Lviv: A Multicultural History through the Centuries

YAROSLAV HRYTSAK

The history of Lviv may be told in many different ways, and indeed historians of assorted nationalities have written distinct historical accounts of the city according to their respective national perspectives. Thus, we have Ukrainian, Polish, Soviet, and Jewish versions of Lviv’s past. Non-Soviet Ukrainian historians have focused on the city as the capital of the Galician-Volhynian principality in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, on the Ukrainian national revivals in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries and in the nineteenth century, as well as on the short-lived Western Ukrainian National Republic established in 1918. Their Soviet counterparts have devoted most attention to the city’s alleged “period of greatest bloom” under communist rule (1944–1991). Polish historians of the city paint the image of Lviv as *semper fidelis*, one always loyal to a Polish state from 1340 to 1772 and again from 1919 to 1939. In Jewish historiography, the designation of Lviv as the “mother of Israel” may be encountered.

No matter how detailed and well written, each of these versions of urban history selects or highlights only those facts and events that best conform to a national paradigm. Even when presenting the same events, such histories differ radically in their interpretations. Thus, the “national” accounts vary in their dating of the city’s origins, the introduction of Magdeburg law, and the foundation of the university in Lviv.

Nevertheless, some of the more recent histories of the city have tried to cross national boundaries, and, in fact, such “transgressions” have increased since the fall of communism. It seems likely that a new multicultural history of Lviv may emerge from these border crossings and supersede the previous nationally defined narratives. However, at present even the general outlines of such a synthetic approach are unclear, for far too much research remains to be done. Thus, this essay pursues only the more modest aim of compiling a multicultural urban history based in large part on recently published research.

One of the most striking discoveries presented in that research pertains to the earliest history of Lviv. Traditionally, the city was thought to have been founded by the Galician prince Danylo Romanovych (1202–1264) several years before its first mention in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (which dates to 1256 or, according to another interpretation, 1259) and was named after Danylo’s son Lev (1228–1300). Some historians doubted this story, and believed that the city was founded several decades earlier, sometime at the turn

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of the thirteenth century. However, in 1992 archeological excavations revealed that Lviv has a much older history, and that the city’s site had been continuously inhabited since the end of the fifth century. This would make Lviv one of the oldest settlements in East Central Europe. Similar settlements, such as the largest known one north of Lviv at Zymno in Volhynia, never evolved into urban centers, while others which did, such as neighboring Halych, Chelm (Kholm), or Volodymyr, became capitals of early medieval states only to fall into decline. In contrast, the settlement that evolved into Lviv continued to grow.

A combination of factors contributed to this steady growth. First and foremost among them was the city’s advantageous location on the divide between the Baltic and Black Sea basins. In medieval times the trade route connecting those seas passed through Lviv, which developed as a market town where merchants stopped to sell goods from the Near East and from the Baltic and North Seas. Already in the fourteenth century a Catalan map of the world displayed Lviv and read: “Merchants come to this city, arriving from the east and leaving via the German [Baltic] sea to Flanders.” Situated along the east-west trade route, which Ferdinand Braudel described as “an essential hinge on which the European complex turned,” Lviv flourished.

Thus, some kind of a larger settlement was bound to emerge on the cross-section of the north-south and west-east trade routes. The identity of this trade center’s earliest inhabitants remains unclear. “Croats” or “White Croats” had inhabited the territory in which it lies between the fifth and the tenth centuries. One school of thought considers these as a nomadic Irano-Alanic tribe that was gradually absorbed by sedentary Slavs. According to another interpretation, they formed a unified Slavic community that later evolved into eastern (Ruthenian, later Ukrainian) and western (Polish) branches. Polish and Ukrainian historians dispute the issue of whether there was a clear-cut ethnic border between their ancestors in the two communities and debate the matter of regional boundaries. Neither side, however, may be correct, because there is no special reason to believe that at that time ethnic and cultural borders coincided with political ones. Most probably, sometime between the years 950 and 970 the territory of Galicia became an eastern frontierland of the Great Moravian kingdom. What is more certain, however, is that in 981 the area of Lviv lay on the western borderlands of Kyivan Rus’.

This “borderlands” pattern was broken in 1199, when Galicia became the core of the Galician-Volhynian principality, which at the height of its power controlled Kyiv, the former capital of the Rus’ state. This came about because of the Mongol invasions of the Kyivan Rus’ territories in the middle of the thirteenth century, which provoked a mass migration westward and northward into Galicia. The refugees from the invading Mongols provided an economic and political stimulus for the development of the area. At this time, Lviv was founded in direct response to the Mongol capture and destruction of the old Galician capital of Halych. Most likely, Lviv was first established as a new
quarter of a previous settlement and then granted a specific juridical urban status.\textsuperscript{19}

Circa 1270 the city became the capital of the Galician-Volhynian principal-
ity and remained so until that state’s demise in the 1340s. Thus, almost from its
very beginnings the settlement functioned both as an administrative center of a
state and a trade center, the commercial connections of which extended into
Asia Minor, the Volga region, Crimea, and Moldova. Armenian documents of
the fourteenth century describe Lviv in this period as “the most blessed and
dignified mother of cities [metropolia], protected by God” and “the most
blessed capital protected by God, and the glorious mother of cities that belong
to Christian kings.”\textsuperscript{20} On the “List of nearest and farthest Ruthenian cities”
compiled by the second half of the fourteenth century, the city bore the sobri-
quet “Great Lviv.”\textsuperscript{21}

There is no doubt that this trading city had a multiethnic character from the
very beginning. Danylo and Lev were Orthodox Ruthenians, as, most probably,
were the majority of the city’s population. On the other hand, the principality
had intensive contacts with the Catholic world through dynastic intermarriages
with Polish, Hungarian, and Austrian royal houses, early German colonization,
and special relations with Rome. Beside Catholics and Orthodox, various
Eastern peoples resided in the city. The royal charter granting fundamental
privileges to the city in 1356 provides a clue to the ethnic composition of Lviv
at that time. It mentions, among others, Armenians, Tatars, Jews, and, rather
enigmatically, “Saracens,”\textsuperscript{22} whom historians have variously identified as
Karaim, Turks, Arabs, or even Genoese.\textsuperscript{23}

