost as well its intermediary to the world beyond the unit. On the battlefield, Russian soldiers without officers were not so much militarily as socially isolated. They had no sense of being part of an integrated military machine, nor could they have, since this was not their peacetime experience. Soldiers without officers had no more notion of how to comport themselves than would a Russian village suddenly materialized in the midst of a battle.

Finally, what has been said of soldier society suggests a number of ways to approach the Tsarist officer corps. In the final analysis, soldier society was what it was because officers permitted it to be so. Officer society was functionally complementary to soldier society, and not just in the way I suggested earlier; a more detailed analysis of this aspect of the officer corps would be well worth the while. It has, for instance, recently been suggested that many of the ills of the Tsarist army on the eve of World War I can be attributed to uncontrolled rivalry among cliques of generals (the generals' inability to coordinate their activities also made itself felt prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War), which negated otherwise beneficial military reforms.³² Clearly, rivalry between high-ranking cliques was only one of several end products of the functioning of the Tsarist military system. Furthermore, the reforms hastily enacted after the Russo-Japanese War failed not because of accidental personal rivalry, but because they were incompatible with the reality of the Tsarist army — they were obliterated by self-perpetuating (officer-perpetuated) military routine. And just as there was a connection between the soldiers' peacetime experience and battlefield performance, there must certainly have been such a connection for the officer corps. Indeed, a few military commentators after the Russo-Japanese War placed the blame for defeat squarely on habits acquired by officers in the course of their economic chores.³³ In any event, to appreciate properly the service habits of Tsarist officers in peace and war, we need a structural — if you will, an anthropological — analysis of the officer corps much like that offered here for enlisted personnel.

FOOTNOTES

1. A Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt v deistvitel'nosti i v mechtakh* (Spb., 1893), p. 20. Rittikh makes similar observations on pp. 38 and 263.
2. Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, (Oct. 1960), p. 32. Others who make much the same point are Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 80-84; James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," *ibid.*, pp. 396-98; Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago, 1977), pp. 156-8; W. Raymond Duncan, "Development Roles of the Military in Cuba: Modal Personality and Nation Building," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts* (Boulder, Col., 1978), pp. 77-121.
3. On the Tsarist army at the time of the Crimean War: John Shelton Curtiss, *The Army of Nicholas I, 1825-1855* (Durham, N.C., 1965). On Miliutin's reforms: P.A. Zaionchkovskii, *Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii* (M., 1952), and Forrest A. Miller, *Dmirii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia*, (Nashville, 1968). P.A. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii, 1881-1903* (M., 1973), pp. 116-17, provides figures on draftees.
4. Required instruction was dropped in the mid-1880's then restored, for the infantry alone, in 1902. Even when literacy instruction was required, however, it frequently — perhaps ordinarily — remained a dead letter. The officer in charge filled out and presented the proper forms during brigade inspection, and no one asked whether instruction had actually been provided. Ziaonchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia*, pp. 276-9; A. Gerua, *Posle voiny. O nashei armii* (Spb., 1907), pp. 54-5; *V tsarstve shtykov* (N. Novgorod, 1908), pp. 21-2; A.A. Ignatyev, *A Subaltern in Old Russia* (New York, 1944), p. 150; M. Grulev, *Zapiski generala-levreia* (Paris, 1930), pp. 112-13, 130-31; M. Grulev, *Zloby dnia v zhizni armii* ([Brest-Litovsk], 1911), pp. 76, 78, reports a lack of enthusiasm for educating soldiers even after the Russo-Japanese War. A.I. Denikin, *Put' russkogo ofitsera* (New York, 1953), p. 123, claims that at least after 1902 hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers did become literate while in the army, but the weight of the evidence is against him.
On the instruction provided in the *uchebnye roty* for future non-coms: A. Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 55-6; Col. Mamontov, "Sovremennoe polozhenie 'untr-ofitser'skogo voprosa' v Rossii i za granitseiu," *Obshchestvo revniteli voennykh znaniu*, kn. 4 (1906), p. 82.
5. W. Barnes Stevni, *The Russian Army from Within* (New York, 1914), pp. 35, 44, 47, reports this as the common sentiment among Russian officers. Other officers felt not so much that the Russian army was carrying out a civilizing mission as that it should be doing so: Captain Veselovskii, *K voprosu o vospitanii soldata* (Spb., 1900), p. 164; Mstislav Levitskii, *Vospitanie soldata* (Spb., 1911), p. 4 and passim; M. Galkin, *Novyi put' sovremennogo ofitsera* (M., 1906), pp. 19, 53-5.
6. Dragomirov's ideas on this subject are laid out in, *inter alia*, *Opyt rukovodstva dlia podgotovka k boiu* (many editions), especially Part I, and *Podgotovka voisk v mirnoe vremia* (Kiev, 1906). Both are reprinted in M.I. Dragomirov, *Izbrannye trudy. Voprosy vospitaniia i obuchenia* (M., 1956). Dragomirov's influence is remarked by German Miuller, "Moral'noe vospitanie voisk v Germanii, Rossii i Iaponii. Sravnitel'nyi etiid na osnovanii Russko-Iaponskoi voiny," *Voina i mir* (1907), no. 3, passim; A. Gerua, *Posle voiny*, pp. 73-4, 100-1; and by most other contemporary commentators.
7. In 1882, only 53.6 percent of the army was housed in regular barracks; by 1903, all field troops were quartered either in barracks or in private apartments under barrack conditions. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia*, pp. 270-1; Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 138-141.

