


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Fall, 2018

The Motherhood Penalty:

From the Homosexual Perspective

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Abstract

Being a mother means she may need to “sacrifice” her job. Whether it is because she needs to spend more time taking care of her children or it is because she constantly worries about how her kids are performing at school, a mother simply cannot focus her attention entirely on the workplace just like before having children. Researchers believe mothers are punished for “being mothers.” The “motherhood penalty” was proposed in early 2000s, and studies confirmed that the penalty exists — at least for heterosexual mothers. This study looks at the motherhood penalty from a new perspective. It proposes that sexual orientation makes a difference to the existence and size of the penalty, because of division of labor within households. The study also investigates whether mothers are suffering from workplace discrimination because of being mothers, and what types of discrimination they are facing. Through empirical analysis, I explore the possibility that the motherhood penalty could be a bit more than just a “penalty.”

Introduction

Women are believed to be punished in the labor market because of childbearing and childrearing. Economists and sociologists have looked into this issue and called it “the motherhood penalty.” However, not all women suffer from this penalty. Traditional studies on the motherhood penalty have been focusing on heterosexual women, so their results did not consider how sexual orientation may alter the existence and magnitude of the penalty. Also, children in different age groups need different kind of care from their mothers, but most of the existing studies only roughly categorize children as “under 18 years old,” with no further detailed grouping. This study compares the motherhood penalty across sexual orientations, using a newly available dataset that could directly identify married homosexuals in households. Children are divided into different age groups so that I can better capture how difference in care

would influence their mothers' wages. Furthermore, this study discusses division of labor and different types of labor market discrimination in the context of sexual orientations. The ultimate goals of my research are to see whether the method of household specialization matters for mothers' labor market outcomes and which types of discrimination on mothers affects each sexual orientation.

Previous Studies

Research on the motherhood penalty began in the early 2000s with the "Wage Penalty for Motherhood" by Michelle Budig and Paula England (2001). In this paper, the authors showed that there was "a wage penalty for 7 percent per child," and that "[penalties were] larger for married women than for unmarried women. Women with (more) children [had] fewer years of job experience, and controlling for experience a penalty of 5 percent per child remains" (Budig and England, 2001). The existence of the motherhood penalty was confirmed by a study conducted by Correll, Bernard and Paid (2007) using a laboratory experiment. Researchers asked employers to evaluate pairs of applications with candidates of same gender. These candidates were equally qualified for the job but differed in parental statuses. Experimental results indicated that "mothers were penalized on a host of measures, including perceived competence and recommended starting salary." Specifically, the competence ratings for mothers were about 10% lower than that for non-mothers, and the starting wage for mothers was 7.4% lower (Correll, et al., 2007)

The motherhood penalty was further specified in Budig and Hodges (2010), in which the authors measured the motherhood penalty for low-wage, middle-wage and high-wage workers. Their results showed that although the penalty existed at all earning levels, the largest penalty was induced on low-wage women, whereas the high-wage women suffered from significantly

smaller penalty. The paper also proposed that “the mechanisms creating the motherhood penalty vary by earning level” (Budig and Hodges, 2010). As family resources, work effort and compensating differentials composed of a large proportion of the penalty for low-wage workers, high-paid women’s penalty was “largely explained by lost human capital due to childbearing” (Budig and Hodges, 2010). Furthermore, a study done by Avellar and Smock (2003) suggested that not only “each additional child [was] associated with a negative effect on women’s wages,” the penalty had not diminished over time, comparing the two cohorts drawn from the 1975-1985 and the 1986-1998 National Longitudinal Survey.

Potential explanations to the motherhood penalty were composed of several popular theories that extended from four major frameworks proposed in the Budig and England (2001) paper. The authors stated that the motherhood penalty arose because having children caused mothers to “(1) lose job experience, (2) be less productive at work, (3) trade off higher wages for mother-friendly jobs, or (4) be discriminated against by employers” (Budig and England, 2001).

Anderson, Binder and Krause (2003) discussed explanation (1), (2) and (3) in detail. Regression results showed that human capital controls, which were the core of explanation (1), and unobserved heterogeneity accounted for 55-57% of the wage difference between mothers and non-mothers. By looking at wage gaps among low-, medium- and high-skilled groups, the study did not seem to support explanation (2), but it did support explanation (3): medium-skilled women faced the highest penalty among the three groups, yet it was not reasonable to deduce that they were the only ones who reduced work effort. According to data analysis results, medium-skilled women were also the most likely to face inflexible (not mother-friendly) work schedules (Anderson et al., 2003). This suggested that medium-skilled women might have the incentive to forsake these jobs in exchange for jobs that were more flexible or simply chose to

work part-time — as Budig and England (2001) pointed out, “about half of the effect [of mother-friendly characteristics] came from a single job characteristic – whether the current job [was] part-time.”

Benard, et al. (2007) and in Benard and Correll (2010) explored explanation (4). These two papers proposed plausible psychological frameworks that could explain workplace discrimination against mothers. Specifically, Benard, Paik and Correll (2007) discussed the status characteristics theory, the stereotype content model, the shifting standards model and the lack-of-fit model. These theories provided that mothers were “better at care-giving and less good at working in the labor market,” using competence and warmth as a two-dimensional description (Benard et al., 2007). This method of description made it difficult to compare mothers to other workers because their identities as mothers singularized them from the rest of the population. The authors thus concluded that “women who [were] mothers [were] perceived as warmer but less competent than their childless counterparts” (Benard et al., 2007). On the other hand, Benard and Correll (2010) introduced normative discrimination. This type of discrimination implied when mothers were considered unambiguously competent, they were discriminated against because they were perceived as “less warm, less likable, and more interpersonally hostile,” contradicting to the traditional impression of mothers (Benard and Correll, 2010).

