The New EU Governance: New Intergovernmentalism, New Supranationalism, and New Parliamentarism

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I was was in Brussels on June 16 to give a talk at a seminar hosted by the Open Society European Policy Institute and the Istituto degli Affari Internazionali based on my contribution to the IAI’s essay collection Govering Europe: How to Make the EU more Efficient and Democratic.

In the piece, entitled “The New EU Governance: New Intergovernmentalism, New Supranationalism, and New Parliamentarism,” I explain how governance in the EU has changed in recent years, what its problems are, and how it could be governed in the future.

I argue that only by by considering the  actions  and  interactions  of  all  three  main  actors  together  can we  fully  understand  the  “new”  EU  governance  and  its  problems. I use, by way of illustration, EU’s  crises  of  money,  borders  and  security, suggesting that it is best to think about the future of EU governance not in terms of any hard core but rather as a “soft core” of  member-states  clustered  in  overlapping  policy  communities. Finally I propose ways of reinforcing EU-level capacity for policy  coordination  with  national-level  decentralisation to address problems of democracy and legitimacy.

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Europe’s Crisis of Legitimacy: Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone

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I was in Mannheim on June 6 to give a talk entitled: “Europe’s Crisis of Legitimacy: Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone” at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), in their political science seminar series. I argue that the Eurozone’s economic crisis has generated a crisis of democratic legitimacy, as deteriorating economics and increasingly volatile politics have combined with restrictive governance processes focused on ‘governing by the rules and ruling by the numbers’. I analyze this legitimacy crisis in terms of problems with the ‘output’ policies, ‘input’ politics, and ‘throughput’ processes, arguing that in response to such problems, EU institutional actors—ECB, Council, Commission, and EP—all sought to reinterpret the rules and recalibrate the numbers ‘by stealth,’ that is without admitting it in their public discourse. My talk addressed not only issues of democratic theory but also neo-institutionalist theory, by analyzing on-going processes of ideational innovation and discursive legitimation during the Eurozone crisis using discursive institutionalism.

Vivien Schmidt in El Español on “The Seven Challenges Facing Europe”

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Spanish readers: Here is the link to an article on “The Seven Challenges Facing Europe,” for which I was interviewed along with Christopher Bickerton, published yesterday in El Español: http://www.elespanol.com/mundo/20160504/122237835_0.html. I gave this interview in conjunction with a talk on the impact of European integration on national democracies for the BBVA Foundation in Madrid on May 5, 2016.

Download the book  La búsqueda de Europa (kindle, epub y pdf)

British Journal of Politics and International Relations Prize

I was awarded a prize for best paper published in BJPIR (the British Journal of Politics and International Relations) 2013, for my paper entitled, “Speaking to the Markets or to the People? A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the EU’s Sovereign Debt Crisis.”   The prize was announced at the Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, at the conference dinner on the evening of March 31st, 2015 in Sheffield, UK.

The paper argues that the EU’s sovereign debt crisis is not just economic; it is also political, resulting from the failure of EU leaders to offer solutions that calm the markets and convince the people. These failures stem from problems with EU leaders’ ideas about how to solve the crisis as well as their communication about them. That communication encompasses not just EU leaders talking to one another in negotiations of crisis solutions but also speaking to “the markets’ and to ‘the people’ about those solutions, all of which may interact in perverse ways. My article uses the analytic framework of “discursive institutionalism” to consider the different forms, types, levels, rates and mechanisms of change in ideas followed by the EU leaders’ discursive interactions in the “coordinative” discourse and their “communicative discourse” to the global markets and European publics. It uses a range of country cases, but in particular Germany and France, in illustration.

Saving Social Europe: Going Beyond The EU’s “Governing By The Rules And Ruling By The Numbers”

Please see my recent op-ed for Social Europe Journal“Saving Social Europe: Going Beyond Governing by the Rules and Ruling by the Numbers” – on the continued travails of the Eurozone crisis, with suggestions on how to move beyond the austerity policies enacted since 2008 that have wreaked havoc on European social policies, in particular in countries in the periphery.

During the euro’s sovereign debt crisis, European leaders have been obsessed with rules, numbers, and pacts, including the so-called ‘Six-Pack,’ the ‘Two-Pack,’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact,’ each more stringent on the nature of the rules, more restrictive with regard to the numbers, and more punitive for member-states that failed to meet the requirements. In the absence of any deeper political or economic integration, the EU ended up with ‘governing by the rules’ and ‘ruling by the numbers’ in the Eurozone. Austerity policies focused on rapid deficit reduction along with pressures for structural reform – often shorthand for reducing labor rights and protections – have wreaked havoc on ‘Social Europe,’ in particular in countries in the periphery.

Slowly but surely, however, under pressure from deteriorating economies and increasing political volatility, EU leaders have been changing the rules by which they have been governing the economy. But they have not done this formally. Instead, EU leaders have been informally and incrementally reinterpreting the rules without admitting it in their discourse to the public. This has helped to slow the economic crisis but not to end it.

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The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning for the Stability Rules

The latest skirmish on the budget, as Berlin (and Brussels) try to hold the line on the stability rules, while Paris and Rome push for greater flexibility, is very much a draw.  Hollande and Renzi wanted and needed a very public fight to show their citizens that they have been pressing for less austerity to ensure economic growth, even as they reaffirmed their respect for the rules.  They won by gaining modest concessions that marginally violate the rules on austerity. Merkel also won by ensuring that they too had to make modest concessions toward greater austerity.  This leaves the question:  is this the beginning of the end for the stability rules or is it just the end of the beginning—with wrangling about the rules the new modus operandi? If the latter, Eurozone economies will continue to sink.

Quote appears in the Greek newspaper newspaper Kathimerini on November 6, 2014.