THE
CHINA-INDIA
RIVALRY
IN THE
GLOBALIZATION
ERA

T.V. PAUL
EDITOR

Chapter 4

China, India, and Their Differing Conceptions of International Order

MANJARI CHATTERJEE MILLER

In 1965, Raymond Aron asked, "Under what conditions would men (divided in so many ways) be able not only to avoid destruction but live relatively well in one planet?"[1] In his understanding, international order constituted the "minimum conditions for co-existence," and states were the principal architects of such conditions.[2] While the particular content of the "conditions" was ambiguous, it was underlined by a premise that would later be elaborated, implicitly, by Hedley Bull, and, explicitly, by Robert Gilpin—the building and destruction of international order are intricately linked with the conflict between states.[3]

Bull, in his seminal work, talked of order as a shared framework of rules and institutions within the anarchical society of states, which existed so states could retain their independence, preserve international society, and regulate war and violence.[4] In Gilpin's view, however, order is the international system that is built after conflict between the status quo and rising states, and world politics consists of a succession of such ordered systems.[5] G. John Ikenberry more comprehensively defined international order as

> the organizing rules and institutions of world politics. It is the governing arrangements that define and guide the relations among states. To speak of international order is to invoke notions of a functioning political system—however rudimentary—among states. International order is not just the crystallization of the distribution of power. It exists in the organizing principles, authority relations, functional roles, shared expectations, and

settled practices through which states do business. It establishes the terms by which states command, follow, benefit and suffer."[6]

These discussions show us that states' perceptions of international order matter for three reasons. First, order is not simply the condition of nonwar. It is the active creation of powerful, usually hegemonic states rather than the passive outcome of an anarchical international society or the distribution of power. Powerful challenger states emerge after war, and they have both the influence and the desire to reorganize the international system.[7] Thus order, rather than being built on the balance of power, is built on an "asymmetry of power" by a powerful state or states and is a deliberate (re)organization of "the rules and arrangements of interstate relations."[8]

Second, much of power transition theory, which has focused on the destruction and rebuilding of international order, sees it as the outcome of "asymmetries of power." That is, new orders are built when "changes in the distribution of power trigger rivalry among states seeking to sit atop a new international hierarchy." Order thus, in this iteration, relies "exclusively on material variables."[9] However, order is also built on norms. To begin with, the challenger's dissatisfaction, which, power transition theory points out, leads to the establishment of new orders, "rests on the premise of the ideas of the challenger about the distribution of goods in the international system rather than the distribution of the goods itself."[10] A change in international order is also thus a "contest among competing norms,"[11] and the term itself bears "normative and ideological connotations."[12] As Andrew Hurrell has pointed out, the challenge facing international society is not simply the need to "manage unequal power" but also the need to emphasize "shared and common interests" and "mediate cultural diversity."[13] Consequently, order is underpinned by norms, rules, and institutions by which states seek to structure and regulate their interactions.[14] This, in turn, can affect whether the transition between orders is peaceful or conflictual. For example, Charles A. Kupchan points to the similarity of ideas and rules between Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, calling it "uniquely peaceful," while the Ottoman order was hugely normatively different from Pax Britannica.[15]

Finally, order rests on "a concert of great powers"[16] or perhaps even more arguably a concert of willing states. If international order is the deliberate and active creation of rules and institutions of world politics that exist not just through functional roles but also through shared norms, values, and expectations, it is reasonable to assume that its creation, while hugely influenced by a hegemon, is not an act of coercion and does not rest on the hegemon alone. Rather, there is acquiescence, as well as, more often than not, active participation by other states that stand to benefit, not just because of shared material interests but also because of shared ideational interests. Different hegemons had different methods of co-opting other states into building their international order. The Ottoman Empire, for example, despite having religious foundations, promoted religious heterodoxy. The Ottomans forged political bonds across religious

boundaries, making significant concessions for non-Muslims even while propagating norms derived from Islamic tradition.[17] Similarly, Pax Americana is not simply an imposition of order by the United States but a complex creation of rules and institutions that are underpinned by ideational interests and norms that are shared across many Western and some non-Western states. The United States has a network of alliances, including friendships and "special relationships,"[18] that helps it create and maintain Pax Americana.

Given that order is actively created, is built on both material interests and norms, and needs a network of compliant states to maintain it, the rise of India and China and the possibility of upending the international status quo compel us to thus ask what kind of international order each would seek to create and how their visions would differ.

BUILDING INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY

In 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took the unprecedented step of opening a social media account with Weibo, China's answer to Twitter, with a post that read, "Hello China! Looking forward to interacting with Chinese friends."[19] His post was highly symbolic, showcasing not just a desire to intensify diplomatic efforts toward China but also an acknowledgment by an Indian leader with the reputation of being an economic crusader that the economic relationship between the two countries had come to be the most important commonality in a very complex relationship.[20]

With the 1962 China-India War, a war in which the disastrous loss India suffered spurred it to massively increase its military spending, the hitherto warm relationship between India and China turned frosty and suspicious. This affected every level of the bilateral relationship, including trade. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s, after both countries had enacted open and reform policies, trade between them was around a billion dollars.[21] Today, however, China is India's largest trading partner, and from 2015 to 2016 the trade between them stood at over $70 billion.[22]

Yet their relationship remains complex. On the one hand, trade ties bind them together. On the other, it is often argued that India is paranoid about China, particularly its dealings in the region.[23] India perceives the bilateral relationship as a rivalry and remains extremely wary and suspicious of China. Thus how China would seek to reorganize the rules and arrangements of the international system, what norms it would propagate, and which states would buy into a China-led and designed world order are incredibly important for Indian foreign policy.