In short, mothers were discriminated against in the labor market either because mothers were considered incompetent, or because competent mothers were perceived as lacking in interpersonal skills because they contradicted conventional impressions. Therefore, discussing the motherhood penalty in the homosexual context was interesting because homosexual women were stereotypically perceived as “competent and committed workers” (Peplau and Fingerhut, 2004) and were more likely to be in less “typically female” occupations than other women

(Black et al., 2007). Additionally, Benard, Paik and Correll (2007) showed that “while heterosexual mothers [were] rated as less competent and career oriented than childless heterosexual women, lesbians [did] not experience any change in perceived competence or work-orientation due to motherhood.” Thus, introducing homosexual women into the discussion of the motherhood penalty could potentially distinguish different types of discrimination against mothers, based on whether such discrimination was related to perceived competence. This advantage should help me finding out the magnitude of the motherhood penalty without the influence of discrimination regarding perceived competence.

So far, only one study directly targeted the motherhood penalty on lesbians. Using 2000 U.S. Census data, Baumle (2009) concluded that motherhood gave lesbians a wage premium of about 20%. Baumle speculated that the premium was attributed to “the notion that lesbians [were] dependent on having both partners employed and, consequently, could be less likely to exit the labor force to raise children” (Baumle, 2009). This statement was supported by Peplau and Fingerhut (2004), in which the authors claimed that a lesbian woman “contemplating having or adopting a baby [knew] that she [would] be the primary breadwinner. Even when a lesbian mother [had] a lesbian co-parent, the personal value placed on financial independence coupled with economic necessity [encouraged] continued work commitment.” However, I must point out that the Baumle (2009) only investigated lesbians who were in cohabiting relationships due to the limitation of the available data, and thus unable to make appropriate comparison of the motherhood penalty to married heterosexual women. This study would be an improvement to such aspect because I could clearly identify married and cohabiting homosexual women using current dataset.

Theoretical Framework

This study proposes a different way of looking at explanations (1) to (3), and then puts an emphasis on explanation (4). The first three explanations proposed by Budig and England (2001) focused on tangible labor market disadvantages due to the difficulties in having children.

However, these explanations and their supporting analysis did not specifically discuss reduced working hours due to motherhood. Household division of labor contributes to reduced working hours of mothers. In his *A Treatise on the Family*, Gary Becker pointed out that division of labor within households and families were between men and women, and this specialization was determined “partly by biological differences and partly by different experiences and different investments in human capital” (Becker, 1991). Following this reasoning, women are endowed with the biological comparative advantages on having children, and thus will choose to reduce labor hours after becoming mothers. This division persists in today’s families, especially among heterosexual families, as conventional gender roles still have strong influence on the specialization of labor market and household production. As this study includes homosexual population in the scope, the division of labor within household is not as clear. Becker supported this observation: “[households] with only men or only women [were] less efficient because they [were] unable to profit from the sexual difference in comparative advantage” (Becker, 1991).

This paper does not intend to investigate the level of efficiency in homosexual families.

However, if homosexual mating indeed weakens the benefit of specialization, and if division of labor is an explanation to the motherhood penalty, then I shall see (1) controlling working hours will significantly decrease the magnitude of the penalty, and (2) heterosexual mothers’ labor hours will decrease more than that of lesbian mothers. Hence:

Prediction 1: Division of labor enlarges the magnitude of the motherhood penalty by reducing mothers' working hours.

Prediction 2: Different level of specialization differentiates the magnitude of reduced working hours between homosexual and heterosexual mothers.

Scholars believed that discrimination against mothers in the labor market also contributed to the motherhood penalty. This discrimination was bi-directional: employers either believed that (1) mothers were less competent, or believed that (2) competent mothers must be lacking in interpersonal skills, because they did not fit the conventional “warm and caring” impression of mothers. Therefore, including lesbians into the study of the motherhood penalty could effectively lower the complication of testing the existence of discrimination. Since lesbians are generally considered to be competent labor market candidates, lesbian mothers are less likely to suffer from type (1) discrimination. Thus, if there is a significant difference in the magnitude of penalty between lesbian and heterosexual mothers, type (1) discrimination arguably exists. Furthermore, if lesbian mothers still suffer from the motherhood penalty after all other potential variables are controlled, type (2) discrimination is assumed to contribute to the penalty, among other unobservable factors. Hence:

Prediction 3: Lesbian mothers only suffer from type (2) discrimination, while heterosexual mothers suffer from both type (1) and type (2) discrimination.

Data

This study uses the 1% sample of the 2013 to 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The dataset contains detailed

information on married and cohabiting same-sex couples of both genders, and a large number of observations on their heterosexual counterparts. The ACS data also include an individual's demographic and labor market characteristics, together with rich household information. This dataset is nationally representative with around 11,000 lesbians and 1.1 million heterosexual women, in marriage or cohabitation.

