

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Manjari Chatterjee Miller

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Re-collecting Empire: "Victimhood" and the 1962 Sino-Indian War

MANJARI CHATTERJEE MILLER

Abstract: *As rising powers, India and China are critical to regional and global stability in the twenty-first century. While most analyses of their behavior emphasize their material capabilities as an explanatory variable, this article takes into greater account the role of the past. This involves how they both operate under a "post-imperial ideology" (PII), an emphasis on colonial trauma and "victimhood," exemplified in their still unresolved territorial dispute. Using new documents, this article shows how PII led to the breakdown of the negotiations between the two sides and war in 1962. PII not only suggests a new way to think about two important rising powers today, China and India, it also offers a new way to think about states in the international system.*

Introduction

Analysts agree that the foreign policy choices of India and China will be a critical determinant of regional and global stability in the twenty-first century. The ready classification of these countries as rising powers has meant that their foreign policies are usually analyzed in terms of their present and future material capabilities. This article suggests a different approach – an approach that takes into greater account the role of the past. It is proposed that countries like India and China, which have very different experiences of colonialism, operate under a "post-imperial ideology" (PII) that is characterized by a similar strong sense of colonial trauma. Their foreign policies are often driven by a desire to be acknowledged as a victim in the international system. This desire in turn determines their approach to two goals, maximizing territorial sovereignty and maximizing status.

In order to demonstrate the explanatory potential of PII for the policy choices of countries like China and India, this article focuses on an important, and as yet unresolved, territorial dispute in which both countries were involved – the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China in January 2008 underscored the fact that this remains an extremely sensitive issue defining the subtly pugnacious relations between the two countries – convergence on other issues of common interest could only be achieved by an agreement by both governments to

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Address correspondence to: Manjari Chatterjee Miller, 523 Leverett Mail Center, 28 DeWolfe St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. E-mail: mchatter@fas.harvard.edu

temporarily set aside the territorial dispute. The dominant explanation of the dispute sees it as a result of a quest to maximize state security that resulted in a turf battle. This approach has meant, however, that certain aspects of the conflict have either been substantially underexplained or gone unacknowledged. Why did India adopt an aggressive military policy when its military was in virtual shambles? Why did China (much to the shock of the international community) declare an abrupt ceasefire and withdraw, when it could easily have militarily occupied the disputed territories?

The theory of PII explains these seemingly anomalous outcomes.[1] Drawing on previously unknown documents, discovered in the private Nehru Memorial Library Archives,[2] this article demonstrates how PII and its dominant goal of establishing victimhood, driving the goals of status and territory maximization, led to the breakdown of the last talks between the two sides before war broke out in 1962.[3]

In doing so, it introduces a new theoretical framework for the analysis of the behavior of a large number of states, irrespective of power structure or regime type – states that have experienced colonialism. PII fills a gap in the international relations (IR) literature by emphasizing the importance of history, specifically colonial history as both, a causal variable and as a method of categorizing states. PII thus not only suggests a new way to think about two important rising powers today, China and India, for whom the discourse of victimhood is still very much in play; it also offers a new way to think about states in the international system.

The Sino-Indian Conflict and Alternative Explanations

The Sino-Indian border conflict began to escalate in 1959, and full scale war broke out between the two nations between September and November 1962. At stake were two undemarcated frontier territories. One was the western sector involving the plateau of Aksai Chin on the western side of the India-China border. The Aksai Chin plateau is bordered on three sides by Ladakh (part of Indian-controlled Kashmir), Tibet, and Xinjiang. The other area of conflict was the eastern sector or the Northeast Frontier Agency on the eastern side of the India-China border near Burma. This sector was north of the state of Assam and comprised the Assam Himalaya region and its foothills.[4] The Indian government claimed that the boundaries they had outlined in their maps in the eastern (McMahon line) and western (Ardagh-Johnson line including Aksai Chin) sectors were the recognized and permanent borders; and China claimed that the eastern sector was undemarcated and the McMahon line was illegitimate while the western sector had never been in dispute at all and the Aksai Chin plateau was a historical part of China (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).

Because the 1962 war was a conflict over territory between two regional powers, explanations for the conflict have focused on perceived threats, internal and external, to state security.[5] Theorists, focusing on variables such as beliefs of policy makers and domestic politics, frame their explanations within the context of state security.[6] If security were the dominant concern,[7] however, any one of three actions would have been more reasonable than those actually taken.

First, rather than undertake extremely risky military action, India should have adopted a conciliatory position during and after the 1960 negotiations. The Indian military was in shambles after partition in 1947. The erstwhile British army had been

FIGURE 1
THE WESTERN SECTOR.



Note: Map also available at http://www.lib.texas.edu/maps/india.html

FIGURE 2
THE EASTERN SECTOR.



Note: Map also available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/india.html

divided between India and Pakistan. After independence, only minimal finances were diverted to the military – Indian troops lacked both equipment and training. Moreover, the army was stretched thin by commitments to the United Nations in Gaza and the Congo, as well as its internal efforts to control Naga rebels.[8] The glaring truth was that India was in no position to conduct war with a neighbor that had emerged victorious from the Korean War and was on its way to becoming a nuclear power. As the new documents make clear, the 1960 negotiations offered India a way out – Zhou hinted that China would be willing to recognize the McMahon line if India accepted the Chinese claim to Aksai Chin. Yet India, led by Nehru, stood by its claim on both territories – swaths of almost-uninhabited land not particularly rich in natural resources – and undertook the disastrous Forward Policy after negotiations failed.

Second, had security concerns been paramount, China would not have offered the trade between the eastern and western sectors. The McMahon line was a boundary that had never been ratified by a Chinese government and that China considered illegal; yet Zhou made clear to Nehru during the negotiations that the Chinese were prepared to accept the status quo in the eastern sector if India accepted the status quo in the western sector. Fravel asserts that in fact Zhou was offering a compromise in order to focus on consolidating Chinese authority in Tibet.[9] But the territories in both the eastern and western sectors border Tibet; if maximizing authority over Tibet were the sole concern, both pieces of territory should have been vitally important to the Chinese. Both are well located and fortified with natural barriers – the barren plateau of Aksai Chin and the high Himalayas in the east. Moreover as Whiting remarks, "India's miniscule military strength along the border . . . could hardly be viewed as a strategic threat to China."[10] And indeed the Chinese were perfectly aware of India's limited military capabilities. As China in fact showed when it decisively struck a blow against the Indian military in 1962, it would have been very easy for it to occupy both the disputed territories adjoining Tibet and secure its borders.

Third, were future security the primary issue, China would not have declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal in 1962. China's announcement on November 21, 1962 – after having made significant and decisive inroads into Indian territory and having routed the Indian military – that its army would cease fire and withdraw its troops over the next ten days astonished the international community. Moreover, from a security perspective the decision was unreasonable for a powerful state undertaking an enormously successful military campaign. Even if the entire purpose of the strike had been punitive, as some theorists have proposed, during withdrawal, it would have been to China's strategic interests to occupy the entire disputed area of the eastern sector and seize the opportunity to obliterate the "illegal" McMahon line. By doing so, China would have been occupying what it had always claimed as Chinese territory, rejecting a boundary line that had never been ratified by any Chinese government and securing a strategic mountainous terrain bordering Tibet. In the western sector, which was clearly crucial for them vis-à-vis Tibet, they not only withdrew their troops, but they went so far as to withdraw them beyond the line of control rather than to it. Clearly they had nothing to fear in terms of a protracted campaign from the weak Indian military.