China, however, does not currently see India as a major threat. Xiaoyu Pu suggests that this is due to the vast asymmetry of power between them—among other factors, "China's GDP is nearly four times that of India, and its standing

army and nuclear stockpiles twice as large as those of India."[24] As a result, Indian perceptions of order are currently unlikely to be a huge factor in China's calculations about the bilateral relationship. Yet India's support or rejection of the international order is important for China to understand as it rises. An Indian perception of world order that is fundamentally different from a Chinese perception of world order has the potential for conflict not just for the bilateral relationship but also for the international system. India may not currently be the focus of China's strategic calculations but neither can it be ignored.

The rest of this chapter examines Chinese and Indian perceptions of international order, how they are different, and how we can observe these differences through some of the speeches of Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi. In China's case, I examine a traditional and explicit notion of order, *tianxia*, that has informed the ideational frameworks of both Chinese scholars and leaders. In India's case I examine postcolonial notions of order—although India, too, had traditional precolonial ideas of order, these, in contrast to China, have not influenced modern Indian frameworks of order. Indeed, as we will see, discussions of order in the Indian context tend to be very implicit and found deeply embedded within other ideologies.[25]

BUILDING A CHINESE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

With the rise of China, one of the most important and pressing questions that is asked by both international relations theorists and policymakers is whether China will accept or reject the existing international order.[26] Evans points out that today the big question of whether China matters has been replaced by the question of what China *thinks*.[27] The assumptions of the literature on international order outlined earlier are paramount in any answer to this question. If order is built on an asymmetry of power, then will China deliberately reorganize the existing rules and arrangements of interstate relations? What are the norms that will shape this order? And will China be able to use its bilateral and trilateral relationships to persuade other states to not just acquiesce but also actively participate in this order? To unpack these questions, scholars have taken two related approaches.

The first approach is to evaluate if there is a Chinese approach to international relations that is distinct from a Western approach. While there is indeed a mission to develop an approach to international relations with Chinese characteristics that can tell us something about China's "international purpose,"[28] there is also acknowledgment that there is no modern Chinese international relations theory to give a unique insight into China's "blueprint for action."[29]

The second approach, however, is more utilitarian in that it looks specifically to China's traditional order (the *tianxia* system, 天下), both to understand its modern conception of international order and to develop a Chinese international relations theory. Briefly, the Chinese world, tianxia ("all-under-Heaven"),

consisted of China, or *zhongguo* ("middle kingdom," 中国), at the center and "barbarians" (nonsinicized peoples) at the periphery. The barbarians recognized Chinese suzerainty by paying tribute to the Chinese emperor (*tianzi*, or the "son of Heaven," 天子) and kowtowing before him. In return, the emperor bestowed lavish gifts on them. This system did not have geographical boundaries in the modern Western sense. Rather, it was a web of concentric territories with the nearer territory forming an inner frontier with China and the outmost territory forming an outer frontier with the lands beyond it. This web receded and expanded depending on the fates of the tributary peoples, both with respect to China and the foreigners in the outer territories.[30]

The tianxia system of tributary model was, according to some narratives, based on strong notions of superiority and hierarchy and on ideas about sovereignty, virtue (*de*, 德), and state roles that were starkly distinct from the Westphalian system, and it was strictly dictated by ritual (*li*, 礼) and sinocentricism.

The reality, however, is complex. While tianxia was indeed unique in many ways, some of its important characteristics need to be parsed. First, the notions of Chinese hierarchy and superiority have to be understood within the reality of China's material capabilities. It was often the case that the tributary system was one of seeming control by China. In other words, depending on the historical period invoked, the Chinese emperors retained nominal control over peripheral areas, while the rulers of those peripheries remained mostly autonomous. It was "a tacit acceptance that Chinese authority could not stretch beyond the empire's military capabilities."[31] Notions of superiority had to be "based on strength and were meaningless during periods of weakness and disorder."[32] What this suggested was a flexibility when it came to norms and practices of external relations so long as the correct order and rituals were nominally adhered to.[33] There was thus a sophisticated pragmatism about foreign policy.

Second, China also had foreign relations outside of the tributary system. In various years of the Ming period, the Japanese and Mongols, for example, did not pay tribute to the Ming emperor. This does not mean, however, that they fell outside of the tributary system, because they had no relations with China. Rather, there continued to be "interesting interactions" between them and the Chinese empire.[34] This implies that China's benevolent "rule by virtue" or the idea that peripheral entities paid tribute and stayed within the system because of the cultural and moral example of China was also flexible—non-Chinese entities could and did, at different points in time, perceive their interests to lie outside of the tributary system.

Third, there was an element of responsibility in the tributary system. While, as has been mentioned above, the strength of China's relations with states within the tributary system varied between dynasties, the question naturally arises as to why the tributary states bought into it at all, particularly when China's rule was nominal. The answer lies in the fact that "China would offer assistance and protection when it was approached to do so."[35] Recognition by the Chinese emperor not only conferred status and prestige on the rulers of these states but

also implied that, if requested, he would support and protect the rulers on whom he had conferred such honors.[36] It was a system of diplomatic management that was designed to satisfy both the center and the peripheral entities.[37]

Finally, none of this is to suggest that the tributary system was one of equality. Rather, "China was at the center of a set of regional relationships that it could not force but were not transposable."[38] The risks and opportunities of the system were much greater for the peripheral states than for the center, but it conferred a stability that no one actor could provide unilaterally.[39]

Turning now to India, we find ideas of international order that are important but less structured and historical.

BUILDING AN INDIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

As a rising power with the potential to challenge the current international order, the case of India too leads us to ask how it would consider reorganizing the rules and arrangements of interstate relations, what norms it would espouse to underpin these rules and institutions, and how it would promote shared ideational interests among states willing to participate in that order. India, too, like China, has struggled to put forth an *Indian* conception of international relations that would answer these questions.