8. Actually, the introduction of conscripts to the vices began before they arrived in their regiments, as they were subject to blatant extortion by non-coms who conveyed them from the induction centers (Gerua, *Posle voiny*, pp. 105-7). On the experience of the conscripts during their first four months of service, see *V tsarstve shtykov*, pp. 2-4, 7, 14; M. Zenchenko, *Obuchenie i vospitanie soldata* (Spb., 1902), pp. 71-85; Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 38-9, 42; B.v. Rechenberg-Linten, *Russische Soldaten und Offiziere aus der Zarenzeit. Nach Selbsterlebnissen in einer russischen Garnison* (Bern-Leipzig, 1924), pp. 8-9, 14-18; N.D. Butovskii, *Sbornik poslednykh statei* (Spb., 1910), pp. 128, 131.

On the high rate of sickness during the first four months, see N. Butovskii, *Nashi soldaty. (Tipy mirnogo i voennogo vremeni)* (Spb., 1893), pp. 10-11, 79, 145. M. Grulev, *Zloby dnia*, pp. 241-3, points out that much of the sickness was due to the fact that many draftees went into the army "under protest" — the list of medical exemptions did not cover them, but they were not really fit for service. Grulev estimates that as many as 10-15 percent of all draftees were discharged on medical grounds, often after hospitalization, soon after arriving in their units. N.N. Golovin, *The Russian Army in the World War* (New Haven, 1931), p. 22, also refers to the high proportion of draftees who arrived at their units "under protest."

The references to beatings, theft and extortion are innumerable, the only question being how prevalent they were in fact. Whatever the true incidence, it is clear that newly-arrived conscripts were the most vulnerable, but that all soldiers considered these phenomena a normal feature of military life.

9. Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 86-8; A. Gerua, *Posle voiny*, pp. 51-2, 65-6, 103, 107-8, 111; A.P. Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziaistve," *Obshchestvo revnitelei voennykh znanii*, kn. 1 (1906), pp. 109-11, 118; A.A. Ignatyev, *A Subaltern*, p. 75; Grulev, *Zloby dnia*, pp. 154, 229; A.M. Volgin, *Ob armii* (Spb., 1908) pp. 114-16. A.I. Denikin, *Staraia armia v. I* (Paris, 1929), p. 93, explicitly compares the running of a regiment at the turn of the century — especially in the interior — to running a *pomest'e*.

10. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia*, pp. 272-3.

11. *Razvedchik*, no. 539, 13 Feb. 1901. The sources on this curious practice are numerous, for it was widely discussed in the military press at the turn of the century. See John Bushnell, "Mutineers and Revolutionaries. Military Revolution in Russia, 1905-1907," Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1977, pp. 18-20 and notes. In addition: Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, p. 52; M. Grulev, *Zapiski*, p. 93. *Vol'nye raboty* were finally suppressed in 1906: *Razvedchik*, no. 796, 29 Jan. 1906.

12. The two budgets (others were offered as well) are in R. Maksheev, "Zhalovan'e i pensii nizhnym chinam," *Intendantskii zhurnal*, 1903, no. 5, pp. 44-7; *Razvedchik*, no. 565, 14 Aug. 1901. On the items soldiers had to provide for themselves, and the cost involved in maintaining uniforms and, especially, boots in required order, see Bushnell, "Mutineers," pp. 16-18. In addition, see Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziaistve," pp. 105, 107. On the increase in pay and the December 1905 increase in equipment issued to soldiers: "Ulushenie byta nizhnikh chinov," *Russkii invalid*, no. 255, 6 Dec. 1905.

13. Bushnell, "Mutineers," p. 18; Ignatyev, *A Subaltern*, pp. 146-7; Steveni, *Russian Army*, pp. 65-6; Grulev, *Zapiski*, p. 94; Denikin, *Put'*, p. 120; Rechenberg-Linten, *Russische Soldaten*, p. 16.

14. The seasonal cycle is laid out in the most detail by Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 44-7, 54, 100, 143, 146, 153. No other source offers contrary evidence. Grulev, *Zloby dnia*, comes up with a figure of 25-30 in a company after summer camp even after the *vol'nye raboty* had been abolished — the rest were detailed to other duties temporarily.

15. A. Denikin, "Soldatskii byt," *Razvedchik*, no. 661, 24 June 1903. On the inferior social status of Tsarist soldiers in general, see Bushnell, "Mutineers," pp. 21-3.