After the last Galician prince died without an heir in 1324 and a sixteen-
year period of interim rule, Polish, Hungarian, and Lithuanian kings and
princes contended for the city and principality in the years 1340–1387. The
Polish king Casimir III laid siege to the city with his Polish and German troops
and captured it in 1340. In 1356 Casimir introduced (or, as some historians
would say, reintroduced) a municipal government into the city according to
the premises of the Magdeburg law.\textsuperscript{24} The city expanded and its center shifted
to the southwest. In 1380, during the period of joint Polish-Hungarian rule
(1370–1387), King Louis I (Hung. Lajos, Pol. Ludwik) implemented a law that
granted the city certain commercial rights (“prawo składu”) which fortified
Lviv’s position as an important trading center, because the law stipulated that
all merchants passing through the city were obliged to stop there for fourteen
days and offer their goods for sale.\textsuperscript{25} This privilege enriched Lviv merchants,
who could now virtually monopolize the trade coming from the Orient into the
Polish kingdom. Lviv was finally annexed by Poland in 1387 and later (ca.
1435) became the capital of the “Ruthenian voivodeship” (Województwo
Ruskie).

Under Polish rule (1387–1772) the city also served as a military stronghold
that enjoyed the reputation of an “unconquerable fortress” until it was sacked
by Swedish troops at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This period of the
city's history was marked by a sequence of calamities, including epidemics, foreign sieges, riots, and fires. The wooden buildings of the city were destroyed in a conflagration in 1527; thereafter, the city was rebuilt in stone.

Nevertheless, as a comparatively safe administrative and trade haven Lviv attracted a diverse population. From records we know that the approximately one third of the city's residents who were granted citizenship rights from the fifteenth to the first half of the seventeenth century were merchants and artisans directly engaged in east-west commerce. About 40 percent of the immigrants came to the city from Polish and German lands. Polish kings also promoted the settlement of Germans and Jews in Lviv. Armenians, Scots, Romanians ("Wallachians"), Hungarians, Greeks, and Czechs also settled there. The flow of immigration into the city came mainly from the west via the cities of Cracow and Przemyśl (Peremyshl), and from Lviv newcomers fanned out further to the east. Areas which were on the periphery, especially to the north of the continental trade route, were forced to use more local human resources for their economies. About 20–25 percent of Lviv’s population derived from the local (ethnically Ruthenian) voivodeships of the Polish crown.

This mixed urban population generally increased throughout medieval and early modern times. Two to three thousand inhabitants lived in Lviv during the existence of the Galician-Volhynian principality. The population rose to about 5,500 by the beginning of the fifteenth century and to 8,000 by end of that century. The most dramatic increase in population coincided with an increase in trade at the end of the fourteenth and during the first half of the seventeenth centuries. The city’s population more than doubled from approximately 12,000 between 1572 and 1591 to 29,000 between 1592 and 1620. Nonetheless, compared with other more western cities in Europe during that period, Lviv remained only a middle-size city. Its development followed a general pattern of urbanization in Eastern and Central Europe, where cities had smaller populations than their counterparts further west.

What distinguished Lviv from other cities was the starkly multiethnic character of its population. By the second quarter of the sixteenth century the ethnic composition of its population was divided as follows: Poles (38 percent), Ruthenians (24 percent), Germans (8 percent), Jews (8 percent), and Armenians (7 percent). No other city in the Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1569–1772), or perhaps in all of Europe, could claim five ethnic groups each comprising over 5 percent of the population. In its religious composition the city exhibited a similar diversity. Catholics, Orthodox, Armenian Christians, and Jews lived in Lviv. The German merchant Martin Grüneweg, a seventeenth-century chronicler of the city, vividly describes this diversity:

In this city, as in Venice, it became quite usual to meet people at the market from all countries of the world in their dress: Magyars in their magerkas, Cossacks in their kuchmas, Muscovites in white hats, Turks in white turbans.
All of them are in long clothes, while Germans, Italians, and Spaniards wear short clothes. Each of them, whatever language they speak, will find their own language here. The city is more than a hundred miles away from the sea. Still, when you see . . . crowds of Cretans, Turks, Italians, dressed as sailors, you have a feeling that a seaport would be right behind the city gate.34

The mix of nationalities lent Lviv a great cultural diversity. However, one has to keep in mind that medieval notions of “culture” and “nation” differed significantly from a modern understanding of these terms. Medieval multiculturalism had an explicit social dimension. The city was both an intermediary and a melting pot for the three layers of medieval culture—nobiliary, burgher, and peasant. Each of them was different not only in terms of material culture, but also in terms of values, consciousness, and lifestyles.35

The old Ruthenian nobility reacted to the suzerainty of Polish kings over Ruthenian lands by assimilating to Polish culture. This engendered a specific type of gente Rutheni natione Poloni (Ruthenians by origin and Poles by nation), who together with ethnic Polish nobles formed a multiethnic “nation of gentry” (szlachta). The szlachta, though Polish in culture, was initially conceived as a political and not an ethnic community.36 It was a community based on a shared “Sarmatian” myth of common Oriental origins. Whether Polish or Ruthenian, the nobles claimed the “Royal Sarmatians” and Scythians as ancestors, who, in turn, were said to descend directly from the Biblical Adam.37

Until the eighteenth century, these nobles with their landed estates dominated neither politically nor economically.38 Their “Sarmatian” influences, however, made a deep impact on the culture of the burgher, as is evident in the writings of poets such as Sebastian Klonowicz (Sebastianus Fabianus Acernus, 1545–1602) and Jan Turobiński (Ioannes Turobines Ruthenus, 1511–1575), who wrote in or about Lviv.39

The distinct rural culture surrounding Lviv provided a facet of its multicultural composition. For centuries Lviv remained an island in a huge rural sea of peasants, who comprised only a small minority of those gaining a legal status in the city during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (ca. 15–20 percent). In all probability, however, the percentage of peasants residing in the city would have been higher if one counted those living there illegally.40

Generally, these local peasants occupied the lower social strata in the city, but their constant influx sustained a Ruthenian and an Orthodox presence in Lviv. “There were not that many Ruthenians [in Lviv]; still, there was too much Ruthenianness,” is how the Polish historian Władysław Łoziński ironically summarized this situation.41