Also, in addition to these actions, was the fact that a conflict between India and China broke out in the unlikely year of 1962. Not only was India's military in a weak

position, but international and domestic circumstances were hardly propitious for China. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 had devastated the economy and thrown Chinese society into upheaval. More significantly, the Sino-Soviet relationship was deteriorating rapidly. Khrushchev withdrew Soviet aid to China in 1960, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) indicated strong disapproval of a conflict with India. Whiting postulates that the combination of the Great Leap Forward and the perceived threat from the United States and Taiwan compelled China to take action against India, but he does not consider the worsening Sino-Soviet relationship and the logic of balance of power politics. Theories of great power politics dictate that in a bipolar world China should have taken care to not further isolate itself from the USSR. Yet by embarking on a conflict with India in the middle of a deteriorating relationship with its superpower ally (a conflict in which the ally had indicated that it would not support China) in addition to external threats from the United States, China took an enormous and irrational security risk.

Post-Imperial Ideology

Although the Sino-Indian conflict seems a classic case of competing strategic interests, explainable as realist concerns for future security, I suggest that the apparently anomalous events in the conflict can be explained only by a framework that takes into account the effects of past "wrongs" – the framework I am calling "post-imperial ideology."

"PII[11] refers to a set of dominant and subordinate national goals that emerged in the erstwhile-colonized countries due to the transformative historical event of imperialism and colonialism. PII is composed of three national goals – the dominant goal is victimhood. The goal of victimhood dominates the calculus of decision-making in two ways. First, these countries desire to be internationally acknowledged or sympathized with as victims, and second, they have a corresponding sense of entitlement because of past suffering. The dominant goal of victimhood drives the two subordinate goals of territorial sovereignty, or the desire to maintain traditional boundaries and recover lost territory believed to have been tampered with by colonialism, and status, or the desire to gain prestige and recover lost glory in international society. Before I describe the goals of PII and how PII applies to India and China, two countries with very different experiences of colonialism, I offer a theoretical framework which emphasizes the importance of history, specifically colonial history, as a causal variable and as a method of categorizing states that fills a gap in the IR literature.

History Matters: The Significance of Colonialism

I define a transformative historical event as an event which can either lead to the creation of a new state or can reshape an existing state by altering key political and military institutions, and the ideology thereof, that are intrinsic to the state. A transformative historical event is usually a negative experience – by this, I mean that its occurrence implies the infliction of a collective trauma. The demise of imperialism and colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s was such an event.

Imperialism and colonialism are terms that are often used interchangeably. The concept of imperialism has been elaborately defined by writers – from Hobson and Lenin who viewed it as a metropolitan initiative driven by the profit motive to Doyle

who termed it "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society (that) can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence."[12] Colonialism, a more difficult concept, is seen as a subset or outcome of imperialism.[13] My theory refers to the transformative historical event of modern "imperialism and colonialism" taken together as a whole.

It encapsulates the broader boundaries of imperialism encompassing countries such as China or the Latin Americas that had atypical experiences of colonialism, along with the specific elements of colonialism, such as political dominance, economic exploitation, denial of rights, and suppression of cultural and ethnic pride, that had striking resonance for all of these countries. As such, it is concerned with extractive colonialism rather than settler colonialism. Extractive colonialism refers to the distinction made between two different types of colonial policies – those that created extractive colonies like those in most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and those that led to settler colonies like the United States or New Zealand. The former is defined by the "extractive states" set up by the colonizing power(s) whose purpose was to shift as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer, and the latter is defined by the colonies settled by immigrants from the colonizing power.[14] The wave of decolonization in the twentieth century brought about the demise of this phenomenon.

The demise of extractive colonialism was directly linked with a radical change in the normative structure of the international system.[15] The colonial system was severely criticized and, as Jackson puts it, "lost its moral force" in the face of the ascendant "normative idea of self-determination,"[16] according to which it was unacceptable for states to keep colonies because it was "wrong to deny nations and individuals political self-determination".[17] Not only was independence now a basic right, but colonialism was "an absolute wrong" – "an injury to the dignity and autonomy of those peoples and a vehicle for their economic exploitation and political oppression."[18]

Today this sentiment is accepted as intuitively right and proper but in the mid-twentieth century, it was an explosively radical idea. It overturned the established notions of rights to sovereign statehood, international legitimacy, and the "responsibilities" of "civilized" states.[19] The countries that had experienced the colonial yoke burst upon the international system in a new avatar with sometimes hotly contested post-imperial boundaries, anticolonial nationalism, and a burning desire to regain a sense of worth and make a mark in the new order. Thus, these newly independent ex-colonies, shaped by their colonial past and their struggle to gain the moral right to self-determination, in a world for which that right had become a primary value, had a fundamentally different outlook on the international system.

This outlook was a direct product of anti-imperial and anticolonial mass nationalism which at its core laid great stress on the sufferings and injuries of the past and the search for redress. As nations that had undergone the trauma of imperialism and colonialism, they, even after decolonization, continued to give the utmost importance to the wrongs they had suffered and the quest for restitution. I term this outlook PII.

The dominant goal of victimhood that distinguishes PII was informed by the anticolonial national beliefs that were a response to the transformative historical event of colonialism. PII states intensely believe they have suffered politically, economically,

socially, and culturally at the hands of colonial powers and seek acknowledgement of this by international society. Moreover, there is a sense of entitlement and recovery because of that suffering.

Due to the "negative" nature of the transformative historical event of colonialism – because it is seen as a traumatic experience – PII is also "negative;" hence the dominant goal of PII is the victimhood syndrome or the desire to be recognized as and empathized with as a victim. One may question why the overcoming of a trauma leads to a negative ideology of victimhood rather than a positive ideology of triumphalism –colonialism was, after all, vanquished by powerful nationalist movements. However, psychologists have shown evidence for the emergence of "negative" identities/ideologies especially after trauma.

Erik Erikson suggested, for example, that there is a connection between the development of society and societal institutions and the development of an individual. He theorized that a lack of trustworthy and stable societal institutions halts individuals' development and sends them off on a course more pathological than a normal progression. Moreover, it gives birth to "negative identity" rather than positive identity.[20] It is possible to extrapolate from Erikson's work that lack of "just" institutions and the economic and political exploitation that, for anticolonial nationalists, were key features of colonialism would lead to a negative ideology of victimhood rather than a positive ideology of triumphalism.

The goal of victimhood drives the two other goals of maximizing territorial sovereignty and maximizing status. While many states attach importance to territorial sovereignty and status, states with PII are sensitive to these goals in a distinctive way. Since colonialism was a regime that, in Jackson's words, "codified and reflected the colonizers' belief in the inferior status of the conquered,"[21] PII has a strong undercurrent of a consciousness of humiliation and exploitation, a sense of entitlement, and a striving to regain worth. Not only are concerns about territorial sovereignty or status intricately tied to memories of humiliation and victimization, states with PII often make decisions about territorial sovereignty and status that go against traditional security calculations because of their overwhelming desire to either maintain borders or regain "lost" territories that they believe were intruded upon by colonialism, and to gain prestige and save face.