As Behera has pointed out, scholars of Indian foreign policy have "creatively" deployed Western international relations in their specific local contexts but are yet to move from the "particular" to the "universal."[40] There is today no debate about what an Indian order or international relations would look like. Conceptions of international order are instead embedded, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, within domestic discussions of the making of Indian foreign policy that draw from different belief systems.

The most explicit work on categorizing Indian conceptions of international order has been undertaken by Kanti Bajpai. Bajpai finds four competing conceptions of international order embedded within four different and well-known articulations of Indian worldviews.[41] Each of these worldviews has also been explored separately and in great detail by other academics, with more implicit connotations of international order.

The first is Gandhism. Although a Gandhian outlook on foreign policy was rejected by the Indian elite, Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy remained the utopian moral ideal that influenced many Indian nationalist leaders, including the first Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (who, as detailed below, would articulate his own vision of order). Gandhian philosophy was dubious about the nation-state as the primary political actor and characterized primarily by nonviolence. This played out in two ways. On one hand, Gandhi was accepting of the Western international system in that he did not reject its principles. On the other, he deeply believed that it needed to be reorganized by devolving power from the nation-state to local institutions that would serve the citizens

and by adopting nonviolence as its creed. He ventured that the Indian National Congress should consider having postcolonial India respond with nonviolence even when attacked,[42] calculating that "in aggregate this would amount to fewer deaths than if there were armed resistance."[43]

The second, and possibly the most influential, worldview is Nehruvianism. After India's independence from British rule in 1947, Nehru almost completely dominated foreign policy in India. He held the portfolios of both prime minister and minister of external affairs, and his extensive knowledge of and dedication to international affairs meant that foreign affairs expertise was concentrated almost entirely in South Block—the headquarters of the Ministry of External Affairs—and institutionalized.[44] While Nehruvians accept the Western concept of states as the primary political units in the international system with both rights and responsibilities, they add four elements: "ambivalence" about the use of force; *panchashila*, the five principles of coexistence; nonalignment; and economic equality.[45]

Nehruvians believe that the use of force must be defensive, that mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, and noninterference in internal affairs is paramount, that states must reject bloc membership, abide by international rules and institutions, that the weak must ally against the strong, and that states as a whole must strive for international economic equality.[46] These different tenets all flow from a unified logic, which is that colonialism had ill served the newly independent ex-colonial states and the postcolonial world threatens to again trap these states within the dictates of neoimperialism.[47]

To escape the power politics of the "haves" in the international system, these weakened states must band together, strive for parity (not just economic but also political) with the richer countries, refrain from being turned against each other by the dictates of the two superpowers, and have harmonious interstate relationships governed by the principles of panchashila. In this order, India would be the shining moral example and lead the way. Nehru even used the Indian anticolonial movement to suggest that in political disputes approaching "another country in a friendly way with goodwill and generosity . . . [will be paid back] in the same coin and probably the payment will be in even larger measure."[48] The moralism underpinning Nehruvianism was derided by many as, at best, unpractical and idealistic and, at worst, an excuse for leaning toward the Soviet Union.[49]

The third Indian outlook is that of Hindutva, or Hindu political ideology. Hindutva espoused by Hindu nationalists such as M. S. Golwalkar argues that social cohesion can be achieved on the basis of an essentialist brand of Hinduism.[50] This drive stems from a conviction that disunity in Indian society has been a source of Indian weakness toward the outside world. The aim is to generate a monolithic Hindu nation in order to develop a "martial spirit and social cohesion" to defend India "against external aggression."[51] The international order is one of struggle not just between states but also civilizations, and therefore violence and war are unavoidable.[52] Hindutva sees an essentially Hindu India as a superior civilization that has made great cultural contributions to the

world and, as a result, that Hindus are destined for global leadership. India is an example to the world by virtue of its superior culture.[53]

The final Indian conception of order that can be detected within Indian foreign policy thought, according to Bajpai, is neoliberal globalism. Bajpai conceives of this body of thought as a post–Cold War philosophy embraced by a small group of scholars, journalists, and politicians such as C. Raja Mohan, Sanjaya Baru, Shekhar Gupta, and Jaswant Singh.[54] Neoliberal globalists argue that economic interdependence and the end of the Cold War have reorganized interstate relations, leading to a "pragmatism."[55] With this pragmatic outlook, India will resist great-power intervention yet cooperate with the West to ensure stability.[56]

HOW ARE CHINESE AND INDIAN CONCEPTIONS OF ORDER DIFFERENT?

These discussions of Chinese and Indian conceptions of international order are both qualitatively and quantitatively different in terms of the heritage they refer back to, their acceptance or rejection of the Westphalian system, the different strands of thought within, and even in terms of the urgency of the discussions.

Unlike the Chinese search for order, which is also rooted in its ancient precolonial past, Indian conceptions of order are postcolonial.[57] This difference is particularly interesting because not only was the immediate precolonial era in India marked by the conquest and consolidation of the Mughal Empire—one of the greatest dynasties in Indian history, which ruled over a vast expanse of the subcontinent—but also because the Mughals instituted a form of decentralized political sovereignty, the *mansabdari* system, which was in some ways similar to tianxia. Under the emperor Akbar when the Mughal Empire was at the zenith of its power and wealth with control over most of the subcontinent, conquered territories were ruled either by their original king, who swore fealty to the emperor, or through a descendant of the existing ruling family who was instituted as the king by the emperor. Each of these rulers was given a rank, or *mansab*, and a *mansabdar* could have an official rank anywhere from ten to ten thousand. A mansab of ten would denote the command of ten men and so on. These rulers were called on to defend and administer the empire, and other than these tasks were largely autonomous. "The Mughal emperor was *Shah-an-shah*, 'king of kings' rather than king of India. . . . The emperor's power and wealth could be great, but only if he was skilled in extracting money, soldiers and devotion from other kings."[58]

