Resorting to International Institutions to Resolve Trade Imbalances?

U.S. Protectionism via GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation

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Overview

- The Puzzle
 - Variance
 - System
 - Responses
- Previous Studies in IPE and Related Fields
 - Macroeconomics
 - Econometrics
 - IPE
- Significance of Trade Imbalances
 - Private Interests
 - Domestic Level
 - International Level
- Quantitative Analysis



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The Puzzle Variance, System, and Responses

- Variance: To what extent do U.S. trade deficits with its trading partners affect its decisions to launch a protectionist trade policy in international institutional settings?
- System: Most importantly, in the U.S., what are the root mechanisms and roles of government related actors and interest groups, which culminate in filing a case for dispute in the WTO?
- Responses: Furthermore, what are the responses from mainly targeted states (for instance, Northeast Asian nations) in the array of continued policy attacks in the WTO by the U.S. – are they acquiescing, reciprocal, or even retaliatory?



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Literature Review on Trade Imbalances Macroeconomics, Econometrics, and IPE

- Macroeconomic Literature: 'Trade imbalances do not necessarily impact the dynamics of domestic politics. U.S. deficits are complemented by trade surplus generated with other trading partners.' (Cooper, 2008)
- Econometric Literature: 'The U.S. has spearheaded free trade and liberalization but also in tandem with the push for protectionism against Northeast Asian states.' (Chiu et al, 2010)
- IPE Literature: 'Countries that have appreciated their exchange rates are more likely to pursue a WTO dispute settlement case.' (Pevehouse, 2010)



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
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Trade Imbalances Influence WTO Dispute Initiation U.S. Trade Deficits, Mobilization of Interests, and Decision-Making Process

Measuring Trade Imbalances

- U.S. Trade Deficits = (X M)
- Private Interests: Domestic Industrial Losses → Firms' Lobbies to Local Congressional Representatives and Congressional Committees
- Domestic Level: Political Decision-Making → Congress Reports to the USTR and Presidential Executive Orders on Bilateral Economic Relations
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The Hypothesis and the Dependent Variable

 H_1 : The United States is more likely to initiate a WTO dispute case against countries that it runs trade deficits with.

Dependent Variable: The Numbers of a U.S. WTO Dispute Initiation

Alternative Hypotheses

'If not for trade imbalances, why would the United States pursue protectionist policies?'

- Unfair and incompatible trade practices by trading partners
- Pursuit of control in bilateral relations
- Specific U.S. domestic agenda

Explanations to Alternative Hypotheses

Had the U.S. been running a huge trade surplus with a certain trading partner:

- Oomestic industrial concerns would not lead to considerable burdens on economic policy.
- The U.S. is highly unlikely to be confrontational towards a country of strategic importance (in the absence of trade deficits), unless there is a credible military threat involved.

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The Structure of the Dataset

Pooled Cross-Sectional Panel Data

- Multiple countries, comprising of events occurring in a span of time (1995-2010)
- Unit of Analysis: Country-Year
 - Dependent Variable: Number of disputes initiated by the U.S. against a country in a given year

U.S. Disputes with 29 States for Data Analysis

 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Germany, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Venezuela

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Data Sources

- Dispute Settlement Cases: The World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Database (http://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm)
- U.S. Trade Deficits Figures: Bureau of Economic Analysis(BEA) Data, U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis International Transactions Database (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm)
- U.S.Congressional Hearings and Legislative History Data: Lexis Nexis Congressional Universe (http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp)

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The Negative Binomial Regression Model

```
USWTO complaint_{it} = \beta_0
+ \beta_1 Trade Imbalances/GDP_{it}
+ \beta_2 ForeignExchangeReservesAccumulation_{it}
+ \beta_3 USUnemploymentRate_t
+ \beta_4 USCongressional Hearing for WTO Disputes Initiation_t
+ \beta_5 USProtectionistLegislation_t
+ Year effects_t
+\varepsilon_{it}
```

Variables

where

- USWTO complaint_{it} = the number of cases that the US filed a complaint to the WTO (dispute initiation)
- β_1 Trade Imbalances/GDP_{it} = Trade Imbalances (Exports-Imports) of each US trading partner who is a party to the WTO divided by its GDP (Current US Dollars)
- β₂ ForeignExchangeReservesAccumulation_{it} = Foreign Exchange Reserves Accumulation of each US trading partner who is a party to the WTO
- β_3 USUnemploymentRate_t = Unemployment Rate of the United States for each respective year
- β_4 USCongressional Hearing for WTO Disputes Initiation_t = US Congressional Hearing regarding trade deficit (imbalances)
- β_5 USProtectionistLegislation_t = US Protectionist Legislation



Results

Model 1

-0.014***

USWTOrespondent

TradeImbala

LogForeignR

USCongressH

USLegislative

USHouseSen

USUnemplo

Constant

Inalpha

Pseudo R-Sq

_cons

b/se

0.079

-0.11

0.08

-0.37

0.378

-0.47

0.161

-0.18

-0.17

-2.93

-2.96

-44.951

0.1751866

-0.414*

Model 2

0.391***

-0.11

0.076

-0.52

0.35

-0.64

0.146

-0.463*

-9.850**

-27.575

0.1516329

-0.2

-0.21

-3.2

b/se

Model 3

-0.017***

b/se

0.746

-1.778

0.610*

-0.99

-0.27

0.716

-0.49

-4.4

-0.21

-9.054*

-16.675***

0.1872759

-0.6

Model 4

 $-0.0\overline{14^{***}}$

0.079

-0.11

0.636

-1.62

0.109

-0.35

-0.66

-0.546

-2.001

-39.002

0.1751866

-4.01

b/se

Model 5

-0.014***

b/se

0.079

-0.11

0.196

0.236

-0.16

-0.219

-4.292

-72.471

0.1751866

-0.27

-3.94

-0.5

Model 6

-0.014***

0.079

-0.11

-0.17

-0.55

1.187

-0.83

-0.83

-0.52

-0.016

-4.53

-231.298

0.1751866

b/se

Model 7

b/se

-0.014***

n

0.079

-0.11

0.328

-0.425

-0.53

0.32

-0.2

-5.826

-50.895

0.1751866

-3.08

-0.4

Three Qualitative Case Studies.

Example

U.S.-Japan Trade Imbalances

Example

U.S.-Korea Trade Imbalances

Example

U.S.-China Trade Imbalances

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U.S.-China Trade Imbalances

Summary

- The accumulation of U.S. trade deficits influence the initiation of WTO dispute settlement cases.
- The NBRM model shows the significance of the trade deficits variable, but falls short in proving the relevance of variables in U.S. political decision making processes.
- Future Research and Revisions
 - Regressions on Anti-Dumping Cases and Countervailing Duties (Ch.2)
 - Respective Qualitative Case Studies on U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea, and U.S.-China Disputes (Ch.3)

