“Mubarak’s detention makes me wonder what the ‘knock on’ effect will be in other countries facing similar issues. Ivory Coast’s former president just gave up the ghost and has been detained by the new regime, and it’s not at all uncommon for prior regime leaders to face legal charges after giving up power. Immunity grants are less available as a tool (as in situations like Chile and Sierra Leone) where either the domestic legislature retroactively voided the immunity and/or there were legal determinations in other settings that immunity grants, like statutes of limitation, don’t apply to really serious international crimes.

“Gadhafi certainly is thinking about this kind of thing and seems to have decided, at least for now, that his best option is to fight on. Obviously, the specter of legal charges makes a political resolution (like agreeing to go into exile) much harder. The UN Security Council resolution authorizing ICC investigation of Libya required Libya to cooperate with the ICC but only said that other states ‘should’ cooperate, leaving an opening for a state to agree to shelter him while not violating a SC resolution. The SC could have made such cooperation mandatory but didn’t, ostensibly to allow some opening for him to voluntarily leave power. That said, any country that takes him will certainly draw a lot of heat, and even open defiers of the SC and ICC (e.g., al Bashir in Sudan) might not want him there because it will only increase the pressure of their own situations.

“In terms of genuine threats of prosecution, it’s much harder to ignore serious crimes committed while someone was in the process of leaving office (or getting kicked out) than crimes committed while in office (which can stretch back 30+ years in some cases). The challenge is — putting aside courts of limited jurisdiction like the ICC which have a much more limited temporal mandate — that once someone is being investigated and prosecuted for anything, it’s much more likely that the prosecutor will go for the brass ring and seek to bring charges for whatever is available, including past conduct. So, you might see current crimes-on-the-way out operating as a trigger for a much wider inquiry into historic governmental criminality. The current crimes also make it harder to sort this out via a truth and reconciliation commission as in South Africa.”

Contact David Nersessian, 617-358-1959, dnersess@bu.edu

Augustus Richard Norton is a Middle East specialist, author of “Hezbollah: A Short History,” an advisor to the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study group, and director of the BU Institute for Iraqi Studies:

“This is an important development, particularly during a period when the military has been showing less tolerance for demonstrators and critics.

“Among the trio being questioned, it is the son ‘Alaa who may be the most vulnerable.  He is notorious in Egypt for inserting himself as a silent and unwanted partner in a number of businesses.

“It remains to be seen how far the public prosecutor will go with the investigation, but if the immunity of Egyptian autocrats and their families is eroded then this really would be revolutionary.”

Contact  617-353-7808, arn@bu.edu, Twitter @arnorton

Charles Dunbar, who in four decades as a diplomat, served as a U.N. Secretary-General Special Representative, head of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul during the Soviet occupation, and was U.S. ambassador to Qatar and Yemen:

“Those who threw Mr. Mubarak et filii from the sleigh may be a bit concerned as to how things will go for them on judgment day. It might have been better to leave the fate of the Mubarak family’s over-achievement to a popularly elected government.”

Contact 617-353-5633, cfdunbar@bu.edu

“The military has taken power, but in reality the military has — ever since the 1952 coup — held the balance of power in Cairo.

“The Egyptian military has always lurked in the shadows of the Egyptian regime. The levers of influence were seldom exposed to view. Yet, when senior civilian politicos, such as Osama al-Baz, reflected on the regime and its prospects for reform, they often pointed to the powerful role of the generals and vetoes they held in their back pockets. For years, as expectations grew that Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal would succeed his father, it was the military veto that thwarted him.

“Now the power of the generals is in the spotlight. There are some reasons to be optimistic: the army generally showed commendable discipline in its response to the last three weeks of demonstrations, and the demonstrators — whether intuitively or shrewdly — embraced the soldiers; the officer corp is highly professional, promotions are based on merit not connections, and no officer or soldier wishes to be seen as an oppressor of the nation that it is pledged to defend; a skilled group of oppositon figures is poised to negotiate a transition, and the Ikhwan have wisely forges concensus with the non-Islamist elements while also remaining in the background; and, the actions are misactions of the military will be in full international view.

“Nonetheless, the senior officers have a big stake in the existing system, not the least econmic interests. In retirement, many senior officers move to industries dominated by the military, and others move into the thriving private sector. But many others infiltrate the civilian branches of government. They will want to protect their perorgatives. The military leadership will prove cautious about dramatic changes, and they will be nervous about permitting a powerful civilian government to challenge their privileges, or hold officers accountable for their misdeeds. The deep suspicion of the Ikhwan will not be erased, so the generals will want to be assured that the Ikhwan (still an illegal entity) will gain no more than a marginal role in politics.

“When Presidential elections are held, you can be sure that the military will have satisfied itself that its interests will not be jeopardized. It is to early to determine who all the contenders for the Presidency will be, but it is now clear that Amre Mossa is a front runner. He is widely respected, and indeed, is a man of integrity. He was the popular Foreign Minister of Egypt, so popular that Mubarak that “promoted” him to become Secretary General of the Arab League in order to keep him well distant from Egyptian politics. But a lot may happen in a year of transition, and many secrets will be exposed, so keep your bets in your pocket for now.”

Contact Augustus Richard Norton, 617-353-7808, arn@bu.edu