However, possibly because of the very nature of this decentralized sovereignty, which became a factor in the decline of the Mughals,[59] the lack of a distinction between Indian and non-Indian within the mansbdari system (unlike tianxia, where there was a sense of distinction from nonsinicized peoples), and because the decline of the Mughals was then followed by two hundred years of British rule with strongly centralized sovereignty, India experts looked to the

postcolonial era for conceptions of order.[60] Even exponents of Hindutva who tout India's ancient Hindu texts and Hindu heritage do not root their ideas of order in ancient India—rather, they seek to recapture what they believe were the glories of Hindu civilization as a whole.

Moreover, tianxia has often, both to its advantage and detriment, been seen as a contrast to the Westphalian West-led system. On the one hand, the "alienness" of its characteristics rooted in their distinction from Western ideas about the international system has been cited as increasing the propensity for China to have conflicts in its bilateral relations and with the international status quo.[61] On the other, these very characteristics have been lauded as the solution to the problems of the Westphalian system. Early debates about tianxia between scholars such as Mark Mancall, John K. Fairbank, Gungwu Wang, and Benjamin Schwartz had focused on the narrower question of continuity or interruption between the traditional and modern Chinese perceptions of world order.[62] Mancall, Fairbank, and Wang all identified persistent patterns in Chinese foreign policy perspectives. For example, they determined that Chinese notions of superiority and hierarchy that were enshrined in the tianxia system persisted in the modern world. Fairbank viewed it as impacting China's strict modern adherence to sovereignty and territorial integrity, with respect, for example, to the One China policy, while Wang saw the notion of superiority becoming more important to Chinese leaders as they looked to learn from the past, particularly the demonstration of majesty and power that embodied the tianxia system.[63] Schwartz, on the other hand, argued that the old order had been so thoroughly undermined in the contemporary era that it bore little relevance for modern perceptions. What mattered, in his view, was power and whether China could adapt to new realities.[64]

But following Deng Xiaoping's *gaige kafang* policy (the economic reform and opening up of China), this debate proliferated and shifted. The question now became what tianxia could teach China and how it could play a role in the development of a Chinese international relations. Many Chinese intellectuals proposed China's traditional order as both an external and internal framework for the Chinese state.[65] It was felt that harking back to Mao's Marxist-Leninist views of the international system was increasingly irrelevant, while at the same time the "material and spiritual pollution" that had come in from the West was inappropriate.[66] As a result, while some scholars such as Qin Yaqing attributed the modern lack of a Chinese international relations to tianxia,[67] others, notably Zhao Tingyang, elaborated tianxia as an alternative to Western international relations and the ills of the Westphalian order.

Zhao conceives of tianxia as the "ideal of a perfect empire" that implies a world organized by families, then by loyal but autonomous substates (*guo*, 国) and all-under-Heaven.[68] In contrast to the Western system of individuals, nations, and internationals, in tianxia the individual is valued but relevant only within the context of relations, and this relational system is dictated by coexistence. Tianxia thus aims at a good society that keeps order (*zhi*, 秩) and prevents chaos (*luan*,

乱).[69] Tianxia was promoted as realistic in that the system recognized inequality between states yet supposedly lacked constant confrontation. In effect, China's cultural hegemony ensured that non-Chinese entities bought into the structure, understanding that it was in their interests to do so.[70]

Such a conception of tianxia as the ideal system has been roundly critiqued by, among others, William Callahan, who argues that the all-inclusive harmonious tianxia espoused by Zhao in reality excluded and marginalized social groups and led to many violent interactions.[71] June Teufel Dreyer points out Zhao's problematic linking of Confucianism and tianxia.[72] Apart from such criticisms, whether tianxia actually poses a true alternative or indeed is so very different from Westphalia is a debatable question—but the important point here is that it is touted as an *aspirational* alternative *Chinese* model.

In contrast, Indian conceptions of order do not seek to either reject *or* posit an Indian alternative to the Westphalian system. As Bajpai points out, whether Nehruvianism, Hindutva, or neoliberal globalism, these conceptions accept the Westphalian system for the most part while adding mild modifiers. Nehruvianism adds the element of nonalignment leading to a "'Westphalia plus' notion of order."[73] Hindutva does not challenge rules and institutions of Westphalia, including state sovereignty, but predicts the eventual domination of India leading by example of its superior Hindu civilization.[74] Neoliberal globalists accept the primacy of sovereign states but posit that market forces and nonstate actors will play an increasing role in state-driven economic and welfare functions.[75] Even Gandhism, which comes the closest to positing an alternative conception of world order, accepts the Westphalian system but argues that, ideally, small community governments, or *panchayats*, should be empowered by the state because social and political affairs are ultimately localized.[76]

This does not mean that tianxia, even as espoused in its ideal form by Zhao and others, seeks to overthrow the Western order while Indian conceptions seek to maintain it. In many ways, China is extremely accepting of the status quo and subscribes to important norms such as those about responsibility and great power that are a product of the Western system.[77] There is also little doubt that Indian conceptions of order chafe at the Westphalian system. There is a strong sense, for example, that India must resist the dictates of great powers, that the idea of great-power responsibility is a Western stratagem, and that it must pursue independence in foreign policy. Nehruvianism is the most vocal about this. After all, Nehru had once remarked that, in the context of superpower politics, nothing was worse for India than becoming a "camp follower in the hope that some crumbs might fall from their table."[78] Nehruvianism blamed colonialism for the deprivation suffered by the newly independent states and suggested that colonial powers needed to make restitution. Thus the weak states need not only to counter the influence of strong states by remaining nonaligned but also maintain the right to carve their own path.[79]