Collective memory is central to the concept of PII. It is after all the intense memory of the transformative historical event that informed anticolonial national beliefs and ensured the continuation of PII. There is ample work in the psychology literature that details the importance of individual memory, collective memory, and intergenerational transmission. Both implicit ("memory without awareness") and explicit memory ("conscious recollection")[22] are crucial for understanding how and where the past influences the present. Researchers have assumed the importance of memories to individuals a step further and applied it to the collective psyche. For example, by examining Soviet-educated and post-Soviet subjects' accounts of World War II, it has been shown that their perspective is distinct from the usual perspectives held by people from other countries.[23]

One may claim that a distinction needs to be drawn between history and collective memory – a distinction between objective versus subjective representations of the past.

The collective memory approach is naturally subjective as it is not possible to have a unified, detailed, and universally accepted version of events.[24] Rather, it is drawn from "the 'stock of stories' that exist in (our) socio-cultural context," and its function is to provide a "usable past."[25] However, the dilemma of objectivity versus subjectivity does not alter the basic concept of PII. The transformative historical event of colonialism generated PII – whether, more specifically, PII is drawn from the actual facts of the historical event or the domestic interpretation of the facts of the historical event is an interesting question but does not change the fundamental reality that it was generated. Thus, PII emerged from the transformative historical event of colonialism in India. Whether PII is specifically drawn from a particular event associated with the demise (for example, the partition of India and the bloodbath that followed) or from the colonial narrative associated with the demise (for example, the discourse of Indian leaders such as Nehru and Patel) does not change the fact that PII exists in post-colonial India. Indeed, colonial history in China as it is taught today – encompassing the Western and Japanese intrusion into China and omitting any reference to the Manchu Qing dynasty – was constructed by the early Republican government and endorsed later by the Communist Party.

PII not only emphasizes the transformative historical event of colonialism, thereby underlining the simple but overlooked fact that history matters, but also ensures that the international behavior of a wide range of states with differing regimes and power structures is analyzed. Theories of offensive and defensive realism and predictions of state behavior such as balancing, bandwagoning, or bargaining refer primarily to states with material capabilities significant enough to matter while norm-based theories focus on states with the ability to impose or break norms – obviously, norms held by states that are perceived as "successful" (usually Western states) are more likely to be adopted.[26] The behavior of developing nations tends to be given short shift, and when they do receive attention, the assumption is that disparities in economic structures and material capabilities are the sole basis of distinguishing them from developed nations.[27]

A large category of states – states that have experienced imperialism and colonialism – do not behave in the way that realists or liberals would necessarily predict that they would, because their common transformative historical event contributes to a powerful ideology of victimhood that dominates their decision calculus. Thus, the transformative historical event of colonialism can be an important tool to categorize states and explain variations in state foreign policies. This categorization and associated traits are better able to explain key features of foreign policy than traditional dichotomies such as developed versus developing states, major versus minor powers, revisionist versus status quo states, etc.

Thus, the ideology that I term PII carries the scars of the transformative event of imperialism and colonialism and has at its heart a strong sense of the need to establish victimhood. It comprises three national goals: (1) to gain an acknowledgement by other states of having suffered at the hands of specific one or more "others;" (2) to maximize territorial sovereignty by insisting on the maintenance of traditional boundaries and recovery of lost territory; and (3) to maximize status and regain prestige in the international system.

PII in India and China

It is argued here that PII exists in the rising powers, India and China, whose experiences under colonialism gave rise to an anticolonial national psychology that emphasized the political, economic, social, and cultural wrongs suffered at the hands of colonial powers, the memory of which humiliation and exploitation carried on after the demise of colonialism. The preoccupation with colonial heritage, manifest in anticolonial nationalism and carried over into the post-imperial era through school and college textbooks and in political and social discourse, is similar in these two countries despite their contrasting patterns of colonization: complete colonization of India for 200 years and piecemeal colonization of China.

Given the full 200 years of British Raj, one might have predicted that the aftermath of colonialism in India would be greater. In fact, the impact of Western and Japanese influence in China was all the more psychologically devastating to a civilization that believed itself superior to all others.[28] The experiences of both countries, however, are conducive to PII and its attendant sense of victimized territorial priorities and desire for international standing.

The victimized self-image of both countries involves a sharp divide between the pre-colonial and colonial experience. The history of India before the British period and its encounter with the English East India Company is one of assimilation of and accommodation with the continuous influx of foreigners. The advent of British rule drew a clear line between the natives and the outsiders.[29] This eventually led to the rise of organized anticolonial nationalism and the belief that 100 years of British rule had economically and politically crippled the country.

In Chinese historiography, too, the beginning of the modern period is marked by a clear border between the previous conquests and settling of China, and the influx of the Western powers and Japan (bitterly termed *yang guize* or foreign devils) into China. Paine observes that history books present the modern period as "beginning with the defeats in the Opium Wars followed by a century of uninterrupted concessions and humiliations before foreigners"[30] and also that "modern history marks the first time that China had ever been completely unable to sinicize the outsiders but had instead been forced, however reluctantly and painfully, to adapt to the world beyond China."[31] The Chinese nationalist movement saw itself as the successor to the territorial boundaries and legacy of the Qing and had a strong anti-foreign powers doctrine at its core. This attitude continued even when the Guomindang was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Chinese see the modern history of colonialism in China as two-pronged – the carving up of Qing China into foreign spheres of influence by Western powers and Japan (1842–1905) and the later domination by Japan during World War II (1931–45). The phases are collectively remembered, however, as the "century of humiliation" (*bainian guochi*). Indeed, Mao dubbed China during this period as *ban zhimin di* or a semi-colony.

Two aspects of colonial victimization, for both India and China, drive the PII goal of maintaining traditional borders redrawn by colonialism and regaining "lost" territory, even at the expense of material security: the sharp distinction between pre-colonial and post-colonial borders, and the fact that new borders resulted in lost territory. The result of colonialism was to shatter pre-colonial territorial borders and redraw territorial

lines. This often resulted in a change in notions of sovereignty, especially territorial sovereignty, from fluid to rigid. Pre-colonial states had very loose concepts of territorial boundaries which were often ill-defined rather than strict lineal demarcations of territory.[32] The colonial empires, however, mimicked the centralized structures and unitary ideologies of sovereignty prevalent in European nation states and the newly independent post-colonial states in turn inherited these "poisoned legacies."[33]

Before colonial domination, both India and China had relatively fluid borders. During the pre-Opium War period of the Qing, China's foreign relations with the "barbarians" (unsinicized peoples) were organized through a tributary system. The Chinese name for China (*Zhongguo*) sums up this relationship – it translates as "Middle Kingdom/State" implying that China was the center of all civilization surrounded by subordinate territories. Despite disagreement about the exact nature of China's traditional relationship with its neighboring states, as an empire, the idea of sovereignty did not feature in its outlook – "the question of delineation of interstate borders simply did not exist."[34] India under the Mughal empire, as well as in the period between the decline of the Mughals and the ascent of the British, was politically decentralized. Even during the height of its power under Emperor Akbar when the Mughals had territorial control over much of the subcontinent, conquered territories were either ruled by the original king who now swore allegiance to the Mughals or through a descendant of the existing ruling family who was set up as head of state by the emperor. Thus, "the Mughal emperor was Shah-an-Shah, 'king of kings,' rather than king of India."[35]

For both India and China, the change from pre-colonial fluidity to post-colonial rigidity resulted in lost territories and partitions. Consequently, after decolonization, both countries harbored bitter resentment for the territorial damage inflicted on them by imperialist states, and they were determined to not give way on traditional territorial boundaries crucial to their national identity. Since this identity was defined by anticolonial nationalism drawn from memories of suffering and humiliation, these traditional boundaries are usually attached to incidents of victimhood. Traditional borders had been violated and the country plundered by colonial powers, and territories had been lost due to colonial machinations.