For the purpose of this study, I have identified homosexual women using the SSMC variable, which stands for "same-sex married couple." This variable "reports whether the head of the household and spouse are a same-sex married couple," according to the variable description provided by IPUMS-USA. Cohabiting homosexual women are identified by the "unmarried partner" category under the RELATED variable. By identifying lesbian women who are in marriage or cohabitation, this study is able to make comparisons on wage incomes between lesbian mothers and non-mothers. This result is further compared to that of heterosexual women, so as to see if sexuality makes any difference in terms of the motherhood penalty. The capability to distinguish marital status also makes it possible to see if marriage penalty on women diminishes after isolating the motherhood penalty.

I have cleaned up the data so that it only contains women who are in cohabitation or are married, and are within the working age (between 18 to 65 years old). This study also excludes people who live on farms and serve in the military because their wages are difficult to quantify. This study acknowledges that before the Supreme Court ruling in June, 2015, only a limited number of states recognized same-sex marriage.¹ However, as there were a large number of

¹ States that legalized same-sex marriage in 2013 include California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico Rhode Island; states that legalized same-sex marriage in 2014 include Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

married same-sex couples actually lived in states where same-sex marriage was not recognized, analysis in this study should include homosexuals in all states from 2013 to 2015, and regard their marital status consistent with the coding in the SSMC variable. Similar to other studies related to homosexuals, this study is unable to identify homosexuals who are not in a cohabiting relationships, the ones who are married to opposite-sex partners, and the ones who are closeted.²

Descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that in this sample, homosexual women who have children are on average younger than those who do not, and have a larger proportion of being married. However, homosexual mothers are less likely to have bachelor or higher degrees, and are less likely to be employed fulltime, compared to lesbians who do not have children. Regardless of parental status, homosexual women prefer living in urban areas. Table 1 also shows a similar story for heterosexual women in terms of their percentages of being married, education attainments, employment status and urban dwellings, if comparing mothers to non-mothers. Yet, on the whole, homosexual women have higher percentages in receiving higher education (bachelor degree and/or above), and their employment and fulltime employment rates are both higher than those of heterosexual women.

Table 2 presents the mean values of labor market outcomes. For homosexual women, having children does not seem to largely affect their wage income, hourly and weekly wage. However, lesbian mothers do seem to cut back working hours per week and the number of working weeks per year, but not by much. On average, this makes homosexual mothers works 100 hours fewer than non-mothers. For heterosexual women, however, the results are much different. Heterosexual mothers have significantly lower wage income and weekly wages than

² Arabsheibani et al. (2004)

heterosexual women who do not have children. This can partially be explained by heterosexual mothers work fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per years, which makes them work over 200 hours fewer than heterosexual women who have no children.

Method

To detect the motherhood penalty, this study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model that take the natural logarithm of weekly wages as dependent variable. Weekly wages are calculated by dividing wage income over the number of working weeks in a year. The ACS does not provide direct information on working weeks; rather, it provides an intervalled version of it. Thus, this study takes midpoints of each interval and assigns the midpoint values to each individual. Due to the nature of natural logarithm, the regressions will not pick up any individuals who are unemployed or out of the labor force. Therefore, the regression results might underestimate the magnitude of the motherhood penalty.

The main regressors of this study are a series of dummy variables that represent children in different age groups. To capture effect of having children in different ages on mothers' wage income, I have grouped the children as (1) 0 to 2 years old, (2) 3 to 6 years old, (3) 7 to 12 years old, (4) 13 to 18 years old, and (5) 19 to 22 years old. Presumably, group (1) needs the most care, group (2) to group (4) are transitions stages in which children move from one school to another, and group (5) is when children are becoming adults and starting lives of their own. Group (5) is not included in the regressions and is treated as the reference group.

Control variables in the regressions are exhaustive. Targeted individuals' controls include marital status, age, race, dwelling statuses (regions and urban dwelling), education attainment, employment status and working hours. In addition, I have created similar control variables for

these individuals' spouses/partners. These variables account for effects of the presence, the demographic and labor market characteristics of spouses/partners on women's wage income. In the dataset, many females report to be the head of the household in the survey. Thus, I have set up three identical series of control variables for head of household, spouse and partners. The variable series for spouses is taken as the reference series and omits from the regressions to avoid multi-collinearity.

The regressions are constructed as follows, with the "race," "education," "region" and "year" standing for sets of dummy variables for different races, education attainments, regions of residence and survey years:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Log WEEKWAGE} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1(0\text{to}2) + \beta_2(3\text{to}6) + \beta_3(7\text{to}12) + \beta_4(13\text{to}18) + \beta_5\text{AGE} + \beta_6\text{Race} + \\ & \beta_7\text{Education} + \beta_8\text{Region} + \beta_9\text{Urban} + \beta_{10}\text{Immigration} + \beta_{11}\text{YEAR} + \beta_{12}\text{MARRIED} + \beta_{13}\text{HOURS} \\ & + \beta_{14}(\text{Controls on Household Head}) + \beta_{15}(\text{Controls on Partner}) \end{aligned}$$

For simplicity, the regression tables only report main regressors and control variables that are important to the discussion of this paper. The results using OLS estimates are given in Table 3 and Table 4.³ The tables present all variables in Model 1, 2 and 3. Model 4 and 5 add control variables on the household head; model 6 adds controls for the characteristics of women's cohabiting partners. Control variables on spouses are considered as the reference group.

³ Regressions in Table 3 and Table 4 have been corrected for heteroscedasticity by using the "robust" command in Stata. R-square values in the regressions are also in a reasonable range (in between 0.50 and 0.60).