Catholic burghers controlled the municipal administration and dominated the political and cultural landscape of the city, for they were the only residents accorded the full rights of citizenship under Magdeburg law. In the medieval and early modern period, Catholics made up about 50 percent of Lviv’s population. Perhaps no other city of the Rzeczpospolita had such a dispropror-
tionate representation of Catholics in comparison with their numbers in the countryside.42

The ethnic composition of this dominant Catholic community changed significantly over the centuries. Lviv’s first chronicler, Józef Bartolemej Zimorowicz (1597–1677), divided the post-“Ruthenian” history of the city into two periods: “Leopolis Germanica” (German Lviv) and “Leopolis Polonica” (Polish Lviv), proposing 1550 as the watershed.43 Until this date German influence was predominant. The majority of the burghers were German, and German was the only language of administration. Still, a lack of religious, juridical, and, later on, language barriers (with the spread of official Latin instead of German and Polish as the lingua franca) facilitated intermarriage within the Catholic community and led to a gradual assimilation of Germans to Polish culture.44

While the Catholic community became increasingly polonized, the Orthodox Greeks, Wallachians, Serbs, and Moldovans assimilated to the local Ruthenian culture. In contrast, the Armenians remained ethnically homogenous, maintaining their distinctiveness through their separate Christian denomination. Still, they were a diverse community in themselves, for they were divided by language and by origins. A larger group of Armenians had come to Lviv from Crimea and spoke the Kipchak (Tatar) language; a smaller group had emigrated from Wallachia and knew only Armenian. In the context of medieval society, the Armenians composed the urban middle class, and by the end of the sixteenth century the number of Armenian merchants exceeded the number of Polish and Ruthenian merchants in the city.45

Yet the Armenians, like the Ruthenians, were considered second-class citizens (incolae). Such discrimination against non-Catholic Christians was a local peculiarity uncommon in a Polish state known for its religious tolerance. In other cities such as the neighboring Przemyśl, non-Catholic Christians enjoyed equal rights with Catholics. However, this period of religious tolerance in the Rzeczpospolita would come to an end in the late sixteenth century. At that time, a revolutionary Protestantism and the restorative Catholic Counter-Reformation challenged the Orthodox and Armenian Churches. Compromising with Rome, a part of the local Orthodox and Armenian Church hierarchies founded the Uniate (later called Greek Catholic) Church (1596) and the Armenian Catholic Church (1635), which recognized the authority of the pope while preserving their rites.46 This opened the way to a more intensive Polish assimilation of the two groups. Because of their smaller numbers the Armenians assimilated more quickly.47

On the threshold of modern times, Catholicism seemed to have won the battle for hegemony within the city. Yet later Orthodox cultural revivals would expose the fragility of this situation. The end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries saw the establishment of an Orthodox confraternity—the Dormition Brotherhood—in Lviv, with its own school and printing house. Lviv became a major intellectual center for Orthodox Ruthenians (later
Ukrainians and Belarusians) in the Rzeczpospolita. Somewhat paradoxically, the efficiency of the Orthodox resurgence depended on cultural borrowings from their rivals. The confraternity adopted Jesuit instructional methods, Catholic scholarship, and belles-lettres. Given this Orthodox revival, it is perhaps no coincidence that the Muscovite book printer Ivan Fedorov, who fled his backward homeland where the printer’s craft was considered a “black art,” found shelter under the auspices of the Lviv confraternity in 1572, where his skills provided a weapon to counter Catholic propaganda. After another century of bitter rivalry between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches the resistance of the latter was finally broken, and the Uniate Church consolidated its position in Lviv and Galicia.

Jews composed another large unassimilated community that challenged the Catholic domination in the city. Besides the Poles, they were the only other group in the city whose population increased steadily. By the end of the sixteenth century, Jews outnumbered both Ruthenians and Armenians in Lviv. As a diaspora group with distinct, ancient cultural traditions, they were segregated socially and excluded from the polity. In this sense the Jews, who came from both the East and the West, were very similar to the Armenians. Though the Jews did not enjoy burgher rights in Lviv, the king granted them special privileges. As his subjects, they stood under the direct jurisdiction of the royal governor and a council of Jewish elders. The Jews of Lviv engaged in trade, handicrafts, moneylending, and other financial activities; but the Jewish population also comprised a large group of laborers, who had no specific occupation. Though regulations restricted the economic activities of the Jews, Lviv’s Christians often complained that they controlled the city. At best the Christians tolerated the Jews; at worst Jews became victims of numerous pogroms instigated by the Christians.49

By the end of the sixteenth century, Lviv had become a major center of Polish, Ruthenian, Jewish, and Armenian cultures, the influences of which were spread throughout all of Eastern and Central Europe by books printed in the city and by those who had studied in its schools. This flourishing urban culture came to an end by the middle of the seventeenth century as Lviv’s prosperity declined. Several factors led to this decline: a reorientation of the whole European commerce from continental toward overseas trade routes, military catastrophes of the second half of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, and an increase in the influence of the Polish nobility.

Miserable conditions prevailed in Lviv at the time of its annexation by the Austrian monarchy in 1772. The first accounts of Austrian officials and travelers visiting the city reported the extremely poor condition of the streets and that many houses were either in ruins or uninhabited. When the Habsburg emperor Joseph II first visited Lviv and his six-horse coach became trapped in mud in a central but impassable street,50 this sent a clear message that something had to be done in terms of improving the city’s conditions.
Lviv became the capital of Galicia—the largest of the Austrian crownlands—which included the former Ruthenian and Belz voivodeships with their overwhelming Ruthenian populations. Officially, the crownland was called the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, a name that harked back to the medieval Galician-Volhynian principality (Regnum Galiciae et Lodomeriae). Yet if the name evoked a past era, the Austrian administration aimed to modernize the region and the new crownland capital. Lviv had lost its traditional importance as a trade center to Brody, which stood close to the Austrian-Russian border, and its role as the main eastern fortress to the city of Przemyśl. Thus, between 1777 and 1825, all of Lviv’s fortifications were pulled down and boulevards took their place. Though such a pattern of urban reconstruction was a hallmark of Habsburg administration in the expanded empire, in Lviv it took place much earlier even than in Vienna (1857) or in Prague (1870). Only after the building of railway connections between Vienna and Russian seaports in the 1860s was the city able to reemerge as an important trading center. These developments led to an increase in the city’s population: from 29,500 in 1776 to 212,000 in 1913.