16. *Golos iz russkoi armii. Rzaoblacheniia* (Berlin, 1902), pp. 44, 62, provides direct soldier testimony on this point. The known behavior pattern in the army — frequent striking of soldiers and the soldiers' acceptance of same — is at least circumstantial evidence.
17. *Russkii invalid*, no. 235, 28 Oct. 1900.
18. "Eshche o vol'nykh rabotakh," *Varshavskii voennyi zhurnal*, 1902, no. 1.
19. N.D. Butovskii, *Stat'i na sovremennye voprosy* (Spb., 1907), pp. 62, 64; Grulev, *Zloby dnia*, pp. 228-9, 237-8; Denikin, *Staraia armia*, v. 1, p. 93.
20. Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziastve," pp. 111-12, 122.
21. George Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist* 67 (1965), no. 2, pp. 293-315.
22. Veselovskii, *K voprosu*, p. 12; Gerua, *Posle voiny*, pp. 47-51, 54, 118; Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziaistve," pp. 97, 112-18; Zenchenko, *Obuchenie*, pp. 59-63; Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, p. 75; Galkin, *Novy put'*, pp. 49-52; Rechenberg-Linten, *Russishche Soldaten*, pp. 13-22; Butovskii, *Sbornik*, pp. 63-70, 120-22; Grulev, *Zloby dnia*, 54, 57-8, 155-7. There was little contact between officers and men even during guard duty, because the officers and men on guard detail came from different units: Levitskii, *Vospitanie*, p. 10. Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," *California Slavic Studies* 7, (1973), pp. 129, 133-34, notes that a disproportionate number of Tsarist officers were assigned to staff work, while the ratio between officers (including staff officers) and men was the lowest of any major European army.
23. Ignatyev, *A Subaltern*, p. 85; *V tsarstve shtykov*, p. 8; Grulev, *Zapiski*, pp. 92, 94, 98, 133; Zenchenko, *Obuchenie*, p. 59; *Golos iz russkoi armii*, pp. 4-5; Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 48-9; Mamontov, "Sovremennoe polozhenie 'untr-ofitser'skogo voprosa'," pp. 97, 101; K.V., "Sravnenie nashikh uslovii obuchenii soldata s zagranichnymi," *Russkii invalid*, no. 154, 20 July 1905; P. Sagat-skii, "K unter-ofitser'skomu voprosu," *Razvedchik*, no. 821, 18 July 1906; Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia*, pp. 120-23; Butovskii, *Stat'i*, p. 25; Golovin, *Russian Army*, p. 29.
24. *V tsarstve shtykov*, p. 13; Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziastve," p. 110; Rittikh, *Russkii voennyi byt*, pp. 51-2; Gerua, *Posle voiny*, pp. 86, 88; Bushnell, "Mutineers," pp. 20-21.
25. *V tsarstve shtykov*, pp. 23-4. There is some indication that the "improving officer" was more common after 1905 than before, and that the soldiers' perception of the proper role of their officers may gradually have been changing. But the change could only have been gradual, because the bulk of the Tsarist officers were still immersed in office paperwork.
26. On the officer's role as patron (in providing special treats out of his own pocket, helping out soldiers in time of need, and so on), see Ignatyev, *A Subaltern*, pp. 86-7, 89, 144; B.V. Gerua, *Vospominaniia o moei zhizni*, 1 (Paris, 1969), p. 58. The patron role was filled most often in the Guards, where officers were independently wealthy. It may well be that where soldiers felt that the patron role was being adequately filled they were more likely to be loyal to their officers; this may have been one of the reasons why some units did not mutiny during the epidemic of mutinies in late 1905. See Bushnell, "Mutineers," pp. 95-7 (the evidence is therein presented, but the point is not stated in the same terms).
27. E.G. Bailey, "The Peasant View of the Bad Life," *The Advancement of Science*, 23 (Dec. 1966), p. 401.

28. There is a nice discussion of the peasant's place in the city in Joseph Crane Bradley, Jr., "Muzhik and Muscovite: Peasants in Late Nineteenth-Century Urban Russia," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1977, pp. 98-117, 170-73, and passim.
29. Bushnell, "Mutineers," pp. 68-97, 145-52, 295-343, discusses the mutinies of 1905 and 1906, though not quite in the same terms (the peasant analogy is suggested, but not developed).
30. Representative comments from the late 19th and early 20th centuries: "Report of Captain Carl Reichman," in U.S. War Department, General Staff G-2, *Reports of Military Observers attached to the Armies in Manchuria*, Part I, 1906, p. 244; F.V. Greene, *Sketches of Army Life in Russia* (New York, 1880), pp. 24-5, 124-5; Steveni, *Russian Army*, p. 50; Grulev, *Zloby dnia*, pp. 55, 85.
31. Veselovskii, *K voprosu o vospitanii*, pp. 7-10, does an intelligent job in deriving the Russian soldier's martial virtues from his peasant background.
32. Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front 1914-1917* (New York, 1975), pp. 17-35; W. Thomas Wilfong, "Rebuilding the Russian Army, 1905-1914: The Question of a Comprehensive Plan for National Defense," Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1977, pp. 170, 174-5.
33. Gerua, *Posle voiny*, 50, 57, 61, 332; Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziastve," p. 97.