Results and Discussion

Table 3 presents the regression results for homosexual women. After adding all the control variables, lesbian mothers do not seem to be suffer from motherhood penalty. Even though the coefficients are still negative for mothers who have children aged between 3 and 6 and between 13 and 18, they are not statistically significant. Noticeably, however, the coefficient for the age group of 13 to 18 is significantly negative when labor market and demographic characteristics of mothers are controlled for. The significance only disappears after adding control variables concerning spouses/partners. This observation signals that characteristics of spouses/partners can be influential in terms of whether lesbian women suffer from the motherhood penalty. Another discussable point is that lesbian mothers who have children in the age of 0 and 2 years old actually enjoy a motherhood premium on their weekly wages. The premium is around 13% to 18%. This observation agrees with the findings in Baumle (2009), but the size of the premium is somewhat smaller and the premium only applies to lesbian mothers with infants, which is a smaller scope than stated in Baumle's study. Besides, after isolating the effect of having children on wage income, lesbians enjoy a stable marriage premium of about 4.7% to 5.7%.

The story for heterosexual mothers is quite different. Those who have young children (ages between 0 and 2 and between 3 and 6) enjoy a motherhood premium around 6.2% and 2.3%, respectively; those who have pre-teens and teenagers (age between 7 and 12, and between 13 and 18) suffer from a motherhood penalty of around 1.5% and 3.8%, respectively. These results seem to say that older children create a much larger barrier in their mothers' labor market advancement than younger children. These results are counter-intuitive because people usually assume that infants, toddlers and preschoolers require more care from their mothers and thus the

penalty should be the largest for mothers with younger children. However, according to Anderson, Binder and Krause (2003), the motherhood penalties are at their highest when women first return to work.⁴ Since this dataset does not specify when these mothers reenter the labor market, I would propose that there might be many mothers in the dataset who have decided to work after their children finishing preschool. This situation could explain why the coefficients on mothers with younger children are non-negative, and why the negative sign first shows up on mothers with children ages between 7 and 12 years old.

Additionally, the size of the penalty for mothers with children in age group 13 to 18 years old is larger than that in the age group 7 to 12 years old, contradicting the statement in Anderson, Binder and Krause (2003). A plausible explanation is that children need more sophisticated care as they grow up. Although younger children need mothers to be around them most of the time, the care is relatively simple: feeding, sleeping, changing diapers, etc. As children grow older, the complexity of their needs increase. Schooling, extra-curriculum activities, and socializing start to occupy higher fraction of the care — not to mention the time taking up to drive children back and forth from those events. Therefore, a mother “will not be surprised by the result that mothers with older children are suffering from larger labor market penalties.”⁵

Lastly, married heterosexual women seem to have a marriage premium on weekly wages after isolating the effect of having children. The premium ranges from 0.8% to 6%, which have a much larger variability comparing to that of married lesbians. The finding of marriage premium

⁴ The result of Anderson et al. (2003) shows that women faces the highest penalty when they first return to work, probably due to “learning to manage the dual responsibilities of work and children, the greater incidence of illnesses among children when they first enter a daycare or school environment, or poor match quality, on average, in the first jobs that are taken on reentry.”

⁵ Dr. Bahar Erbas (lecturer in economics and a mother with a 12-year-old son), in discussion with the author, Oct 2018.

indicates marriage penalties on heterosexual women found in past researches could be largely contributed to the motherhood penalty, instead of the negative impact from marriage itself.

Results in Table 5 show that, for both homosexual and heterosexual women, the impacts on wages when having children in different age groups are jointly different from zero. Thus, the motherhood penalties/premiums on different age groups of children do not cancel out with one another. These coefficients are also jointly and significantly different from each other, based on F-test results.

Table 6 presents t-test results on whether coefficients are significantly different before and after adding control variables on labor supply (working hours per week, working weeks per year, and fulltime working status). Results show that for both homosexual and heterosexual women, controlling for labor supply leads to significant decrease in the magnitude of the motherhood penalty/premium in all children age groups. Since t-tests are conducted using coefficients after adding labor supply controls minus those before adding the controls, the positive t-test statistic shows that labor supply is a big part of the motherhood penalty/premium. Therefore, I can confirm *Prediction 1* and conclude that division of labor enlarges the magnitude of the motherhood penalty by reducing mothers' working hours.

Prediction 2 says that homosexual mothers have a smaller reduction in labor supply than heterosexual mothers. I have tested this prediction by running regressions on working hours, working weeks and fulltime working status. The main regressors include a dummy indicating whether a woman is homosexual, a dummy indicated whether a woman have children, and an interaction term of the two dummies. These regressions control for the demographic and labor

market traits of the targeted observations.⁶ Table 7 shows the results of these regressions. Lesbians seem to work more hours per week, more weeks per year, and more likely to be working fulltime. Also, having children has a negative impact on labor supply. By calculation, heterosexual mothers supply 2.455 fewer hours weekly than heterosexual women who are not mothers, and lesbian mothers supply about 1.599 fewer hours than non-mother lesbians. Thus, lesbian mothers reduce 0.857 working hours fewer than heterosexual mothers on average, which is shown by the interaction term in the first regression. The same reasoning applies to all three regressions. In general, lesbian mothers have a smaller reduction in labor supply than heterosexual mothers, even though in terms of working weeks, the difference in labor supply reduction is only significant at 10% level.