Compared with other European cities in the nineteenth century, Lviv’s development was impressive but not extraordinary. Lviv did not belong to the list of the “top forty” European cities, but was certainly among the “top forty” cities in the east-central part of the continent. Other cities in the region had experienced much more dramatic development by the end of the century; however, Lviv stood apart due to a specific economic conjuncture. Except for the establishment of local oil production, industrialization left Austrian Galicia largely untouched. It remained one of the poorest and most populated agricultural regions in all of Europe. This backwardness became apparent in two industrial exhibitions held in Lviv, in 1877 and in 1894. Still, the lack of industrialization offered advantages. The city was spared the excessive pressures on urban services and resources that were common to other cities that experienced large-scale migration. Judging by the criteria of maximum use of city infrastructure for the needs of everyday life and the support of urban culture, by the turn of the century Lviv had become a modern city and one of the few modern cities within the territories of the former Rzeczpospolita.

Lviv owed its spectacular growth to its role as the capital of Galicia. After the 1860s, when Galicia gained autonomy, the center of administrative power shifted from Vienna to Lviv. This resulted in a concentration of administrative, economic, educational, and cultural institutions in the city, one which distinguished it from Cracow, the other major Galician city. Through its status as a crownland capital, Lviv garnered large state investments, and the reintroduction of self-government in 1870 allowed the municipality to channel those investments into the development of urban infrastructure.

Austrian rule thus introduced a peculiar kind of modernization, whereby the main agent of change was not industry or private capital, but the state. Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century, government officials com-
prised one of the largest social groups in the city.\textsuperscript{60} This "modernization through bureaucratization" affected Lviv in its own way, making deep inroads into Galician society and even engendering a type of nationalism through bureaucratic practice. Emperor Joseph II is sometimes even credited for creating the very nations themselves in the Habsburg Empire through his enlightened reforms.\textsuperscript{61} In the specific multiethnic milieu of Galicia, one nationalism inspired and reinforced another. The first bureaucrats, mostly Germans or germanized Czechs from the core lands of the empire, charged Polish nobility with a direct responsibility for the drastic decline of the region and considered it their mission "to reeducate Sarmatian beasts into human beings."\textsuperscript{62} Initially, the Habsburg bureaucrats occupied most positions in the local government, and until 1849 no native Galician was appointed as governor. In 1825, German was introduced instead of Latin as the official language of administration and also as the language of instruction at Lviv University. By the 1830s, for a German traveler Lviv had a totally German appearance, and looked like Magdeburg, Nuremberg, or Frankfurt-am-Main. Its "Germanness" stemmed not only from the Magdeburg planning of the old city, but from a feeling of being protected by a just government, from an emphasis on order, and last but not least, from the "Germanic" coffee-houses.\textsuperscript{63}

The germanization of the city provoked resistance from the Polish elite. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the high urban culture had divided into two antagonistic camps, the "party of Schiller" and the "party of Mickiewicz." The center of the Polish activities was a cultural institution called the Ossolineum, founded in 1815 in Lviv by permission of the Austrian government. Polish cultural activism was only part of a growing nationalism that had a clear political aim in the restoration of the \textit{Rzeczpospolita} within its former ("historical") borders. At times of Habsburg weakness—during Napoleon's offensive in 1809 and the revolution of 1848—Polish nationalists attempted to wrest control of the city. Their failure finally forced them to compromise with the Habsburgs. For its part, the Austrian government was forced to come to terms with the Polish elite in the 1860s, after being weakened by a series of military defeats and by tensions and strife within the multinational empire. With the granting of autonomy to Galicia in the 1860s, the polonization of the crownland became the \textit{sine qua non} of further Austrian-Polish coexistence.\textsuperscript{64}

As in the late medieval era, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century German "Lemberg" had become Polish "Lwów" again. The Polish acculturation of Austrian German officials could best be illustrated by the fact that the last mayor appointed by Vienna, Franz Kröbl, asked to be buried wearing Polish \textit{kontusz} (i.e., "Sarmatian") dress.\textsuperscript{65} Less hampered by political constraints, the Polish elite saw Galicia as fulfilling the special role of a "national Piedmont," i.e., the territory which would serve as a core for a reborn Polish state. Lviv was to serve as a center of national revival for all the areas of partitioned Poland. This Polish understanding of the city manifested itself on
different levels, from the predominance of Poles in the local administration to the renaming of streets after personages, events, and places in Polish history.

The "re-polonization" of the city was a direct result of Polish political dominance during the period of autonomy. However, other factors were at work. First of all, Polish nationalism had rather strong democratic and revolutionary connotations, which made it very appealing for many non-Poles. The better educated and more numerous Poles dominated in the areas of education, cultural production, and representation in a city that had an impoverished and tiny Ruthenian elite and a small Jewish one.

Yet from the very beginning of Habsburg rule in Lviv, the imperial government carried out policies that put an end to the most extreme religious, ethnic, and social discrimination toward Ruthenians and Jews in the former Rzeczpospolita. Both Ruthenians and Jews reciprocated by expressing loyalty to the Habsburg rulers. In the case of the Jews, access to education led to a germanization of their elites. From 1815 to 1840, Lviv became one of the most important centers of Haskalah (the Jewish Enlightenment) that claimed, among other things, that Jews were a part of the German nation. Introduction of Galician autonomy led to a new crisis in the Jewish community. A new generation of "progressive" Jewish intellectuals insisted that Galician Jews become members of the Polish nation. Antisemitic sentiments rose in Polish society as Jews attempted to assimilate to Polish culture. By the turn of the twentieth century, Polish national strivings had begun to lose their more democratic implications and devolve into a xenophobic nationalism. Rejected by the Poles, some of the young Jewish intellectuals turned to Zionism and the concept of an independent Jewish nation. By the end of the nineteenth century Lviv had become one of the first strongholds of Zionist organizations.66