While neither Hindutva nationalists nor neoliberal globalists suggest nonalignment, they too are very clear that the current order presents a form of

domination. Rules and institutions are made and broken by great powers that can and should be resisted. Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, an ardent Hindu nationalist, advocated that India needed to build "invincible national strength" as the world is uncaring of the demands of the weak.[80] Neoliberal globalists suggest that it is domestic politics that is prior to and must dictate the international order rather than the other way around. This implies "a shift to global norms and rules over the sovereign rights of states in respect of economics, security, domestic politics and transnational flows."[81] And Gandhism is unambiguous about the flaws of Western order, suggesting it "would be a mistake to imitate Europe."[82]

However, there is an urgency and concerted effort in Chinese discourse, particularly in more recent years, about developing an alternative Chinese model, a Chinese path to international relations, which is lacking in Indian discourse. The tianxia system (as well as Confucianism) has become the subject of study in China and marked for export.[83] Simultaneously, Chinese presidents have espoused concepts that could both, implicitly and explicitly, be linked to tianxia—Hu Jintao's concept of a "harmonious world" (*hexie shijie*, 和谐世界) was related to *tianxia datong* ("world of great harmony," 天下大同), while Xi Jinping's recent articulation of *zhongguo meng* ("China dream," 中国梦) encompasses working for a harmonious world.[84] Such discussions of order, whether among academics or policymakers, are implicit at best in the Indian context. Whether Indian conceptions of order are critical of the Westphalian system or not, the primary question today is whether Nehruvianism and nonalignment still hold sway in India and what the rise of Hindutva means for Indian domestic politics and foreign policy.[85] The question of an *Indian* alternative and aspirational conception of order is yet to be explicitly asked or espoused.

We can see these differences play out in the speeches of the current leadership.

XI, MODI, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

From 2013 to 2015, Xi made a number of speeches that were explicitly on foreign policy and for a foreign audience.[86] After Modi's election in 2014, although he did not take over the portfolio of minister of external affairs, he made his interest in foreign affairs very clear and also made a number of speeches to foreign audiences.[87]

Xi's speeches often refer back to concepts that are seen to be enshrined in tianxia. In a speech to the Boao Forum on March 20, 2015, Xi stated that

> China greatly needs a harmonious and stable domestic environment, and a peaceful and calm international environment. Any unrest or conflict is not in China's fundamental interests. Through the ages, the Chinese people have always loved peace; since ancient times [they have] advocated a mindset of "prizing harmony," "living harmoniously with all nations," "within the four seas all men are brothers," etc. In recent times, China has suffered

more than a hundred years of unrest and war and would never inflict such suffering on others. Throughout history countries that have used armed force to serve their development objectives have ultimately failed. China will always unwaveringly insist on independent policies of peaceful diplomacy, an independent path of peaceful development, and mutually beneficial open strategies and uphold justice. [China] will push for and establish a new type of international relations based on cooperation and mutual benefit, will safeguard world peace, and promote common development.[88]

In contrast, Modi, a man whose personal views, party politics, and political leadership are all heavily intertwined with Hindutva,[89] quotes ancient texts (Hindu scriptures) but seldom if at all refers to precolonial views of international society or order. In a speech to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), he quoted, "The wealth that increases by giving, that wealth is knowledge and is supreme of all possessions,"[90] to emphasize the domestic programs India has launched to provide skills and education for Indian children.[91] At the Asian Leadership Forum, he stated, "As some of us in Asia become more prosperous, we must be prepared to share our resources and markets with those who need them. . . . This is the principle that guides India's policies. And, it comes from our timeless belief in the world as one family, 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.'"[92]

Xi's speeches express support for key tenets of the Western international order but make clear that there are limits.[93] He declared to a group of Asian and African states,

We need to abandon the Cold War mentality and old ways of thinking of zero-sum games, propose commonality, band together, and cooperate. We can promote new ideas about security, persist in dialogue and peaceful solutions to differences and disputes, develop common answers to terrorism, public health and Internet safety, climate change, nontraditional security problems, and global challenges. [We need] to construct a common destiny. [We should forge] a new security path of sharing winning and safeguarding our region and world peace and stability.[94]

He often, sometimes in the same speech, repeatedly touts the Chinese way, which is posited as an aspirational alternative. Chinese domestic politics is also linked to the welfare of international society:

China will always be a constructor of world peace, will firmly walk the path of peaceful development. No matter how the world situation changes or how we develop, China will never seek hegemony or expansion.[95]
To bring about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people is the fundamental dream of the Chinese nation.[96]
China insists that countries do not distinguish between the big and small, the strong and weak, the poor and rich but rather adhere to equality and justice. China will be a champion of justice and oppose those who bully and oppress the weaker and use wealth to pressure the poor. China will oppose any interference in another country's internal affairs.[97]

Modi rarely, if ever, actively talks of Indian leadership in the world order, and he espouses no *Indian* way to emulate. Rather, he refers to morality,[98] and he speaks repeatedly of the nuts and bolts of India's domestic achievements. The focus is inward—that is, developing India, including sometimes stressing compliance with the international order and attracting foreign investment—rather than both inward and outward—that is, developing India with a view to assuming an international leadership role or shaping the international system:[99]