The PII goal of maximizing international status, by which India and China seek prestige in the international system, is also driven by the goal of establishing victimhood. It has been argued that the "prestige motive" is a factor influencing the behavior of all states.[36] But it is a particularly important factor for countries whose humiliations by colonialism make them particularly sensitive to issues of lost face. India and China perceive their pre-colonial past as rich and glorious. For them, the advent of colonialism resulted not only in having a dominant foreign culture and institutions imposed upon them but also resulted in the crippling of flourishing pre-colonial economies. Nehru was convinced that "Asian countries needed to find a way of relating as equals to the richer powers of the Western world."[37] Rising Chinese nationalism laid special emphasis on the "consciousness of suffering" from disorder and humiliation in the hands of foreign powers and recapturing the past glory of Chinese history.[38] Callahan points out that the "discursive twin" of national humiliation is "national salvation": regaining lost status and taking care not to lose more face are

important components of that salvation.[39] After decolonization, both India and China were not only eager to restore their sense of worth and national pride and enhance lost status but were also quick to sense and condemn slights to their honor.

PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations

These aspects of PII help explain the breakdown of the 1960 negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru which made the territorial dispute in 1962 inevitable. Table 1 describes each goal and specifically what it meant in the case of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Ultimately, PII constrained the 1960 negotiations between Zhou and Nehru in two major ways. First, the emphasis on past suffering and anticolonialism in the 1940s and 1950s affected both India and China's bid to become a prominent leader of the newly decolonized Third World. Each emphasized their anti-imperialist credentials and suffering to build solidarity and gain prestige within the developing community. The result was a competitive atmosphere and resentment during the post-Bandung conference years which did not bode well for the 1960 negotiations. Second, during the negotiations, India and China linked the disputed territories to past history and laid claim to a "mantle of victimhood," i.e., they competed to emphasize past suffering in order to demonstrate that far from making territorial claims they were the victim and the disputed territories had in fact always been historically integral to their pre-colonial nation.

Victimhood and Status

In the late 1940s, India and China both emerged from turbulent circumstances. In 1947, India gained independence from 200 years of British colonial rule, and in 1949, the Communist Party of China came to power after a painful encounter with Japanese imperialism and control and a bloody civil war with the Guomindang. They entered a world that was rapidly changing – not only had the Cold War begun, but decolonization movements had gained momentum, and new countries were constantly emerging to join the international community. Because of their size, their experience with imperialism and colonialism, and their charismatic leaders, both countries were naturally positioned to lead the developing world. India and China were each acutely aware of their importance to the Third World and strongly believed that their unique suffering had equipped them to act as leader of the newly emergent developing nations. Thus, the goal of establishing victimhood drove the status goal of PII to create an awkward,

TABLE 1
PII AND THE SINO-INDIAN WAR

PII Goal	Behavior in 1962 Case
Victimhood (Seek acknowledgment that it has faced suffering and be treated as a victim)	1. Asserts it has suffered in the past and is a victim of imperialism. 2. Links disputed territories to past history.
Status (Seek respect or prestige specifically because of victimization)	1. Lay claim to leadership of the developing world. 2. Emphasize suitability because of past suffering.
Territorial Sovereignty (Maintain or gain control of "traditional" borders that are related to memories of victimization)	Assert that 1. It has not made a territorial claim, and 2. The territory is a historically integral part of the nation.

competitive scenario in the 1950s which did not bode well for the 1960 negotiations in Delhi.

The rapid decolonization taking place in the 1940s and 1950s made anti-imperialism the paramount issue for the Third World. India attended the conference clearly acknowledged and conscious of its role as a leader in the Third World. Nehru believed in India's destiny as an influential world power,[40] and Bandung was the showcase for this. Even though Indonesia was the actual host and organizer of the conference, India was a key player and heavily involved in the details. A letter from Nehru to Badr Tyabji, the Indian ambassador to Indonesia, states:

> I am rather anxious about this Asian-African Conference and, more especially, about the arrangements. I wonder if the people in Indonesia have any full realization of what this conference is going to be . . . We cannot take the slightest risk of lack of adequate arrangements . . . You have been pointing out that the Indonesians are sensitive. We should respect their sensitiveness. But we cannot afford to have everything messed up because they are sensitive.[41]

Thus, clearly even before the conference began, Nehru not only envisioned Bandung as the international forum to display India's leadership but espoused a rather patronizing big brother attitude toward other developing nations.

Bandung was the launching pad for India's bid to become a major player and gain prestige in the international community. To begin with, it gave impetus to the international ideology espoused by India during the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement, which was established in 1961. Nehru's speeches at Bandung which, in keeping with the theme of the conference regularly referred to anticolonialism and past suffering, also tied his nascent nonaligned ideology to the concept of victimhood. In a closed session, he declared,

> Are, we the countries of Asia and Africa, devoid of any positive position except being pro-communist or anticommunist? It is most degrading and humiliating to any self-respecting person or nation. It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way.[42]

Second, Bandung was also the forum at which India felt itself to be the public mentor and introducer of China into the group of developing nations. India had already constituted itself as a champion of China in world affairs in the late 1940s and early 1950s.[43] It was an ardent supporter of China's entry into the United Nations and campaigned vigorously for this to happen. In fact, India was so hell bent on achieving this foreign policy coup and demonstrating the high moral road it was taking that it actually refused the offer of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, citing empathy and solidarity with China.[44] In both the pre- and post-Bandung period with the rising hostility between the United States, Taiwan, and China, India involved itself in the Formosa issue and was eager to offer its mitigating services. India was so involved in the crisis that when two American military planes were shot down by the

Chinese and some American nationals were imprisoned, India took upon itself to persuade the Chinese to release them as a gesture of goodwill.

The PII goal of establishing victimhood with its emphasis on colonial history and past suffering drove the goal of maximizing status for India by aspiring to the leadership of the newly decolonized developing world. Bandung was first and foremost a conference organized against imperialism and colonialism, and the theme of victimhood suffused the conference and the years after it. The fact that India thought of itself as crucial to both the conference and the developing world was clear from Nehru's statements and actions upon his return. In a detailed briefing to the Chief Ministers, for example, he proudly pointed out, "The two most important countries present at the Bandung Conference were China and India. Indeed U Nu (the Prime Minister of Burma) pointed out at a private meeting that without China and India the conference would not have had much significance."[45]

India's aspirations to lead the community of developing nations were echoed by China. China's ambitions to be a world power and regain what it considered its lost status were evident from the time the CCP came to power in 1949. The CCP's policy of "leaning to one side" did not, in its view, indicate submission to Soviet dictates. It viewed the relationship as a way to secure assistance and enable China to become an equal partner in the Communist camp.[46] In the 1950s, China decided to take steps toward building relationships with the noncommunist developing countries. The Bandung conference of 1955 was the first time the Chinese had gained access to an international forum.[47] It was the ideal opportunity to declare China a part of the community of developing nations and use the conference as a launching pad to increase Chinese influence in the Third World.