Not unlike the Jews, Ruthenians under Austrian rule evinced shifting cultural and national orientations. The early phase of their national revival from 1810 to the 1840s took its cue from German and Polish examples. During the 1848 Revolution their national aspirations received support from the central Austrian government, which saw in them the means to counter Polish strivings for independence. From 1848 until the demise of the Austrian Empire, Ruthenians strove to divide Galicia into western (Polish) and eastern (Ruthenian) provinces, with Lviv as the capital of the latter.67

Even though united in their resentments against Polish domination, the Ruthenian camp was disunited on the matter of their national orientations. In the age of modern nationalism and progressing assimilation, their ethnic identity was threatened. They were looking for a solution that would elevate their small ethnic group to the status of membership within a larger nation. Starting from 1848 and until World War I, the Ruthenian elite was fragmented into pro-Russian, pro-Polish, and pro-Ukrainian orientations.68

The Ukrainian orientation won out when, owing to repression, leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire moved the center of their activity from Russian Kyiv to Austrian Lviv and assigned to Galicia the role of
a "Ukrainian Piedmont." Ukrainian activity was concentrated in the Shevchenko Scientific Society, founded in Lviv in 1873 with substantial financial assistance from Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. The famous Ukrainian historian and political leader Mykhailo Hrushevskyi from Kyiv headed this organization between 1897 and 1913. During this period in the Galician capital, the modern Ukrainian literary language was codified and a new national version of history was elaborated. Lviv experienced the founding of the first Ukrainian political parties and the initial propagation of political independence for Ukraine.69 In this period, Ruthenians finally became Ukrainians, and Lviv became one of the most Ukrainian cities in terms of both political influences and cultural production.

The last years of Austrian rule in Lviv fully revealed the ambiguous character of the Habsburg heritage in the city. On the one hand, each ethnic group inherited constitutional and liberal practices that still had a positive influence in their political organizations.70 On the other hand, the legacy was marred by acute national tensions that carried the seeds of future violent conflicts. This second tendency predominated throughout most of the twentieth century, as the violent Polish-Ukrainian national conflict in Galicia led to ethnic cleansings during and after both world wars. Though the political leaders from the two rival camps deserve credit for banning the most violent forms of their conflict from Lviv,71 that city had all the potential of becoming what Sarajevo was in the early 1990s.

The large-scale loss of life in Lviv during the twentieth century resulted not from ethnic conflict but from warring powers trying to assert their control over East Central Europe. Lviv endured the political and military turmoil associated with the world wars and their effects. From 1914 to 1919 political control of the city changed seven times. For a short period at the very beginning of World War I (September 1914 to June 1915) Russian troops occupied the city and installed a military administration. At the end of World War I, in November 1918, Lviv was proclaimed the capital of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, which declared unification in January 1919 with the Ukrainian National Republic in Kyiv to become the first independent and united Ukrainian state. The proclamation had a rather symbolic meaning, for by the middle of 1919 the Poles had taken control of Galicia after defeating the Ukrainians in the Polish-Ukrainian War. Under the Polish interwar regime Lviv came to serve as the capital of a voivodeship bearing its name (Województwo Lwowskie). After the fall of Poland, the Soviets occupied Lviv from September 1939 until June 1941. The German Nazi occupation, when during the 1941–1944 interim period Galicia was included in the Generalgouvernement as a separate Distrikt Galizien, proved devastating. Lviv was relegated to the status of a provincial city, while Cracow became the Distrikt capital. After being retaken by the Red Army in 1944, Galicia was again annexed by the Soviet Union. Throughout the whole Soviet period as well as after the break-up of the USSR, Lviv served as the administrative center of the Lviv Oblast, first in the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR), and then, after 1991, in an independent Ukraine.

Despite the turbulent events of the twentieth century, Lviv continued to grow much as it had in the nineteenth century, doubling its population every 40–50 years. Although two caesuras interrupted this trend owing to the world wars, the city recovered quickly. By 1921 the population of Lviv had exceeded that of 1910 and by 1955 that of 1943. In 1990 it reached its highest point of 790,000, making Lviv the sixteenth largest city in East Central Europe. Part of the city’s continued growth in the first half of the twentieth century depended on its expansion into a “Greater Lviv,” which incorporated the neighboring villages. This idea had already been suggested during the Habsburg period, but was only realized in 1930, when the city doubled its territory from 32.40 square kilometers to 66.68 square kilometers. The incorporation gained the support of the Polish elite, which worried about the decline in the city’s prestige during the interwar period and who sought to counter this trend by instituting special programs to revive the former capital status of the city and its political, economic, and cultural importance in a reborn Poland. Those plans failed largely due to such contingent factors as the Great Depression of 1929–1933, although a more specific reason can be found in the departure of the most qualified Polish and Jewish professionals to other cities of Poland, where they found better career opportunities. A simultaneous emigration of Ukrainians took place, directed to Prague, Berlin, or to the Ukrainian SSR, where the short-lived ukrainianization of the 1920s offered them an opportunity to make full use of their qualifications. The Ukrainians and Jews were driven away by the extremely nationalistic policies of the new Polish state, which found their most severe application in the eastern provinces. Nonetheless, interwar statistics reveal that the assimilation of Jews and Germans in Lviv progressed on a larger scale than in Cracow, not to mention Łódź or Warsaw.

Such polonization often bore a superficial character and did not lead to any decrease of national tensions. The social and cultural disenfranchisement experienced by Jews and Ukrainians in the Polish state helped spawn extreme political movements influenced by communist and nationalist ideologies. The extremism of political groups in Lviv mirrored the growing influence of communism and fascism throughout Eastern and Central Europe. Both the Soviet troops in 1939 and Nazi troops in 1941 were thus met enthusiastically by alienated and radicalized segments of the local population. A part of the Jewish elite opted for Stalin, while some Ukrainian nationalists imagined the realization of their national aspirations through Hitler.