Prediction 3 talks about women with different sexual orientations suffering from different types of labor market discrimination. Since lesbians are considered competent in general, the motherhood penalty/premium after controlling for labor supply should be largely composed of type (2) discrimination, among other unobservable factors. However, regression results on lesbians (Table 3) suggest that lesbian mothers who have children in the age group 0 to 2 enjoyed a premium, with other age groups' results insignificant. Therefore, lesbian mothers suffer from discrimination in the labor market due to their motherhoods.

It is a different story for heterosexual mothers. In the regressions (Table 4), heterosexual mothers who have children in the age groups 0 to 2 and 3 to 6 have a premium, while mothers with older children have penalties. By taking the differences of results from lesbian mothers and heterosexual mothers, I could find out if type (1) discrimination applies to heterosexual mothers.

⁶ These controls are not shown in the table for simplicity.

Table 8 presents t-test results of the differences. Apparently, the differences are significant for mothers with children in age groups 7 to 12 and 13 to 18. Thus, I can conclude that heterosexual mothers with pre-teens and teenagers are facing type (1) discrimination. However, because lesbian mothers are not suffering from type (2) discrimination, I cannot say for sure that whether type (2) discrimination applies to heterosexual mothers.

Limitation

Although this study creates four different age groups of children to capture age effect on the motherhood penalty, it does not control for the number of children in each group or in each household. This can be problematic because having two teenage children and having two infants may create different pressure on the mother's labor supply, and thus may alter the magnitude of the penalty. Furthermore, living in a single-child home and a home with three children can be vastly different, and this will influence the mother's ability and willingness to work.

Another problem is that this study only includes mothers who are part time or fulltime employed. Due to the nature of natural logarithm, the regressions automatically drop out mothers with no wage income, and hence with no job. This would probably lead to an underestimation of the motherhood penalty because many mothers choose to drop out of the labor force after having children and focus on raising their children. As the regressions neglect this fraction of mothers, this study could only analyze mothers who keep their jobs or mothers who get back to work after giving births, without knowing how much difference would mothers with no jobs make on the penalty.

Lastly, this study is not able to test for the existence of type (2) discrimination for both sexualities. Although many studies have shown evidence on type (2) discrimination, this study

only conclude that lesbian mothers are not suffering from this type of discrimination. The same conclusion can not be made for heterosexual mothers.

Conclusion

The motherhood penalty is not simply a “penalty” as many previous studies claimed. Across sexualities and age groups of children, the motherhood “penalty” differs in sizes and signs. Lesbian mothers who have infants and toddlers enjoy a premium of about 13% to 18%, and the ones with children in other age groups have no premium or penalty. Heterosexual mothers with young children also have premiums ranging from 2% to 6%, but mothers with preteens and teenagers suffer from penalties from 1% to 4%. Reducing working hours constitutes a big part of the motherhood penalty/premium, as the sizes of premiums and penalties decrease after controlling for labor supply. Different ways of household specialization between households of different sexualities contribute to the different magnitudes in working hours reduced. Between lesbian mothers’ premium and lacking in penalty, and heterosexual mothers’ young-children premium and teenage-penalty, I could show that heterosexual mothers are suffering from a type of discrimination that said “mothers are less competent.” Further investigation is expected to find out whether heterosexual mothers also suffer from the type of discrimination that considers competent mothers are less approachable and lacking in interpersonal communication skills.

Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Homosexual Women		Heterosexual Women	
	With Children	No Children	With Children	No Children
<i>N</i>	3748	10,369	801,934	844,833
<i>AGE</i>	39.63581	44.95747	35.33163	48.65113
<i>%MARRIED</i>	55.58	43.11	55.32	50.37
<i>%PARTNERED</i>	44.42	56.89	44.68	49.63
<i>%BLACK</i>	11.47	8.01	11.52	12.07
<i>%WHITE</i>	76.73	82.52	72.09	76.88
<i>%ASIAN</i>	4	3.33	6.76	5.43
<i>%OTHER</i>	7.79	6.13	9.63	5.62
<i>%HISPANIC</i>	14.51	10.6	18.4	9.9
<i>%HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT</i>	10.03	3.95	20.15	7.84
<i>%HIGH SCHOOL</i>	17.37	16.08	19.78	25.43
<i>%SOME COLLEGE</i>	29.43	29.18	29.8	31.19
<i>%BACHELOR</i>	20.2	26.35	18.86	21.92
<i>%MORE THAN COLLEGE</i>	22.97	24.44	11.42	13.62
<i>%EMPLOYED</i>	77.53	79.54	61.82	67.6
<i>%UNEMPLOYED</i>	4.43	3.89	4.77	3.59
<i>%NOT IN LABOR FORCE</i>	16.92	16.58	29.64	28.81
<i>%FULLTIME EMPLOYED</i>	66.38	70.94	43.99	55.6
<i>%NORTHEAST</i>	33.7	32.11	30.69	30.26
<i>%MIDWEST</i>	17.74	16.55	21.33	22.19
<i>%SOUTH</i>	28.36	28.75	29.16	30.12
<i>%WEST</i>	20.2	22.59	18.82	17.44
<i>%URBAN</i>	82.12	85.46	79.39	76.52
<i>%IMMIGRANT</i>	12.75	9.56	20.1	14.56