Excellencies, we in India don't see development and climate change as competing objectives. This is centered on the belief in the unity of humanity and Nature. We have ambitious plans for addressing the challenges of climate change. This includes additional capacity of 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022; cut in subsidies on fossil fuel and tax on coal; and, National Clean Energy Fund of US$3 billion to promote clean technologies. With our highly ambitious/Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), India would remain in step with the world.[100]
I am pleased that elimination of poverty in all forms everywhere is at the top of our goals. Addressing the needs of 1.3 billion poor people in the world is not merely a question of their survival and dignity or our moral responsibility. It is a vital necessity for ensuring a peaceful, sustainable and just world. . . . Today, much of India's development agenda is mirrored in the Sustainable Development Goals. . . . Since Independence, we have pursued the dream of eliminating poverty from India.[101]

CONCLUSION

China and India both have outlined conceptions of international order. Modern Chinese conceptions of order have often drawn on a powerful and ancient ideational heritage, which in recent years has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity as an aspirational model of international order. At the same time, Chinese elites including the leadership are acutely conscious of the need to forge a Chinese path in international relations, and the ideas embedded in tianxia provide one method of thinking about such a path. China seeks to outline the limits of the Westphalian order without rejecting it per se. It is seeking to be a norm shaper if not a norm maker.[102] Indian conceptions of order, on the other hand, are postcolonial. Despite some common chafing at the current international order, these postcolonial conceptions are distinct from each other in significant ways, and none of them overwhelmingly reject or posit any alternative to the Westphalian order. In India there is little sense of urgency that an *Indian* path of development or forging international order is needed. These differing viewpoints are reflected in the speeches of the current leaders Xi and Modi.

China's dual and, to some extent, dueling perspective (accepting some elements of the Westphalian order while also pushing a distinct Chinese path) can be seen in foreign policy initiatives pushed by Xi, such as the One Belt One Road (OBOR, *yi dai yi lu*, 一带一路) policy, which is an infrastructural

network of primarily road and rail enterprises and oil and gas pipelines that will eventually connect "65 countries, 4.4 billion people, and 40 per cent of global GDP."[103] OBOR draws on Xi's conception of great "national rejuvenation" (*minzu weida de fuxing*, 民族伟大的复兴) and his effort to develop a "new type of great-power relations" (*xinxing daguo guanxi*, 新型大国关系) while emphasizing openness, inclusivity, and cooperation with other international development initiatives rather than the replacement of them.[104] But this of course means that because it is undoubtedly geared toward increasing China's international influence (even if, from China's point of view, in a nonthreatening way), there is concern that its ultimate effect will be to "marginalize US influence"[105] and thereby de facto contribute to the erosion of the current order.

Indian foreign policy, under the leadership of Modi, was expected by many to undergo a radical shift. Commentators wondered whether he, as a transformational leader, would come to significantly influence his foreign policy.[106] Others argued that while domestic transformation was possible, there were unlikely to be radical shifts in foreign policy.[107] Modi's speeches indicate that currently the focus of the government is on domestic reform. Unlike Xi, Modi has not yet espoused an accompanying explicit international conception of how India could shape or make the existing international order. Yet his election has brought an ardent proponent of Hindutva into mainstream politics. The question, therefore, remains whether Hindutva now can be adapted and reshaped to articulate an active and outward-looking Indian conception of international order.[108]

The literature on international order tells us that order is built on an asymmetry of power and is the deliberate attempt by a powerful state to reorganize the rules, arrangements, and norms of the international system. Moreover, the rearrangement presumes acquiescence and/or active participation on the part of other states. While China is making more of a push to actively outline a Chinese alternative to world order, it remains to be seen, particularly in terms of the bilateral relationship, whether India will acquiesce, even symbolically, to this alternative view.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, "Conference Report on the Conditions of World Order," *Daedalus* 95, no. 2 (1966): 456.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 457.
4. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2003).
5. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
6. G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise, Character and Evolution of International Order," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, ed. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 539.
7. Gilpin, *War and Change*.
8. G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction," in *Power, Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 4.
9. Charles A. Kupchan, "Unpacking Hegemony: The Social Foundations of Hierarchical Order," in Ikenberry, *Power, Order and Change*, 19.
10. Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Powers," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (2016): 218–19.
11. Kupchan, "Unpacking Hegemony," 20.
12. John A. Hall and T.V. Paul, "Introduction," in *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, ed. T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.
13. Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3.
14. Ibid., 4.
15. Kupchan, "Unpacking Hegemony," 21, 30–35.
16. Hall and Paul, "Introduction," 6.
17. Kupchan, "Unpacking Hegemony," 34–35.
18. Special relationships are strong bilateral relationships (e.g., US-UK, Israel-Germany, US-Israel) that share goals of strategic security but also share values and ideological interests. See Janice Bially-Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis and Representational Force* (London: Routledge, 2005), and Y. Bar-Simon Tov, "The US and Israel since 1948: A 'Special Relationship'?" *Diplomatic History* 22 (1998): 231–62.
19. Niharika Mandhana, "How India's Narendra Modi Became a Social Media #Superstar," *Wall Street Journal*, May 6, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/indias-prime-minister-a-hit-on-social-media-1430905148.
20. Soutik Biswas, "Will India's Narendra Modi Be a Reformer?," BBC, May 26, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-27534163.
21. Arvind Virmani, "India-China Economic Cooperation," in *China and India: Learning from Each Other*, ed. Eswar S. Prasad, Jahangir Aziz, and Steven Dunaway (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund 2006), 272.
22. Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, "Export Import Data Bank," http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopnq.asp.
23. Biswas Baral, "India's Self-Defeating Paranoia about China in Nepal," *The Diplomat*, May 14, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/indias-self-defeating-paranoia-over-china-in-nepal/.
24. Xiaoyu Pu, "Ambivalent Accommodation: Status Signaling of a Rising India and China's Response," in "India's Rise at 70," ed. Manjari Chatterjee Miller and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, special issue, *International Affairs* 93, no. 1 (2017): 155.
25. While China too has had ideologies that have referred to international order (whether Mao's thought, Deng's thought, etc.), the historical concept of *tianxia*, a very explicit and Chinese idea of international order, has been referred to repeatedly by scholars and leaders. In contrast, historical notions of international order rarely, if ever, find mention in modern Indian thought.
26. Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?," *Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2010): 119–38.
27. Paul Evans, "Historians and Chinese World Order: Fairbank, Wang, and the Matter of 'Indeterminate Relevance,'" in *China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu*, ed. Yongnian Zheng (London: Routledge, 2010), 42.
28. Hun Joon Kim, "Will IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics Be a Powerful Alternative?," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 1 (2016): 66.
29. Yaqing Qin, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?," in *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed.