The Nazi and Soviet regimes combined to destroy the historically multicultural character of the city. From 1772 to 1939 the ethnic structure of Lviv had evolved in a rather stable tripartite manner among the dominant Poles (from 50 to 55 percent), and the two minorities of Jews (30–35 percent) and Ukrainians (15–20 percent). The German Nazi invaders totally decimated the
Jewish population (only some 2–3 percent survived the mass murders), while the Soviet regime deported Poles and repopulated the city with people from other parts of the Soviet Union (Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, Moldovans, and others) and with Ukrainians who had been deported from territories allotted to postwar Poland. The remaining Ukrainians and Poles were repressed by the Soviet regime; many fled to Western Europe or North America. All told, Lviv lost about 80 percent of its prewar population. Resettlement transformed Lviv into a predominantly East Slavic city of Ukrainians and Russians. The Ukrainians steadily increased their proportion of the population from 44.2 percent in 1955 to 79.1 percent in 1989, while the Russian proportion dropped from 35 percent to 16 percent during the same period. By 1989 Jews and Poles comprised 1.6 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively. No other minority constituted more than 1 percent of the population.

With the repopulation of the city, the Soviet regime launched an ambitious project to transform Lviv into an industrial center. This plan was announced in 1946 and, if one believes the Soviet official reports, the city’s rate of industrial growth during the 1950s–1970s surpassed that of the rest of Galicia, of the entire Ukrainian SSR, and indeed of the Soviet Union as a whole. This represented a bold attempt to break with traditional patterns in both urban and regional development. As a result of these policies, Lviv became a leader in the production of televisions, buses, industrial machines, and sophisticated technical devices used mainly in the military. As part of Soviet urban development the city was surrounded with new slab-style apartment blocks that formed a “New Lviv” and that was meant to house engineers and workers from other Soviet cities and, most of all, from other parts of western Ukraine (about 60 percent of the migrants came from surrounding regions, according to some estimates). However, industrialization outpaced urban development, so that the rapid growth of new plants and factories, for example, brought about an acute shortage in the water supply. This forced industrialization failed to have a general economic impact on the region. Galicia remained one of the most overcrowded, least productive, and poorest paid areas of Ukraine.

Within the Soviet Union, Galicia bore the reputation of being one of the least sovietized regions. Although the pre-1939 political, civic, and religious institutions (including the Greek Catholic and Armenian Catholic Churches) had been disbanded as centers of “bourgeois” and “nationalistic” influences after World War II, anti-Soviet guerillas continued to operate in the region until the early 1950s. This had two opposite results. Galician Ukrainians were not considered sufficiently reliable to hold the highest positions within and outside of the region, and so during the half century of Soviet rule the local party and administrative elite were largely imported from Russia or eastern Ukraine. On the other hand, the Soviet regime did not dare to foster a rapid russification and sovietization of this “contaminated” region. In contrast to other parts of the former Polish state annexed in 1939 by the USSR, in western Ukraine the bulk of local newspapers and magazines were published in the indigenous language.
as opposed to Russian. While all other cities in the Ukrainian SSR were becoming more Russian in terms of both population and language, Lviv exhibited an opposite tendency. Moreover, in the postwar decades Lviv became a leading center of an intellectual ferment for all of Ukraine, a sort of "secret Ukrainian capital." Lviv provided cadres and a leadership for an anti-Soviet opposition movement during the 1960s and 1970s, and played a crucial role in attaining Ukrainian independence at the end of the Gorbachev period.89

Nonetheless, post-Soviet Lviv appears not to have gained much in the first years of Ukrainian independence, much as the interwar city seemed to have benefited little from the reconstitution of the Polish state.90 According to a conservative estimate, by the beginning of 1999 close to a third of all Lviv workers had lost their jobs as the city's military production complexes closed down. In the words of an American journalist, "no Ukrainian city is more European or more democratic. And few are poorer."91 Since 1994, Lviv has been losing population, so that the once projected growth to 1,000,000 inhabitants by 201092 now seems farfetched. Hoping to reverse this decline, the city council has been reorienting the city away from industry and toward tourism. However, until now it has only been able to achieve the modest success of having Lviv declared a World Cultural Heritage city by UNESCO (1998).

In reviewing the multicultural history of Lviv, one discerns a double message. On the one hand, the story is one of a failed multicultural experience. Civic solidarity and cooperation among citizens failed to cross the religious, social, ethnic or, later, national boundaries.93 In medieval times the multicultural picture resembled a mosaic in which different ethnic groups made separate pieces and did not mix with each other. Different ethnic and religious groups might speak a common language (as in the cases of the Armenians and the Tatars) or have the same juridical status (the Ukrainians and the Armenians), but they lived in isolation and intermarriages were rather rare.94

These cultural divisions left visible traces on the very planning of the city. Catholics occupied the central Market Square (Pol. Rynek/Ukr. Rynok), while all other groups lived separately in adjacent streets (i.e., the Armenian, Jewish, Serbian, or Ruthenian Streets). More recently some of these borders have been erased and others have become more transparent, but they never ceased to exist. The Austrian and Polish regimes provided some, if limited, opportunities for the civic activity of all national groups, but most of the modern civic institutions and places for public exchange (including Lviv's famous café houses) were staffed and attended according to the national identities of their members.95 As a result, instead of a single one, several competing civil societies developed along national lines.96

If, in the words of Andrzej Walicki, multiculturalism is a situation in which a dominant culture does not subordinate other cultures,97 then such a situation was rather rare in the history of Lviv. A dialogue between different cultures quite often meant an assimilation of a subordinate group by a dominant culture, while subordinate cultures remained largely alien to each other. Thus, a number
of Lviv-born Jews became leading Polish intellectuals, but there was little if any Ukrainian-Jewish cultural exchange. Moreover, even an assimilation to a dominant culture as a surrogate of encounters between different cultures became problematic in an increasingly nationalized world. Through continued degrees of social and political exclusion assimilated persons were confronted with their “alien” ethnic origin. The fate of the assimilated Polish Jews in Lviv, who were rejected by Polish nationalism in interwar Poland and destroyed by the Nazis during World War II—not as Poles by their choice, but as Jews by their origin—may serve as sad corroboration of this thesis.

On the other hand, the multicultural mix influenced each national group. The diverse ethnic, religious, and social structure of the city’s population brought forth renowned Polish, Jewish, and German writers—Joseph Roth, Józef Wittlin, Martin Buber, Stanislaw Lem—who spent their formative years in Lviv. An outstanding “native son” nurtured in this milieu was the Ukrainian writer and political activist Ivan Franko (1856–1916). A trilingual author who wrote in Ukrainian, Polish, and German, his literary and political works drew on interchanges between the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish cultures.

