“So Goldman Sachs is now being examined for various activities with the Libyan regime. The firm has hired an outside counsel, as is its practice, and insists on having done no wrong. It probably did not, in accordance with our laws.

“Many of the enforcement examinations, investigations, and court processes arise after the fact and cost an enormous amount of money, with some results — but perhaps not as strong as compared to their price.

“Are there better ways to induce giant financial institutions’ management to be more self-limiting, even within the law? Perhaps the answer is public opinion. If trust is undermined, financial businesses evaporate. For too long the belief was that if money is made — no matter how — public admiration will follow. Could this belief be proven to have changed?”

Contact Tamar Frankel, 617-353-3773, tfrankel@bu.edu

“Mubarak’s detention makes me wonder what the ‘knock on’ effect will be in other countries facing similar issues. Ivory Coast’s former president just gave up the ghost and has been detained by the new regime, and it’s not at all uncommon for prior regime leaders to face legal charges after giving up power. Immunity grants are less available as a tool (as in situations like Chile and Sierra Leone) where either the domestic legislature retroactively voided the immunity and/or there were legal determinations in other settings that immunity grants, like statutes of limitation, don’t apply to really serious international crimes.

“Gadhafi certainly is thinking about this kind of thing and seems to have decided, at least for now, that his best option is to fight on. Obviously, the specter of legal charges makes a political resolution (like agreeing to go into exile) much harder. The UN Security Council resolution authorizing ICC investigation of Libya required Libya to cooperate with the ICC but only said that other states ‘should’ cooperate, leaving an opening for a state to agree to shelter him while not violating a SC resolution. The SC could have made such cooperation mandatory but didn’t, ostensibly to allow some opening for him to voluntarily leave power. That said, any country that takes him will certainly draw a lot of heat, and even open defiers of the SC and ICC (e.g., al Bashir in Sudan) might not want him there because it will only increase the pressure of their own situations.

“In terms of genuine threats of prosecution, it’s much harder to ignore serious crimes committed while someone was in the process of leaving office (or getting kicked out) than crimes committed while in office (which can stretch back 30+ years in some cases). The challenge is — putting aside courts of limited jurisdiction like the ICC which have a much more limited temporal mandate — that once someone is being investigated and prosecuted for anything, it’s much more likely that the prosecutor will go for the brass ring and seek to bring charges for whatever is available, including past conduct. So, you might see current crimes-on-the-way out operating as a trigger for a much wider inquiry into historic governmental criminality. The current crimes also make it harder to sort this out via a truth and reconciliation commission as in South Africa.”

Contact David Nersessian, 617-358-1959, dnersess@bu.edu

Joseph Wippl

 “The Bay of Pigs was the first example of the failure by intelligence and the CIA to analyze properly that Cuban dictator Fidel Castro had the support of the vast majority of the Cuban people. The opposition to Castro was located not in Cuba but in the United States, convenient safety valve for the Castro government. The operational element at the CIA did not ask the analytical element for an assessment of Castro’s support as well as the strength of his army. The Cuban emigrants supplied the manpower for the failed invasion and they were sure they had the support of the Cuban people. The invaders believed they would receive air cover but President Kennedy denied this overt American support for the invasion. Short of American troops, the invasion would fail with or without air cover. Over the years, Cuba’s loss was America’s (and the Republican party’s) gain as the emigrants generally proved themselves very economically successful in the United States.

“The second ultimate failure was the failure of both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to understand the end of the Monroe Doctrine of American hegemony in the Americas. Both presidents obsessed about Castro, spending money and undermining American prestige trying to overthrow him. Castro is still there, albeit in semi-retirement. Subsequent to the missile crisis, when both CIA and President Kennedy both acquitted themselves much better, Castro has been no threat to anyone other than the Cuban people.

“During the period 1959-61, the CIA’s Bay of Pigs Covert Action was authorized by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy with the informal concurrence of senior members of the Senate and House of Representatives who funded the operation.

“A Covert Action in 2011, such as Libya as reported by the press, would require President Obama to sign a ‘finding,’ that is, a written statement of the reason for an action taken in the national security interests of the United States, and to share the ‘finding’ with the intelligence committees of the House and Senate. The difference over a period of 50 years is a formalization process for Covert Action rather than a shift in authority from the President to Congress. To my knowledge, the Congress refused to fund only one Covert Action since the formalization processes were initiated in the early 1970s: support to the Nicaraguan contras in the mid-1980s.”