China subscribed wholeheartedly to the conference's anti-imperialist, anticolonialist stance. Zhou Enlai's speeches at Bandung not only empathized with the sentiments but also made it amply clear that China felt that the experience of imperialism and suffering was one that it had in common with the other nations present. He repeatedly referred to China's suffering under colonialism and emphasized solidarity with the other ex-colonies.

Consequently, in the opening session of the conference, Zhou declared,

> Ever since modern times, most of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to the plunder and oppression of colonialism and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness. Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, and our destiny placed in the hands of others. Thus, we have no choice but to rise against colonialism. Suffering from the same cause and struggling for the same aim, we the Asian and African peoples have found it easier to understand each other and have long had deep sympathy and concern for one another.[48]

This theme was repeated continuously through all his conference speeches. It was clear from these speeches that, as predicted by PII, China did not consider its atypical experience of imperialism and colonialism any different from or less intense than the other Asian and African decolonized nations – in fact, Zhou explicitly declared otherwise and often detailed China's suffering under colonialism:

> Is there any basis for seeking common ground under us? Yes, there is. The overwhelming majority of the Asian and African countries and peoples have suffering and are still suffering from the calamities of colonialism . . . What some people dislike is the fact . . . that the Chinese people are no longer under the rule of the imperialists . . . The struggle of the Chinese people under colonialism lasted for more than 100 years . . . It is impossible to relate all the sufferings of the Chinese people under the rule of imperialism.[49]

By advocating anti-imperialism, cooperation, solidarity, and peaceful coexistence between it and developing countries with different socio-political systems, China took a crucial step toward improving its relationship with the nonaligned states and building prestige, and in the following years, became an active competitor for leadership of these countries.[50]

Thus, the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 was the international forum for both India and China to raise their profiles and increase their prestige among the community of developing nations. The dominant theme of the conference was anti-imperialism and anticolonialism. With 200 years of British colonial history and a prime minister who had led a famous anti-British independence movement, India considered itself a leading developing nation with bona fide anticolonial credentials. China too clearly felt the same way about its past, and Zhou Enlai repeatedly made it a point to emphasize Chinese suffering under colonialism and claim solidarity with the other nations that had undergone a similar experience. Moreover, India assumed a leadership, big brother-style role not only with respect to the organization of the conference but also in discussing and introducing the concepts of Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence) and nonalignment. At the same time, India transparently felt it had an important role to play vis-à-vis China and thus involved itself heavily in many of China's interactions with the noncommunist world from introducing it to the Third World community at Bandung to moderating during the Formosa issue. In the post-Bandung period this created a delicate situation which would spill over into the 1960 negotiations. China's references to its colonial past and fellowship with the suffering of ex-colonies irked India, and this became a significant factor when Nehru and Zhou met in 1960. India's attempts to "mentor" China were equally resented by the People's Republic of China while India thought of China as extremely ungrateful for all the friendship it had extended to it. Thus the dominant PII goal of victimhood and the goal of status had already served to create a sensitive atmosphere when the 1960 negotiations took place.

Victimhood and Territorial Sovereignty

In 1960 when Zhou Enlai and Nehru came together to discuss the dispute, they were each armed with a list of grievances. From the verbatim transcripts of the negotiations,[51] it is clear that India and China each perceived itself as the victim and sought to have the other recognize it as such. This led both Zhou and Nehru to emphasize the historical significance of the disputed territories, and to dwell on past suffering and a struggle to claim the "mantle" of victimhood. Sensitive to their memories of imperialistic control, both India and China believed they had been subjected to aggression, and during the

negotiations, there was a tussle to play up their past histories of imperial suffering. Their stance on territorial sovereignty was intrinsically connected with their concept of themselves as the victim – they were each insistent they had not put forward any territorial claims. Moreover, their acute sensitivity to past suffering and the insistence on what they perceived as pre-colonial, traditional borders made these territories historically significant to each country. They stressed the fact that these territories had always been an integral part of their country and were righteously indignant when faced with any accusations of territorial claims by the other side.

At the very first meeting on April 20, 1960, Nehru struck a resentful tone: "Your Excellency may say that these are (the) territorial claims of India. But when did we make these claims? We have shown these areas in maps in precise latitude and longitude, and this description is before China and the world for a considerable time, and no objection was taken to these by the Chinese government since 1949 and even before that period."[52] Zhou responded in kind at both that and subsequent meetings: "The purpose of making this explanation is to show that we have made no territorial claims but that we want to maintain the status quo with a view to reaching a solution;"[53] "we have brought in all these historical facts only to show that there has been a dispute for long and that the boundary is not delimited. We did not make any claims nor did we put forward any prerequisites for talks;"[54] "we feel that there is no basis for (the) Indian claim to this territory . . . like this, it will be impossible to find a solution . . . we cannot accept any territorial claims."[55]

For the Chinese, the issue was very simple – Aksai Chin was intimately tied up with Chinese history and an integral part of Chinese territory. Zhou emphasized this fact repeatedly during the 1960 negotiations. The Chinese fixation on Aksai Chin has been interpreted as an emphasis on the strategic securing of Tibet, but it was much more than that. Aksai Chin was seen as historically a part of both Xinjiang and Tibet[56] – two pieces of territory that were considered vital to Chinese unification and nationalization – with the greater northern area a part of Xinjiang and the southern area a part of the Ari region of Tibet.[57] On the first day of the talks, Zhou stated,

> I have pointed out that the main part of the area, namely Aksai Chin, is not under the administrative jurisdiction of Tibet but of Sinkiang. Our jurisdiction has been exercised there not only since 1949 but for a long time in history . . . It is the main route joining Sinkiang to (the) Ari region of Tibet, and this has been so for a very long time.[58]

Both Xinjiang and Tibet held special historical significance for the Chinese. Xinjiang and Tibet were two of many new pieces of territory that fell under Qing control – Xinjiang, Taiwan, Mongolia, Tibet, Kokonor, and the southwest provinces all became permanent territorial acquisitions between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Perdue states that the creation of modern China's identity as a "multinationality nation state" (*duo minzu guojia*) is attributed by the Chinese to these projects of territorial "unification." The Qing conquests and colonization were interpreted by nationalists as necessary to integrate China's minorities into the nation. Xinjiang ("New Frontier") for example was viewed as "naturally" belonging to the Chinese,

and its recovery from the Zunghars was seen as fulfilling "a preexisting definition of national territory."[59] Similarly, with respect to Tibet, the Chinese Republican government as well as the CCP took the stance that Tibet had been subjugated by the Manchus and was hence automatically a part of the Chinese nation. In fact, one of the major nationalistic goals of the CCP was to restore China to its former glory, and control of Xinjiang and Tibet had huge symbolic significance.