The question remains: What is the legacy of this multicultural environment after it ceased to exist? Its impact had been apparent in many of the cultural markers identifying each ethnic group in the city. The Yiddish language spoken by Galician Jews was a German dialect mixed with Hebrew elements and local Slavic (Polish and Ukrainian) borrowings. The Armenian statute of 1519 comprised elements of Armenian, Jewish, Islamic, and Eastern Roman laws as well as Western Polish and German legal codes. Such hybrid elements did not last, and the numbers of Jews and Armenians today are negligible compared to the past. However, in one case, that of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, something of the mix of cultures remains. While its original idea—a synthesis of Eastern and Western Christianity—was never fully achieved, the Church in its modern nationalized Ukrainian form did manage to survive the harshest Soviet repressions, thereby proving its extreme viability. Thus, perhaps there is a silver lining to the dark cloud the story of Lviv casts on the idea of cultural heterogeneity in a single place and territory.

However, as Timothy Garton Ash reminds us:

It has been something close to a rule in the 1990s that the greater the ethnic mix in a post-communist country, the more likely it has been to take a nationalist authoritarian path rather than a liberal democratic one. Those that have done best are also those that are ethnically most homogenous: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and, yes, Slovenia . . . The 1980s revival of the Central European idea involved a celebration of the region’s pre-war ethnic and cultural mélange: mixed cities, like Prague or Czernowitz or Bratislava, where people habitually spoke three to four languages; large minorities, especially Jewish and German ones; multiculturalism avant la lettre. Yet it seems that one of the preconditions for being seen as part of the political
Central Europe in the 1990s was precisely not to be Central European in this earlier sense. 104

Judging by those criteria, the ethnically and culturally homogenous city of Lviv has a better chance for a quicker recovery than, say, the mixed Ukrainian-Russian and highly sovietized cities in eastern Ukraine. In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who in September 1998 was granted the title of honorary Lviv citizen:

For all of Ukraine, Lviv symbolizes a European identity, its cultural connections and political self-determination [...] In this respect, Lviv plays a major role, while it is a leader of Ukrainian success and Ukrainian reforms . . . I am sure that Ukraine will be a worthy partner of a free united Europe, and Lviv will play a special role in this process. 105

Here is the paradox: to fulfill its mission, the largely unicultural Lviv has to evoke, and come to terms with, its multicultural heritage and to construct its new Ukrainian identity along those lines. Therefore, writing a multicultural history becomes more than an academic exercise; to some extent, its success or failure might have an impact on the political future of both Lviv and Ukraine, and, in a larger context, of the whole Central and East European region.
NOTES


2. Owing to space limitations only the most recent ones are mentioned here: Vladimir Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove: XII–pervaia polovina XX veka. Sobytia, obschestvo, liudi* (Lviv, 1994); V. V. Sekretariuk, A. V. Borzenko, and M. V. Bryk et al., *Istoriia L'vova* (Kyiv, 1984); Iaroslav Isaievych, Feodosii Steblii, and Mykola Lytvyn, eds., *L'viv. Istorychni narysy* (Lviv, 1996); Leszek Podhorodecki, *Dzieje Lwowa* (Warsaw, 1993). Each of these works provides a general bibliography that includes the most recent works on the history of Lviv.


4. In the last major Soviet publication on the history of Lviv, published in 1984, 60 percent of the entire volume was devoted to the communist period in the city, even though that period represented a mere 5 percent of the city’s history. See Sekretariuk et al., *Istoriia L'vova*, pp. 226–97.


12. For a list of the most important research projects on topics pertaining to the earliest period of Lviv, see Janeczek, “Studia nad początkami Lwowana,” pp. 27–28. To my knowledge, no one has tried to compile such a list for later periods of the city’s history.


17. For conflicting interpretations, see Iaroslav Isaievych, Ukraina davnia i nova. Narod, relihia, kul'tura (Lviv, 1996), passim; Michal Parczewski,
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Początki kształtowania się polsko-ruskiej rubieży etnicznej w Karpackich. U źródeł rozpadu Słowiańszczyzny na odlam wschodni i zachodni (Cracow, 1991), passim.

18. For a general overview of this discussion, see Magocsi, Galicia, pp. 46–50.


24. See nn. 9, 21.
31. In the fifteenth century Cracow had 12,000 inhabitants, Wrocław (Breslau)—19,000, Gdańsk (Danzig)—nearly 20,000, while Cologne, Nuremberg, and Prague around 50,000. The largest medieval cities were Venice, Milan, and Naples in Italy, each with a population of over 100,000.


44. Jerzy Motylewicz, p. 96. In a strict sense, this culture was neither homogeneously Slavic nor Catholic, especially in the sixteenth century, when, with the coming of the Reformation, Protestants became a significant element in the local population.


54. With its population of 196,000 in 1910 and its 125 percent growth in 1870–1910, Lviv yielded to Vienna (population of 2,031,000 and a 143 percent growth), Budapest (880,000 and 175 percent), Prague (640,000 and 154 percent), Warsaw (771,000 and 150 percent), Odesa (520,000 and 181 percent), Breslau [Wrocław] (512,000 and 114 percent), Łódź (352,000 and 803 percent), Kyiv (323,000 and 154 percent), Stettin [Szczecin] (236,000 and 191 percent), Vilnius (168,000 and 166 percent), Cracow (150,000 and 200 percent), and Minsk (100,000 and 178 percent). See Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, p. 96. In the case of Lviv, Magocsi has mistakenly given the 1880 numbers for 1870 and has slightly exaggerated the size of the population in 1910.


73. Drexler, Wielki Lwów/Le grand Léopol, passim.


75. For more details, see Andrzej Bonusiak, “Niedemokratyczna demokracja: Rzecz o Lwowie w latach 1918–1934,” in Zaliński and Karolczak, eds., Lwów, vol. 2, pp. 215–34. Paradoxically, the most ambitious plan to create a “Greater Lviv” was conceived by the German occupation regime that ordered a fourfold increase in the territory of the city from 66.68 square kilometers to 260 square kilometers. That target, however, was never reached, and in 1990 the territory of Lviv encompassed 155 square kilometers. See Iurii Kryvoruchko, Halyna Petryshyn, and Uliana Ivanochko, “Terytorial’nyi rozvytok Lvova kintsia XVIII–XX stolit,” in Bohdan Cherkes, Martyn [Martin] Kubelik, and Elizabet [Elisabeth] Hofer, eds., Mistobuduvannia ta terytorial’ne planuvannia (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 144–52.