Table 2: Mean Table

	Homosexual Women		Heterosexual Women	
	With Children	No Children	With Children	No Children
<i>WAGE INCOME</i>	46112.32 (1053.136)	46312.57 (560.4091)	24710.83 (46.81602)	30212.15 (45.91387)
<i>HOURLY WAGE</i>	28.29219 (0.6034889)	27.77232 (0.4314463)	21.78636 (0.0829505)	23.43835 (0.1065473)
<i>WEEKLY WAGE</i>	1148.355 (25.30641)	1147.863 (17.40628)	771.3442 (1.331724)	874.8812 (1.301276)
<i>HOURS OF WORK PER WEEK</i>	32.57311 (0.2977073)	34.36773 (0.1756502)	23.5369 (0.0213168)	27.54912 (0.0211837)
<i>WEEKS OF WORK PER YEAR</i>	38.76241 (0.3284853)	40.15619 (0.1882268)	29.88511 (0.0260174)	33.86095 (0.0246296)
<i>HOURS OF WORK PER YEAR</i>	1560.721 (15.68978)	1655.22 (9.236961)	1079.249 (1.089014)	1309.03 (1.08655)

Table 3: OLS Regressions - Homosexual Women

VARIABLES	(1) model 1	(2) model 2	(3) model 3	(4) model 4	(5) model 5	(6) model 6
c0to2	0.109*** (0.0412)	0.136*** (0.0336)	0.179*** (0.0287)	0.179*** (0.0286)	0.130*** (0.0279)	0.129*** (0.0279)
c3to6	-0.0926** (0.0383)	-0.0439 (0.0332)	0.0130 (0.0273)	0.0131 (0.0273)	-0.00806 (0.0258)	-0.00831 (0.0258)
c7to12	0.0135 (0.0306)	-0.0173 (0.0263)	0.0403* (0.0225)	0.0429* (0.0225)	0.0247 (0.0217)	0.0258 (0.0218)
c13to18	-0.121*** (0.0318)	-0.0776*** (0.0258)	-0.0139 (0.0214)	-0.0132 (0.0214)	-0.0164 (0.0206)	-0.0163 (0.0206)
married		0.0572*** (0.0152)	0.0472*** (0.0131)	0.0483*** (0.0131)	0.0547*** (0.0121)	0.171*** (0.0660)
age		0.109*** (0.0238)	0.0257 (0.0197)	0.0275 (0.0198)	0.0557*** (0.0202)	0.0564*** (0.0202)
age2		-0.000902 (0.000591)	0.000461 (0.000485)	0.000398 (0.000492)	-0.000397 (0.000504)	-0.000420 (0.000504)
age3		-2.83e-06 (4.71e-06)	-8.68e-06** (3.83e-06)	-8.15e-06** (3.88e-06)	-1.44e-06 (4.02e-06)	-1.25e-06 (4.01e-06)
hs		0.317*** (0.0457)	0.146*** (0.0390)	0.130*** (0.0447)	0.117** (0.0481)	0.0801 (0.0508)
college		0.497*** (0.0440)	0.335*** (0.0374)	0.272*** (0.0446)	0.250*** (0.0480)	0.218*** (0.0504)
bachelor		0.883*** (0.0448)	0.624*** (0.0384)	0.518*** (0.0460)	0.481*** (0.0491)	0.435*** (0.0516)
higheduc		1.096*** (0.0450)	0.815*** (0.0388)	0.693*** (0.0484)	0.643*** (0.0518)	0.587*** (0.0547)
northeast		-0.0104 (0.0210)	-0.0102 (0.0177)	-0.0110 (0.0178)	-0.00923 (0.0171)	-0.0114 (0.0171)
midwest		-0.141*** (0.0243)	-0.104*** (0.0205)	-0.102*** (0.0205)	-0.0758*** (0.0203)	-0.0766*** (0.0203)
south		-0.0525** (0.0212)	-0.0830*** (0.0180)	-0.0786*** (0.0180)	-0.0607*** (0.0174)	-0.0619*** (0.0174)
white		0.0764** (0.0308)	0.0408 (0.0252)	0.0241 (0.0359)	0.00248 (0.0369)	0.00875 (0.0417)
black		-0.0428 (0.0387)	-0.0902*** (0.0326)	0.0236 (0.0501)	0.0188 (0.0511)	0.00931 (0.0566)
asian		0.123** (0.0514)	0.0520 (0.0468)	0.0180 (0.0711)	0.00231 (0.0739)	0.00958 (0.0822)
hispanic		0.00492 (0.0233)	-0.0388* (0.0210)	-0.0283 (0.0295)	-0.0232 (0.0302)	-0.00730 (0.0329)
urban			0.237*** (0.0183)	0.230*** (0.0183)	0.181*** (0.0196)	0.179*** (0.0197)

immigrant			0.000252 (0.0236)	-0.0381 (0.0309)	-0.0543* (0.0326)	-0.0692** (0.0344)
weekswork			0.00450*** (0.00108)	0.00461*** (0.00108)	0.00642*** (0.00122)	0.00644*** (0.00122)
uhrswork			0.0230*** (0.00107)	0.0230*** (0.00107)	0.0193*** (0.00116)	0.0192*** (0.00115)
fulltime			0.494*** (0.0277)	0.498*** (0.0276)	0.501*** (0.0264)	0.502*** (0.0264)
year2014			0.0381** (0.0179)	0.0366** (0.0178)	0.0167 (0.0173)	0.0186 (0.0173)
year2015			0.0342* (0.0177)	0.0329* (0.0177)	0.0175 (0.0165)	0.0191 (0.0165)
year2016			0.0548*** (0.0176)	0.0531*** (0.0176)	0.0471*** (0.0168)	0.0489*** (0.0167)
Constant	6.726*** (0.00943)	3.346*** (0.305)	3.242*** (0.256)	3.150*** (0.264)	2.977*** (0.262)	2.899*** (0.264)
Observations	11,336	11,336	11,336	11,336	10,718	10,718
R-squared	0.003	0.281	0.491	0.493	0.565	0.566