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (London: Routledge, 2010), 26–50. See also Kim, "Will IR Theory," 66.

30. Sarah C. M. Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 50.

31. Rana Mitter, "An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 210.

32. Wang Gungwu quoted in Feng Zhang, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System': Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics," in Zheng, *China and International Relations*, 82.

33. Rana Mitter, "An Uneasy Engagement," 210; and Zhang, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System,'" 83. Although it is also pointed out that sometimes this hierarchy was not even adhered to nominally. For example, there is a letter written by the Yongle emperor in 1418 to the ruler of the Timurid Empire that refers to him as a fellow monarch. See Zhang, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System,'" 86.

34. Zhang, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System,'" 87.

35. Xiao Ren, "Traditional Chinese Theory and Practice of Foreign Relations," in Zheng, *China and International Relations*, 105.

36. Ibid., 108.

37. Brantly Womach, "Traditional China and the Globalization of International Relations Thinking," in Zheng, *China and International Relations*, 123.

38. Ibid., 120.

39. Ibid., 124.

40. Navnita Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India," in Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, 95, 97.

41. Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvian, Gandhian, Hindutva, and Neo-Liberal," in Foot, Gaddis, and Hurrell, *Order and Justice*.

42. Rahul Sagar, "State of Mind: What Kind of Power Will India Become?," *International Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2009): 802.

43. Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions," 247.

44. Behera, "Re-imagining IR in India," 94.

45. Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions."

46. Ibid., 240–43.

47. Most evident at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955.

48. Quoted in Sagar, "State of Mind," 804.

49. B. R. Nanda, *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 230, 243.

50. Rahul Sagar, "'Jiski lathi uski bhains': The Hindu Nationalist View of International Politics," in *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases*, ed. Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 234–57.

51. Sagar, "Jiski lathi, uski bhains," 237.

52. Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice," 250.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., 255.

56. Ibid., 255–56.

57. This is not to suggest that tianxia has been the only conception of order propagated or harked back to but, rather, that it has cropped up regularly in modern China and given different levels of emphasis by different leaders. There are other varying sources of order, ranging from nationalists such as Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen to the Maoists, who have dominated the discourse at varying points

of time, but none of them have rejected tianxia per se so much as sidelined some aspects of it while upholding others. For a discussion on nationalism, see Zhimin Chen, "Nationalism, Internationalism, and Chinese Foreign Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 42 (2005): 35–53.

58. Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13.

59. Muzaffar Alam states: "The basis of the empire, in a measure, had been negative; its strength had lain in the inability of the local communities and their systems to mobilize beyond relatively narrow bounds. . . . Political integration in Mughal India was, up to a point, inherently flawed. It was conditional on the coordination of the interests and the political activities of the various social groups led by local magnates." Muzaffar Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and Punjab, 1707–48* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6.

60. This is not to suggest that precolonial Indian nationalists did not expound on international relations. See Rahul Sagar, "Before Midnight: Views on International Relations, 1857–1947," in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Rather, individual nationalist thinkers eventually aligned with one or other of the postcolonial Indian conceptions of order—unsurprising when one considers that the postcolonial conceptions were also mostly articulated by influential Indian nationalist leaders.

61. Friso M. S. Stevens, "Why Does Japan's Wartime Ghost Keep Reemerging?," China File, May 26, 2016, https://www.chinafile.com/viewpoint/why-does -japans-wartime-ghost-keep-reemerging; and Wataru Sawamura, "Why Japan Misreads China—and What to Do about It," Huffington Post, September 10, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/10/why-japan-misreads-china _n_5788896.html.

62. See Mark Mancall, "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 349 (1963): 14–26; John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Gungwu Wang, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay," in Fairbank, *Chinese World Order*; and Benjamin Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present," in Fairbank, *Chinese World Order*.

63. Evans, "Historians and Chinese World Order," 48–49.

64. Schwartz, "Chinese Perception," 284.

65. June Teufel Dreyer, "The Tianxia Trope: Will China Change the International System?," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 96 (2015): 2–3.

66. Ibid., 2–3. Note that tianxia was not explicitly a part of the political discourse during the regime of Mao Zedong.

67. In his view, the traditional Chinese understanding of the world took a society of states to be not one of equality and parity but one that reflected the society of individuals. China and the emperor existed at the center and maintained stability—it was "a complete whole where no dichotomous opposites existed. . . . There was only one ego . . . without an opposite alter." See Qin, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?," 36. Modeled on the Confucian notion of "state," which in turn was modeled on the Confucian notion of "family," it had no concept of "international-ness" and the corresponding sovereignty or territorial integrity, a bedrock of Western theories about international relations (ibid., 37).

68. Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept: 'All-under-Heaven,'" *Social Identities* 12, no. 1 (2006): 30; and *Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu*

Zhexue Daolun [The tianxia system: A philosophy for the world institution] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005).