76. Tyrowicz, Wspomnienia, pp. 34–35.


79. Grzegorz Siudut, “Pochodzenie wyznaniowo-narodowościowe ludności Małopolski Wschodniej i Lwowa,” pp. 275, 279–80; Hryciuk, “Zmiany demograficzne ludności polskiej,” p. 16. This was not the case with Ukrainians, who had a higher level of national consciousness in the city than elsewhere. Still, polonization took a heavy toll among them, too.

80. A Polish clandestine newspaper claimed in 1942 that “numerous Lviv citizens [of German origins], Hoflingers and Sudhoffs, have defiled their [Polish] riflemen kontusz [Sarmatian dress] traditions ... From beneath the Polish cultural gilding of many persons there was revealed a cunning Ukrainian character.” Quoted from Hryciuk, “Zmiany demograficzne ludności polskiej,” p. 53n176.

81. These were the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, that united leftist Ukrainian and Jewish intellectuals, and the militant Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (founded in 1929). For more details and literature, see John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 34(4) December 1992: 391–412.

82. Hrytsak, Narys istorii Ukrainy, passim.


88. Ivan Terliuk, Rosiiany zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy (Lviv, 1997), passim.


93. Alois Woldan (“Lemberg,” pp. 63–64) has suggested that in times of calamities the identity of a “small” motherland took over “larger, official” identities among Lviv citizens. He was referring to an episode from the Khmelnytskyi siege of Lviv (1648), when the burghers refused to surrender local Jews to Cossacks for punishment. Even if one accepts the veracity of this account (for a discussion see Melamed, Evreii vo L'vove, pp. 88, 97), the wartime solidarity among citizens could not have had a lasting effect—suffice it to say that in 1664 Lviv became the scene of a large anti-Jewish pogrom led by Catholics (ibid., pp. 90–91).

94. See, for example, Ivan Kryp'iakevych, L'viv's'ka Rus' u pershii polovyni XVI st.: doslidzhennia i materialy (Lviv, 1994), p. 11.


96. The persistence of this tendency is attested by recent developments. The anticommunist opposition in 1988–1991 was characterized by an amazing solidarity between Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, and Russian civic groups. This solidarity did not endure, however, beyond the fall from power of the communists. Post-Soviet Lviv became a site of Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Russian conflicts around historical and cultural symbols in the city. In one case this led to the tragic death of the local Ukrainian composer Ihor Bilozir, who in June 2000 was killed in a skirmish over the matter of where Russian pop songs could be sung (see Andrew Jack, “Ethnic Russians Feel the Heat of Ukraine Nationalism,” Financial Times 19 July 2000: 3). The chronology of these cultural wars
may be followed in the local newspaper *Postup* in 1998–2001 (see the website <http://postup.brama.com/>).


98. A rare exception was the case of Ida Schpiegel, the daughter of a Jewish rabbi, who married a son of a Greek Catholic priest against the will of the two families. After the early death of her husband, she raised all of her five children as Ukrainian intellectuals. Her grandson was the famous Ukrainian historian Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky. See my article, “Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi (Narys intelektual`noi biohrafii),” *Suchasnist* November 1994: 73–96.

99. This point is made by Hryciuk, “Zmiany demograficzne ludności polskiej,” p. 16.

100. This tendency continued even after the city had lost its old multicultural character. It is represented by some contemporary Russian cultural and political figures who spent their formative years in Soviet Lviv. This group comprises the leader of the Yabloko party Grigory Yavlinsky, the cinema critic Andrei Plakhov, the violinist Iurii Bashmet, the theater director Roman Viktiuk, the cinema actor Leonid Iarmol`nyk, and the writer Igor Klekh. For a recent Russian perspective on the history of Lviv, see Igor Klekh, *Insident s klassikom* (Moscow, 1998); idem, “Karta Galitsii (Pis`ma iz Iaseneva [22 December 1998]),” in the following website: <http://www.russ.ru>; for the subject of Russians in post-Soviet Lviv, see Valerii Serdiuchenko, “Russkie vo L`vove. Bostonskii nezavisimii al`manakh *Lebed* [23 April 2000],” in the following website: <www.lebed.com>; Roman Lozyn`skyi, “Rosiiiany u suchasnomu Lvovi,” *Postup* July 2001: 8.


103. This point was made by Chris Hann, “Galician Greek Catholics between East and West” (paper presented at the conference “Galicia: A Region’s Identity?” University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark, 26–28 May 1998). A survey of 1994 revealed that “Ukrainian” and “Greek Catholic” are among the two most preferred identities in Lviv (see Yaroslav Hrytsak,


ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Martin Åberg is senior lecturer in cultural studies at the University of Trollhättan, Uddevalla, Sweden.

John Czaplicka is chair of the Study Group for Politics and Culture in Central Europe at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

Liliana Hentosh is research associate at the Institute for Historical Research at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv.

Yaroslav Hrytsak is director of the Institute for Historical Research, Lviv National University, and recurrent visiting professor at the Central European University (Budapest).

Padraic Kenney is associate professor of history at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Hugo Lane is assistant professor of history at the Polytechnic University, Brooklyn, New York.

Jacek Purchla is head of the Department of Urban Development, Cracow Academy of Economics, and professor of art history at Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Since 1991 he is also director of the International Cultural Centre in Cracow.

Philipp Ther is a researcher and deputy managing director at the Center for Comparative History of Europe in Berlin.

Bohdan Tscherkes is professor of architecture and director of the Department of Architecture at the Lviv Polytechnic National University.

Waclaw Wierzbieniec is assistant professor of Polish contemporary history at the University of Rzeszów, Poland.

Alois Woldan is professor for East Central European studies at the University of Passau (Bavaria, Germany)

Ihor Zhuk is director of the Leopolis Project at the Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv, Ukraine.