The importance of these territories to the concept of a modern unified Chinese nation was underscored by the issue of "lost" territories and imposed treaties. With the decline of the Qing and the inroads of imperial powers, China was forced to sign a number of "unequal" treaties, and this resulted in a national obsession with "rightfully" reclaiming pieces of territory deemed to have been lost through colonial vagaries and a complete rejection of colonial boundaries. In Xinjiang, China was forced to surrender nearly 350,000 square miles of territory to Russia in the mid-nineteenth century as well as give them special trading privileges and the right to station consuls in the region. With respect to Tibet, treaties such as the Anglo-Tibet Convention of 1904 by which the British Government of India (BGOI) essentially converted Tibet into another of its "native state" protectorates, and the Simla Convention of 1914 which drew up the McMahon line, were seen as humiliations suffered at the hands of Western imperialists.[60] As Zhou pointed out to Nehru, "[This] dispute was left to us by imperialism . . . It shocked and distressed us that India should try to impose on us the provisions of the secret treaty of the Simla Convention which, moreover, was never accepted by any of the Chinese governments."[61]

The Chinese were indignant and baffled at what they saw as India's refusal to repudiate imperialist borders drawn by colonial powers. The fact that a colonized state would not completely reject the arrangements imposed by a bullying power was seen as outrageous. The 1961 official report of the Chinese side on the 1960 negotiations states,

> As for the alignment claimed by the Indian side, it does not at all present any so-called traditional customary line; it has neither been confirmed by history nor sanctioned by any treaty or agreement but is a line planned out by the British imperialists for the purpose of implementing its policy of aggression and expansion against China's Sinkiang and Tibet and which only appeared for the first time in 1954 on official Indian maps as its territorial claim.[62]

Zhou coldly pointed out in a meeting with the Indian Home Minister Sardar Swaran Singh that both India and China had been under the sway of imperialism, but today they were independent and certainly should not abide by the actions of old imperialistic regimes.[63] Thus, for China, the victimizers were India as well as the imperialist powers which had first redrawn traditional borders.

For India, the issue was a little more complex. First, India not only claimed that these territories had been controlled by Indian dynasties prior to the British, but they also saw themselves as the successors to the BGOI which they believed had simply formalized the more fluid pre-colonial borders and arrangements. Indeed, when Nehru referred to the BGOI during the 1960 negotiations, he called it the Government

of India. For them, it was natural to adopt the treaties and boundaries that the colonial British administration had drawn up with neighboring states. The publication of India's classified official history of the war asserts that the boundary in the western sector had been "sanctified by custom and tradition."[64] It argued that the Ladakh-Tibet boundary was historically accepted and recognized and did not require any formal delimitation.[65] In the eastern sector too, it similarly argued that the McMahon line was not a new boundary but merely "formalized an alignment up to which Indian rulers had been administering as far back as the centuries before the Christian era when were compiled the great Sanskrit epics such as the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*."[66]

On April 23, 1960, Nehru gave Zhou a long historical explanation of the Indian position, and his remarks demonstrate that the Indians believed in the continuity of administrative control and borders, from pre-British to post-British, over these sectors. At the end of his explanation he stated, "There is no question of our making any territorial claim, that is to say, any claim on a fresh territory which did not belong to India or to Kashmir state throughout this long period."[67] The Indians thus viewed this territory as an integral part of the pre-colonial Indian empire, and to cede it to the Chinese was unthinkable. Second, the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 were unequivocally deplored by the Indian National Congress. The shock of the loss of this territory followed by the war over Kashmir, which again resulted in the redrawing of traditional borders, already had a significant impact on India. Acutely sensitive to the humiliations suffered under colonialism, the potential loss of yet more historically significant territory was not something the Indians were willing to think about. Nehru declared,

> "According to us the boundary between Sinkiang and Ladakh is traditional and customary . . . and can be traced back to the tenth century . . . In 1899, the British made proposals to the Chinese again suggesting that this recognized boundary should be clearly defined. From all this, it would appear that till the nineteenth century, there was no divergence of opinion on the alignment of the boundary of Ladakh in the parties concerned, namely the Ladakhis, Kashmiris, Tibetans, Chinese, Indians, or the British."[68]

For India, the direct victimizer was China, and the indirect victimizer was the British colonial regime. This was because although the Indians bitterly blamed British divide-and-rule policies for the loss of Pakistan which made them hypersensitive to any perceived bullying by China and loss of more territory, in the border dispute case at least, the British had formalized the pre-colonial boundaries.

Both the Chinese and Indians regarded these pieces of territory as integral to their nations, were outraged that the historical significance of these territories could be misinterpreted as territorial claims, and were also eager for the other side to acknowledge that they had suffered injury and had been victims of imperialism. Zhou reiterated to Nehru that the dispute had been "left over by history"[69] to which Nehru retorted that no new boundaries had been fixed by the Simla Convention, and rather it simply formally laid down what the boundaries *should* have been.[70] Both sides talked continuously of national feelings on the issue. Zhou, for example, emphasized,

> This (the Simla Convention) has been a shock to the Chinese people and it has hurt their feelings because these are the legacies of imperialism . . . The British tried to use their special rights (in Tibet) in order to split Tibet from China, completely or partly, and it was also in this period that the British coined the word 'suzerainty' . . . They brought pressure on China and Tibet to negotiate with McMahon.[71]

He extended these sentiments to Xinjiang as well:

> Sinkiang had long historical relations with China dating to as early as Han dynasty 2,000 years ago, and we have uninterrupted historical records to prove this . . . We never realized there was any dispute in this area . . . The Indian government has asked us to withdraw troops from this area which has been historically a part of China . . . Like this, it will be impossible to find a solution.[72]

Similarly, on the very first day of the negotiations between Zhou and Nehru, Nehru had declared, "There is a powerful feeling in India regarding the Himalayan mountains. These are tied up with ancient culture and history. and whatever happened, these mountains have always been looked upon as the frontiers of India."[73] The sense of victimization by China was so strong in the country that Nehru had been forced to make an impassioned statement in the Lok Sabha in February:

> It has been said that the government, and particularly I suppose I, as being the Foreign Minister, have been unfair to Parliament, and have not been quite honest, that we are dying down, we have surrendered, we have submitted to some kind of national humiliation. It has even been said that there is no instance in history like this . . . I wish to point out that if the government is charged with submitting to anything that may be considered 'national humiliation,' then it is a matter of highest importance for this House and this country to be clear about. No government which even remotely is responsible for anything that may be considered 'national humiliation' is deserving of continuing as a government.[74]

The eagerness to portray themselves as victims actually led to a tussle and competing claims of victimhood. In a meeting with Finance Minister Morarji Desai for example (which rapidly degenerated into the diplomatic equivalent of name-calling), Zhou brought up the fact that like India, China had also lost to the imperialists and been reduced to the status of a semi-colony. To this Desai retorted, "These foreign incursions and occupations were confined only to the periphery of China." Zhou shot back that "it was not so, and even at places as deep as Chungkiang a handful of foreign imperialists controlled the fate of China by being in league with the warlords."[75] Desai went on to indignantly defend the Indian position: "We have never had any territorial designs on any country, and yet we are blamed in China for being imperialists."[76]

Thus, when Nehru and Zhou met in 1960, the goal of establishing victimhood played a crucial role in shaping their attitudes toward the conflict. Each leader took pains to outline the historical significance of these territories and were eager to show

that they had been victimized in the past and were currently again facing aggression. This in turn influenced their stance on territorial sovereignty – they insisted that they were not making any territorial claims; rather they emphasized that these territories had always been an integral part of their country.