Table 4: OLS Regressions - Heterosexual Women

VARIABLES	(1) model 1	(2) model 2	(3) model 3	(4) model 4	(5) model 5	(6) model 6
c0to2	0.00155 (0.00364)	0.0360*** (0.00318)	0.0864*** (0.00262)	0.0748*** (0.00264)	0.0619*** (0.00252)	0.0624*** (0.00253)
c3to6	-0.0207*** (0.00323)	-0.0299*** (0.00282)	0.0451*** (0.00229)	0.0377*** (0.00230)	0.0232*** (0.00220)	0.0231*** (0.00221)
c7to12	0.00732*** (0.00269)	-0.0968*** (0.00231)	0.00361* (0.00188)	-0.00196 (0.00188)	-0.0145*** (0.00183)	-0.0147*** (0.00183)
c13to18	-0.327*** (0.00252)	-0.119*** (0.00209)	-0.0242*** (0.00171)	-0.0272*** (0.00171)	-0.0378*** (0.00168)	-0.0382*** (0.00168)
married		0.0120*** (0.00173)	0.0600*** (0.00143)	0.0512*** (0.00145)	0.0116*** (0.00143)	0.00791*** (0.00151)
age		0.258*** (0.00205)	0.0711*** (0.00178)	0.0744*** (0.00182)	0.104*** (0.00190)	0.104*** (0.00190)
age2		-0.00474*** (5.22e-05)	-0.000952*** (4.44e-05)	-0.00101*** (4.55e-05)	-0.00177*** (4.74e-05)	-0.00178*** (4.75e-05)
age3		2.77e-05***	3.69e-06***	4.18e-06***	1.06e-05***	1.07e-05***

		(4.21e-07)	(3.53e-07)	(3.60e-07)	(3.74e-07)	(3.75e-07)
hs		0.230***	0.130***	0.104***	0.103***	0.103***
		(0.00347)	(0.00300)	(0.00350)	(0.00389)	(0.00392)
college		0.429***	0.303***	0.248***	0.244***	0.245***
		(0.00336)	(0.00292)	(0.00349)	(0.00386)	(0.00389)
bachelor		0.823***	0.595***	0.496***	0.486***	0.484***
		(0.00362)	(0.00312)	(0.00384)	(0.00425)	(0.00428)
higheduc		1.117***	0.819***	0.703***	0.699***	0.699***
		(0.00383)	(0.00333)	(0.00427)	(0.00472)	(0.00475)
northeast		0.0232***	0.0178***	0.0189***	0.00838***	0.00839***
		(0.00244)	(0.00201)	(0.00202)	(0.00197)	(0.00197)
midwest		-0.105***	-0.0791***	-0.0795***	-0.0676***	-0.0676***
		(0.00261)	(0.00215)	(0.00216)	(0.00212)	(0.00212)
south		-0.0430***	-0.0811***	-0.0822***	-0.0754***	-0.0754***
		(0.00248)	(0.00205)	(0.00205)	(0.00200)	(0.00201)
white		0.0269***	0.0300***	0.0108**	0.0183***	0.0217***
		(0.00331)	(0.00281)	(0.00535)	(0.00587)	(0.00594)
black		0.0177***	-0.0279***	-0.0208**	-0.00237	0.000660
		(0.00398)	(0.00340)	(0.00899)	(0.00980)	(0.00986)
asian		0.0724***	0.0697***	0.0469***	0.0333***	0.0370***
		(0.00466)	(0.00420)	(0.00823)	(0.00914)	(0.00930)
hispanic		-0.0340***	-0.0779***	-0.0388***	-0.0425***	-0.0412***
		(0.00254)	(0.00231)	(0.00457)	(0.00500)	(0.00506)
urban			0.211***	0.205***	0.152***	0.152***
			(0.00161)	(0.00162)	(0.00180)	(0.00180)
immigrant			-0.0685***	-0.0852***	-0.0797***	-0.0790***
			(0.00220)	(0.00320)	(0.00355)	(0.00358)
weekswork			0.00386***	0.00387***	0.00483***	0.00483***
			(8.39e-05)	(8.41e-05)	(0.000107)	(0.000107)
uhrswork			0.0285***	0.0285***	0.0257***	0.0257***
			(0.000136)	(0.000136)	(0.000138)	(0.000138)
fulltime			0.370***	0.369***	0.379***	0.379***
			(0.00277)	(0.00277)	(0.00270)	(0.00270)
year2014			0.0167***	0.0167***	0.0123***	0.0123***
			(0.00178)	(0.00178)	(0.00174)	(0.00174)
year2015			0.0350***	0.0349***	0.0244***	0.0245***
			(0.00178)	(0.00178)	(0.00174)	(0.00174)
year2016			0.0590***	0.0589***	0.0418***	0.0420***
			(0.00178)	(0.00178)	(0.00175)	(0.00175)
Constant	6.421***	1.523***	2.781***	2.776***	2.514***	2.518***
	(0.00108)	(0.0249)	(0.0213)	(0.0230)	(0.0247)	(0.0247)
Observations	1,112,203	1,112,203	1,112,203	1,112,203	1,029,945	1,029,945
R-squared	0.019	0.304	0.535	0.537	0.586	0.586