Contact Joseph Wippl, 617-353-8992, jwippl@bu.edu

“During the Cold War, France periodically pushed for a European (and mainly French) military capability apart from the overwhelming military force of the United States. From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterrand, various schemes were hatched to achieve this result. None of them amounted to anything.

“In the same period, France launched military interventions on numerous occasions in its former colonies in sub-Sahara Africa, defending proteges from domestic threats or ousting leaders who had lost favor with the former colonial power.

“Now, President Sarkozy seems intent on resurrecting this old policy of robust military interventions, this time for humanitarian reasons in partnerships with the United Nations. Unlike in the past, now Washington appears to be supportive of these independent French operations. And polls show that the French public is strongly supportive as well.

“But the big question is, where is the European Union and its much celebrated European Security and Defense Policy?”

Contact William Keylor, 617-358-0197, wrkeylor@bu.edu

Arthur Hulnick, a 35-year veteran of the intelligence profession, mostly with the CIA

Contact 617-353-8978, ahulnick@bu.edu

 
Joseph Wippl, a 30-year CIA veteran

Contact 617-353-8992, jwippl@bu.edu

“The president is walking a tightrope because a lot depends on what the Libyan rebels do or do not do.

“Regime change is difficult. Who will emerge as the leader?”

Watch the entire NECN interview here.

Contact Michael Corgan, 617-353-3553, mcorgan@bu.edu

“It seems to me that the demurrals about the mission from NATO members Turkey and Lithuania have to do with the fear of mission creep. To wit, how do strikes against Qaddafi’s ground forces serve the UNSC mission of protecting civilian life when the threat to civilians seems to have come mostly from the air?”

Contact Michael Corgan, 617-353-3553, mcorgan@bu.edu

“The Hobson’s choice Obama faces seems to be a simple one. Either run the operation unilaterally, and incur the resentment of Arab countries and the strong disapproval of many NATO allies, or try to preserve the broad coalition he has assembled which includes several Arab nations, in the face of divergent objectives pursued by its member states.

“Coalition warfare is always exceedingly difficult to manage, as Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin learned in World War II. But the alternative is a reversion to a U.S.-dominated unilateral operation as occurred in response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1990s. The decision he makes is bound to have many unforseen consequences for the region.”

Contact William Keylor, 617-358-0197, wrkeylor@bu.edu

Augustus Richard Norton, International relations professor; Middle East specialist and a member of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group; Author of “Hezbollah: A Short History”

Contact 617-358-7808, arn@bu.edu, Twitter @arnorton

Charles Dunbar, International relations professor; Former U.S. ambassador to Yemen

Contact 617-353-5633, cfdunbar@bu.edu

Joseph Wippl, International relations professor; a 30-year CIA veteran

Contact 617-353-8992, jwippl@bu.edu

Michael Corgan, International relations professor; a specialist in international security with extensive government service in political and military planning (especially NATO)

Contact 617-353-3553, mcorgan@bu.edu

William Keylor, International relations professor; Author of  “A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945″

Contact 617-358-0197, wrkeylor@bu.edu

Robert Zelnick, Journalism professor; Former ABC News foreign correspondent; Regular contributor to PoliticoArena

Contact 617-353-5007, bzelnick@bu.edu

Augustus Richard Norton, International relations professor; Middle East specialist and a member of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group; Author of “Hezbollah: A Short History”

Contact 617-353-7808, arn@bu.edu, Twitter: @arnorton

Adil Najam, International relations professor; Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future;  Expert on Pakistan and Middle East politics

Contact 617-358-4002, anajam@bu.edu, Twitter: @adilnajam

Charles Dunbar, International relations professor; Former U.S. ambassador to Yemen

Contact 617-353-5633, cfdunbar@bu.edu

Stephen Kinzer, International relations professor; Former award winning New York Times foreign correspondent; Author of “Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future”

Contact 617-358-6240, skinzer@bu.edu

Joseph Wippl, International relations professor; a 30-year CIA veteran

Contact 617-353-8992, jwippl@bu.edu

Robert Zelnick, Journalism professor; Former ABC News foreign correspondent; Regular contributor to PoliticoArena

Contact 617-353-5007, bzelnick@bu.edu

Farouk El-Baz, Research professor & Director of the Center for Remote Sensing; Expert in Middle East current events

Contact 617-353-9709, farouk@bu.edu