The Failure of the 1960 Negotiations

As a result of PII, the 1960 negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru failed spectacularly. The goals of establishing victimhood, territorial sovereignty, and status ensured a hostile outcome. PII thus explains the three puzzling outcomes mentioned earlier in this article.

First, India, despite being in a militarily weak position, could not adopt a conciliatory attitude during the negotiations. Even prior to the negotiations, the attention to status driven by victimhood had created a cool atmosphere, both in the government and in Parliament. Documents show that the Indians were hostile and suspicious of China's intentions long before Zhou Enlai set foot in Delhi. After Nehru's invitation had been issued to Zhou, a telegram from Foreign Secretary Dutt to Indian ambassador Parthasarathy in Beijing remarks in surprise: "Chou En Lai intends staying here till April 25. This is rather longer than we expected."[77] Another telegram from Ambassador Parthasarathy to Secretary Dutt a few days later a little disjointedly states:

> It is evident . . . that the Chinese want to show that they are most anxious for a settlement and will appear extremely reasonable which does not mean that they will be accommodating or give up in any way their basic approach. Their main line seems to be that the two sides have different conceptions of the boundary which has remained vague and undefined for centuries. There is genuine misunderstanding on both sides which can be corrected by agreeing in a friendly way to delimit the boundary. From this, they will proceed to propose a joint committee to undertake the delimitation of the boundary. The Chinese will maintain this posture of reasonableness trying to make it difficult for us to reject their approach. But we should clearly say 'no' to any attempt to persuade us to accept joint discussions to delimit the entire boundary or sections thereof. I feel politically we are in a strong position to maintain our clearly stated policy.[78]

Subsequently during the negotiations, India rejected the main proposals put forward by Zhou, i.e., a trade of western for eastern sectors and a retreat of the military forces of the two states.

Second, the Chinese had a dual approach with respect to the two sectors. They stated that the eastern sector definitely was disputed territory with undefined and undemarcated borders.[79] As far as the western sector was concerned, however, the Chinese position was that it had never been in dispute. Zhou stated, "As regards the western sector of the boundary, no question has ever been raised in the past and we never thought there was any question on that side . . . New China has only inherited this area as shown by history."[80] Zhou proposed that the current "status quo" should be maintained. This implied that if the Indians agreed to compromise in

the western sector, the Chinese would be prepared to eventually recognize the McMahon line. On the first day of the talks, Zhou declared, "We stated that we do not recognize the McMahon line but that we were willing to take a realistic view with Burma and India."[81] This clear hint was reinforced during the meeting by his suggestion that,

> We can avoid clashes and misunderstanding by maintaining the status quo and removing the forces from the border, thus making the border one of everlasting friendship. We have made no claims and we have only asked for status quo and negotiations . . . We have always said status quo should be maintained . . . When we say status quo, we mean status quo prevailing generally after independence, and this would also show the friendliness of our attitude.[82]

This was not, however, a compromise on China's part. Rather it was simply the fact that Aksai Chin was considered historically a part of both Xinjiang and Tibet – two very important pieces of territory – that drove the Chinese to make the offer. It was true that they believed the McMahon line had been imposed on them against their will, but the territory in the eastern sector (the Tawang tract) was seen as having been influenced by Tibet rather than having been historically a part of Tibet.

Government dispatches show that the Indians fully understood the hints thrown out by Zhou, but both the western and the eastern sector were seen as equally historically integral to the country. A telegram from the Foreign Secretary circulated to some of the Indian Heads of Mission in different countries on April 27, 1960 states,

> It is quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA [the North Eastern Frontier Agency] (eastern sector). Throughout the discussions they have invariably connected Ladakh with NEFA and stressed that the same principles of settling the boundary must govern both areas. It was also obvious that if we accepted the line claimed by China in Ladakh they would accept the McMahon line. There might be need for minor frontier rectifications, but that would not create much practical difficulty.[83]

Third, Zhou also proposed a cessation of patrolling in the disputed areas and a pull back of the military forces of both states. In a meeting, he elaborated,

> There should be a line between the two areas actually controlled by the two sides. In order to ensure tranquility along the border, to facilitate the work of the survey teams and in the interest of friendship, we should maintain a distance between the forces on either side. We have suggested the distance to be 20 km, but your Excellency (Nehru) said that you were not in favor of it, on account of geographical features. We may, however, fix any other distance which would be suitable to geographical features. Thus, we can avoid clashes between the armed forces of our two countries. This is also for the purpose of establishing a border of perpetual friendship and preventing any untoward incidents."[84]

Zhou repeated this suggestion the following day:

> In order to maintain the status quo, even after the boundary line is determined, we should make it a line of friendship, and for this purpose, forces of both sides should be removed from the border. The distance to which each force should be removed can be decided by mutual agreement and in accordance with favorable geographical features. Merely stopping the patrolling of the border will not remove danger.[85]

Zhou's proposal during the negotiations was the precursor to 1962 when the Chinese government declared a unilateral ceasefire and pulled their troops 20 km back beyond the line of control. This declaration at one stroke vindicated the Chinese position that they were the victimized party rather than the aggressors in the conflict and enhanced their prestige vis-à-vis the international community. It was also a sharp humiliating lesson to India, who had rejected the option of a similar positioning of troops during the negotiations.

India was not only annoyed by the implication that both pieces of territory might not be equally important to it but also resented the fact that the Chinese gave the appearance of making a very "reasonable" offer which the Indians would be only too eager to jump at. A secret telegram from the Indian embassy in Beijing irately states, "The *People's Daily* editorial has generally tried to explain that the Chinese side made proposals for a reasonable settlement of the boundary question but that the Indian side was not prepared for a settlement even though the Government of India itself had at various times put forward some of the arguments contained in Chou En Lai's proposals;" so that "while there is no attempt directly blaming the Indian side for the failure of the talks, by stressing the constructive efforts of Chou En Lai, the reader is left in little doubt as to why no agreement was possible."[86]

In 1960, clearly, influenced by PII's dominant goal of establishing victimhood driving the goals of territorial sovereignty and status, the Indians did not take a long hard look at their weak position and rejected any possible solutions to the territorial dispute. Buoyed by confidence in its international position as a leading member of the developing community of nations deeply engaged in world affairs, India launched the disastrous Forward Policy shortly after the failure of the 1960 negotiations. Interestingly, hints of India's misplaced faith in its prowess could be found even during Bandung when Nehru bombastically proclaimed to the assembly, "We will defend ourselves with whatever arms and strength we have, and if we have no arms, we will defend ourselves without arms. I am dead certain that no country can conquer India."[87]

Conclusion

Despite the dismantling of the colonial empire more than half a century ago, the legacy of colonialism has played out in dramatic and tragic fashion in modern international politics. From the present quagmire in Iraq to the territorial dispute in Kashmir, many continuing conflicts today are heavily influenced by the vagaries of colonialism. The Sino-Indian border dispute is one such conflict. The territorial dispute played a

large part in creating the uneasy relationship that exists between the two countries today, and its resolution is indisputably important for any progress in the relationship.