69. Zhao, "Rethinking Empire," 33.

70. Dreyer, "Tianxia Trope," 2.

71. William Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 4 (2008): 749–61.

72. Dreyer, "Tianxia Trope," 9.

73. As Bajpai terms it. See Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice," 243.

74. Ibid., 252–53.

75. Ibid., 256.

76. Ibid., 246.

77. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?," *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56.

78. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), 31–32.

79. Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice."

80. Sagar, "State of Mind," 808.

81. Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice," 258.

82. Sagar, "Before Midnight," 69.

83. Through, e.g., the network of Confucius Institutes set up in 2005. See Dreyer, "Tianxia Trope."

84. Ibid.

85. Manjari Chatterjee Miller and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, "Introduction: India's Rise at 70," *International Affairs* 93, no. 1 (2017), 3.

86. I collected thirty-seven speeches that were publicly available. He made many more speeches that were internal and restricted (*neibu*).

87. I collected forty-seven speeches from 2015 to 2016.

88. 中国最需要和谐稳定的国内环境与和平安宁的国际环境，任何动荡和战争都不符合中国人民根本利益。中华民族历来爱好和平，自古就崇尚"以和为贵"、"协和万邦"、"四海之内皆兄弟也"等思想。中国近代以后遭遇了100多年的动荡和战火，中国人民绝不会将自己曾经遭受过的悲惨经历强加给其他国家和民族。纵观历史，任何国家试图通过武力实现自己的发展目标，最终都是要失败的。中国将毫不动摇坚持独立自主的和平外交政策，坚持走和平发展道路，坚持互利共赢的开放战略，秉持正确义利观，推动建立以合作共赢为核心的新型国际关系，始终做维护世界和平、促进共同发展的坚定力量. Xi Jinping, speech to the Boao Forum, March 28, 2015.

89. "More than any other leader, including the previous BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Narendra Modi is closely associated with Hindutva as both a personal belief system and a source of domestic political support." Manjari Chatterjee Miller and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, "Pragmatism in Indian Foreign Policy: How Ideas Constrain Modi," *International Affairs* 93, no. 1 (2017): 32.

90. वयये कृते वरधते एव नतियं, वदिया धनं सरव परधानं (Both the Sanskrit phrase and its English translation are within the speech.)

91. Narendra Modi, "Speech to UNESCO," (Paris, April 10, 2015).

92. वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्, Narendra Modi, "Speech to the Asian Leadership Forum," Seoul, May 19, 2015.

93. E.g., in a 2014 speech, Xi emphasized the seeking of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, and respect for diverse civilizations, and common development" (坚持互信、互利、平等、协商、尊重多样文明、谋求共同发展). Xi Jinping, speech to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, July 12, 2014.

94. 要摒弃冷战思维、零和博弈的旧观念，倡导共同、综合、合作、可持续安全的新理念，坚持通过对话协商和平解决分歧争端，共同应对恐怖主义、公共卫生、网络安全、气候变化等非传统安全问题和全球性挑战，建设命运共同体，走出一条共建、共享、共赢的安全新路，共同维护地区和世界和平稳定. Xi Jinping, "Speech to Asian African Summit," Jakarta, April 22, 2015.

95. 中国将始终做世界和平的建设者，坚定走和平发展道路，无论国际形势如何变化，无论自身如何发展，中国永不称霸、永不扩张. Xi Jinping, "Speech to the UN General Assembly," New York, September 29, 2015.

96. 实现中华民族伟大复兴是近代以来中华民族最根本的梦想. Xi Jinping, "Speech to the Mexican Senate," Mexico City, June 6, 2013.

97. 中国坚持国家不分大小、强弱、贫富一律平等，秉持公道、伸张正义，反对以大欺小、以强凌弱、以富压贫，反对干涉别国内政. Xi Jinping, "Speech in Tanzania," Dar es Salaam, March 25, 2013).

98. A theme in both Nehruvianism and Gandhism.

99. One reading of this could assert that it is consistent with the tenets of Hindutva: a showcasing of India as a superior state that the world will eventually emulate without any concrete pathways by which this could happen.

100. Narendra Modi, "Speech to the G20," Antalya, Turkey, November 15, 2015.

101. Narendra Modi, "Speech to the UN," New York, September 25, 2015.

102. Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, "China's 'New Type of Great Power Relations': A G2 with Chinese Characteristics?," *International Affairs* 92, no. 4 (2016): 773–94.

103. Bert Hofman, "China's One Belt One Road Initiative: What We Know So Far," World Bank, December 4, 2015, http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/china-one-belt-one-road-initiative-what-we-know-thus-far.

104. Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the 'One Belt One Road' Initiative," *China Leadership Monitor* 47, no. 5 (2015): 6, 9, 13.

105. Ibid., 14.

106. Brahma Chellaney, "Narendra Modi's Imprint on Foreign Policy," *LiveMint*, September 2, 2014; Christophe Jaffrelot, "A Modi Doctrine?," *Indian Express*, November 20, 2014; Amitabh Mattoo, "The Modi Foreign Policy Doctrine: India as a Smart Power," *The Conversation*, June 12, 2014; and Harsh Pant, "Out with Non-Alignment, in with a 'Modi Doctrine,'" *The Diplomat*, November 13, 2014.

107. Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "Foreign Policy à la Modi," *Foreign Affairs*, April 3, 2014; Ankit Panda, "Hindu Nationalism and . . . Foreign Policy?," *The Diplomat*, April 4, 2014; Kanti Bajpai, "Continuity—but with Zeal," *Seminar* no. 688, April 2015, 23–27; and Ian Hall, "Is a 'Modi Doctrine' Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (2015).

108. Some are very pessimistic about the flexibility of ideational tools that Hindutva provides. See Ian Hall, "Narendra Modi and India's Normative Power," *International Affairs* 93, no. 1 (2017): 113–31.