Table 5: Robustness Check with All Controls

Homosexuals	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>F-test (different from 0)</i>	6.68 (0)	7.38 (0)	10.98 (0)	11.04 (0)	5.8 (0.0001)	5.74 (0.0001)
<i>F-test (different from one another)</i>	7.18 (0.0001)	9.31 (0)	10.71 (0)	10.59 (0)	6.67 (0.0002)	6.54 (0.0002)
Heterosexuals	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>F-test (different from 0)</i>	4405.86 (0)	1636.57 (0)	507 (0)	398.45 (0)	395.69 (0)	401.09 (0)
<i>F-test (different from one another)</i>	3797.26 (0)	807.62 (0)	605.48 (0)	512.16 (0)	519.69 (0)	525.68 (0)

Table 6: T-tests before and after controlling labor supply (Within Group)

Homosexuals	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>c0to2</i>	NA NA	NA NA	25.689 (0)	30.933 (0)	20.654 (0)	20.692 (0)
<i>c3to6</i>	NA NA	NA NA	6.415 (0)	9.659 (0)	17.44 (0)	17.302 (0)
<i>c7to12</i>	NA NA	NA NA	25.198 (0)	27.489 (0)	28.086 (0)	27.365 (0)
<i>c13to18</i>	NA NA	NA NA	60.144 (0)	55.332 (0)	59.947 (0)	59.947 (0)
Heterosexuals	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>c0to2</i>	NA NA	NA NA	5.40E+03 (0)	7.40E+03 (0)	6.80E+03 (0)	6.70E+03 (0)
<i>c3to6</i>	NA NA	NA NA	5.80E+03 (0)	7.10E+03 (0)	6.90E+03 (0)	6.80E+03 (0)
<i>c7to12</i>	NA NA	NA NA	8.10E+03 (0)	9.00E+03 (0)	8.70E+03 (0)	8.60E+03 (0)
<i>c13to18</i>	NA NA	NA NA	9.40E+03 (0)	8.70E+03 (0)	8.90E+03 (0)	8.90E+03 (0)

Table 7: Regressions on differences in labor supply

VARIABLES	(1) weekly hours	(2) working weeks	(3) fulltime
homosexuals	4.188*** (0.156)	3.574*** (0.186)	0.102*** (0.00409)
haschild	-2.455*** (0.0280)	-1.887*** (0.0334)	-0.0581*** (0.000735)
interaction	0.857*** (0.290)	0.589* (0.346)	0.0221*** (0.00762)
Constant	-3.601*** (0.0721)	-5.085*** (0.0860)	-0.0503*** (0.00189)
Observations	2,063,974	2,063,974	2,063,974
R-squared	0.381	0.391	0.280

Table 8: T-tests after controlling labor supply (Across Group)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>c0to2</i>	2.10E+03 (0)	2.30E+03 (0)	2.50E+03 (0)	2.80E+03 (0)	1.90E+03 (0)	1.80E+03 (0)
<i>c3to6</i>	-1.50E+03 (0)	-3.40E+02 (0)	-9.50E+02 (0)	-7.30E+02 (0)	-9.40E+02 (0)	-9.50E+02 (0)
<i>c7to12</i>	160.6331 (0)	2.40E+03 (0)	1.30E+03 (0)	1.60E+03 (0)	1.40E+03 (0)	1.50E+03 (0)
<i>c13to18</i>	5.40E+03 (0)	1.30E+03 (0)	398.0211 (0)	540.9996 (0)	823.4928 (0)	842.7333 (0)

Appendix

Variable Name	Description
<i>Sexuality</i>	
SSM	Whether a person is a married homosexual
SSUP	Whether a person is a unmarried but partnered homosexual
HOMOSEXUAL	Whether a person is identified as a homosexual
HETERO	Whether a person is identified as a heterosexual
<i>Demographics</i>	
AGE	Shows a person's age
AGE2	Square of AGE
AGE3	Cube of AGE
SEX	Classification of a person's gender
MARST	Classification of a person's marital status
MARRIED	Whether a person is married
NORTHEAST	Whether a person lives in the northeast region
MIDWEST	Whether a person lives in the Midwest region
SOUTH	Whether a person lives in the south region
WEST	Whether a person lives in the west region
WHITE	Whether a person is white
BLACK	Whether a person is black
ASIAN	Whether a person is Asian
OTHER	Whether a person is in an ethnic group other than black, white and Asian
IMMIGRANT	Whether a person is an immigrant
URBAN	Whether a household's location was urban or rural.
<i>Family</i>	
RELATED	Shows the person's relation to the householder
NCHILD	Shows the number of children a person has
<i>Education</i>	
HSDROP	Whether a person is a high school drop-out
HS	Whether a person completes high school
COLLEGE	Whether a person has taken some college education
BACHELOR	Whether a person has a bachelor degree
HIGHEDUC	Whether a person has more education than bachelor degree
<i>Work</i>	
FULLTIME	Whether a person works no less than 35 hours a week
UHRSWORK	Shows usual working hours of an person in a typical week
WORK	Whether a person is employed
WKSWORK2	Weeks worked last year, intervalled
YRHRSWORK	Total working hours in a year
<i>Income</i>	
INCWAGE	Shows a person's annual pre-tax wage and salary income
HOURWAGE	Shows a person's hourly wage
WEEKWAGE	Shows a person's weekly wage

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