Yet, because of India and China's status as rising powers, analyses of this particular dispute, as well as their other foreign policy decisions, focus on state security as the dominant explanatory variable. But, as I have demonstrated, PII, consisting of the dominant goal of establishing victimhood driving the goals of maximizing status and territorial sovereignty, is a better explanation of the failure of the crucial 1960 negotiations and the deviant outcomes of the 1962 war.

A look at the discourse of states in the United Nations quantitatively shows that both China and India have an acutely strong sense of victimhood even today.[88] The sense of victimhood and its corollary, a sense of entitlement and recovery, thus, needs to be an important component of any international discourse on "managing" or "engaging" these two rising powers. William Callahan's work points out the influence of themes of past humiliation and victimization in twenty-first century Chinese nationalism[89] – "The theme of the 2004 National Defense Education Fund, for example, was 'never forget national humiliation, strengthen our national defense.'"[90] Thus, any analysis of China's fraught relationship with Japan, which led to large anti-Japanese violence and riots in 2005, needs to incorporate the Chinese preoccupation with past victimization at the hands of Japan. India's justification for its nuclear tests in 1998 included references to ending the era of "nuclear apartheid" and "nuclear haves and have-nots" as well as the classic colonial imagery of breaking into the "club of nuclear powers."[91] Understanding India's nuclear power status with references only to security or even prestige is, therefore, incomplete without an understanding of its grievance against a nuclear system that it believed was specifically designed to exclude and discriminate.

The PII framework can also be applied to a large category of states in the international system. It can be used to analyze not just the behavior of rising powers such as India or China but also the more developed states such as Greece and Singapore and developing states such as Malaysia and the Philippines. While measuring different levels of PII is outside the scope of this work, it is possible to speculate that PII may be more intense and pertinent for rising powers that are carving out, effectively, new identities in the international system. PII thus not only suggests a new way to think about two important rising powers today, China and India, it also offers a new way to think about how states could be grouped in the international system.

NOTES

1. In a longer work on this subject, I treat PII as a dependent variable and statistically establish its existence across states. See Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "Scars of Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology, Historical Memory, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2007). In this article, I discuss the link between colonialism, victimhood, and PII and treat PII as an independent variable to analyze the last negotiations before the outbreak of the 1962 war.
2. The Indian and Chinese governments have declassified extremely few documents (and none of much significance) pertaining to the border dispute. This private collection, however, includes detailed verbatim transcripts of the 1960 border negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru as well as dispatches between top Indian government officials and the Indian embassy in Beijing analyzing the situation. The only other published (and cursory) reference to these documents is Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), where he notes that the transcripts of the talks between Zhou and Nehru are still officially secret.

3. The article does not analyze the war itself or events during the war. Rather it demonstrates that the crucial negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Nehru, a last attempt to prevent a military conflict, were derailed by the presence of PII.
4. There were also problems in the middle sector of the frontier, which ran from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh to Punjab, but this squabble was peripheral to the main conflict that broke out in 1962.
5. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Cape, 1970); Allen S. Whiting, *Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1975); John K. Fairbank, *China Watch* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
6. Yaacov Vertzberger, "India's Border Conflict with China: A Perceptual Analysis," *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 17, No. 4 (October, 1982), pp. 607–631; Steven Hoffman, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); John W. Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962," in Alastair I. Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 86–130.
7. The most well-known security explanations were advanced by Maxwell and Whiting. Maxwell blamed the Indian government for its territorial policies – using occupation to justify ownership – that naturally provoked the Chinese into defending their territory. Whiting offered a more nuanced security argument that rejected Maxwell's hypothesis. He suggested that external threats combined with the domestic situation made the Chinese feel vulnerable about state security and borders. Vertzberger posited that the conflict was the result of opposing world views, legalistic versus ideological, held by Nehru and Mao; Hoffman concluded that Nehru and his coterie had ideas and beliefs that influenced the process of border formulation; Garver emphasized that the conflict was due to Chinese misperceptions of Indian aggression against its territory. Vertzberger, Hoffman, and Garver all framed their theories within the context of security. Vertzberger stated that China's perception of international law stemmed from its desire to achieve its strategic interests. Garver postulated that Mao erroneously believed that Nehru wanted to wrest Tibetan control for China but implied that this belief and the desire to assert full control over Tibet were influenced by concerns of Chinese security. Hoffman widened his category of explanatory variables to include Indian insecurity about Chinese "aggression" in addition to historical, cultural, traditional, and individual beliefs.
8. Judith Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 322.
9. M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," *International Security* Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), p. 68.
10. Whiting, *Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, p. 11.
11. Apart from the broader application of the concept, the term "post-imperial" rather than "post-colonial" was chosen to distinguish my theory from the post-colonial literature.
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13. Doyle, *Empires*; Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1994).
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52. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, Subject File 26, Installment I/II. P. N. Haksar private papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) 5 pm, April 20, 1960, p. 5.
53. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 5 pm, April 20, 1960, p. 8.
54. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 10 am, April 22, 1960, p. 4.
55. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 10 am, April 22, 1960, p. 7.
56. Whiting, *Chinese Calculus of Deterrence,* referred to the strategic importance of Aksai China to Xinjiang, and I agree with his analysis. However, I disagree that the emphasis on Xinjiang was only because the Chinese felt it was vital to state security.
57. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 4 pm, April 21, 1960, p. 4.
58. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 5 pm, April 20, 1960, p. 7.
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63. Conversation between Home Minister and Premier Zhou, Subject File 26, Installment I/II. P. N. Haksar private papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) 11:25 am, April 21, 1960, p. 10.
64. P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale et al., *History of the Conflict with China* (New Delhi, India: Government of India, Ministry of Defense, 1992), p. 2. This document was leaked in 2002.
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67. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 4:30 pm, April 23, 1960, p. 7.
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69. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 4 pm, April 21, 1960, p. 2.
70. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 4 pm, April 21, 1960, p. 8.
71. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 10 am, April 22, 1960, pp. 2–3.
72. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 10 am, April 22, 1960, pp. 5–7.
73. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 10 am, April 20, 1960, p. 4.

74. Prime Minister's Reply to Lok Sabha Discussions, Subject File 25. P. N. Haksar Private Papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) February 22, 1960.
75. Meeting between Finance Minister and Premier Zhou, Subject File 26. P. N. Haksar private papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) April 22, 1960, p. 1.
76. Meeting between Finance Minister and Premier Zhou, April 22, 1960, p. 6.
77. Telegram from Foreign Secretary Dutt to Indian Ambassador Parthasarathy, Subject File 25. P. N. Haksar private papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) March 20, 1960.
78. Telegram from Indian Ambassador Parthasarathy to Foreign Secretary Dutt, Subject File 25. P. N. Haksar private papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) March 1960 (exact date is unclear but is in response to Dutt's telegram of March 20, 1960).
79. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 10 am, April 22, 1960, p. 2.
80. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 5 pm, April 20, 1960, p. 3.
81. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 5 pm, April 20, 1960, p. 1.
82. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 5 pm, April 20, 1960, pp. 3, 6–7, 9.
83. Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Heads of Mission, Subject File 25. P. N. Haksar private papers (Nehru Memorial Library Archives, New Delhi, India) April 27, 1960, p. 2.
84. Meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou, 4 pm, April 21, 1960, p. 6.
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Manjari Chatterjee Miller is a College Fellow and Lecturer in the Department of Government, Harvard University.