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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2016
Dissertation Title: *Essays on Internet Economics*
Main Advisor: Albert Ma
Dissertation Committee: Albert Ma, Marc Rysman, Juan Ortner and Monic Sun
M.A., Economics, New York University, New York NY, 2010
B.A., Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, 2008

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Industrial Organization, Quantitative Marketing, Applied Game Theory, Applied Econometrics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Department of Economics, Boston University
Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2015
Teaching Assistant, Empirical Economics, Spring 2015
Teaching Assistant, Statistics for Economists (graduate), Spring 2015
Teaching Assistant, Economics of Information (graduate), Spring 2014, Fall 2011
Teaching Assistant, Behavioral Economics, Spring 2014, Fall 2011
Teaching Assistant, Game Theory (undergraduate and graduate), Spring 2012
Stern School of Business, New York University
Teaching Assistant, Microeconomics, Spring 2010

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Professor Monic Sun, Spring 2015
Research Assistant (Data Analysis), Department of Economics, Boston University, Professor Daniele Paserman, Fall 2012-Spring 2013

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2013, Fall 2014
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, Summer 2014
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, 2011-2015
Excellent Student Award, Renmin University of China, 2006-2008

WORKING PAPERS

- “How Do Firms Advertise When Customer Reviews are Available?”, October 2015.
“Advertising Response to A Better Online Rating: A Regression Discontinuity Design on Local Restaurants”, October 2015.
“Delay in Platform Adoption” (joint with Marc Rysman), April 2016

WORKS IN PROGRESS

- “Customer Reviews and Quality Disclosure” (joint with Jacopo Bizzotto)
“Advertising vs. Customer Reviews: A Model of Dynamic Signaling and Social Learning” (joint with Mengxi Zhang)

REFeree EXPERIENCE

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Economic Analysis and Policy

CONFERENCES

- “How Do Firms Advertise When Customer Reviews are Available?”
13th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston, MA, 2015
8th Workshop on Economics of Advertising and Marketing (Invited), Oxford, UK, 2015
10th Economic Graduate Student Conference, WashU in St. Louis, 2015

LANGUAGES

Fluent in English, Native in Chinese (Mandarin)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, R, MATLAB, Mathematica, LaTeX, Lyx, Microsoft Office

OTHER: Flute (Amateur Top Level Certificate), Piano (Amateur Top Level Certificate)

CITIZENSHIP/VISA: China/F1

REFERENCES

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October, 2015

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How Do Firms Advertise When Customer Reviews are Available?

(Job Market Paper)

Online consumer product reviews have become very popular and influential in consumers' purchase decisions. I study how competing firms choose advertising and prices when customer reviews are available and when firms may build up loyal customer bases. The model predicts that higher-rated firms are more likely to be dominant in advertising. In other words, online reviews complement firms' advertising. I also analyze an extreme case of the model: an entry game in which an entrant and an incumbent interact. I find that the availability of customer reviews undoes the "fat-cat" effect of a big incumbent with a lot of loyal customers. An incumbent with a high enough ratio of good reviews can successfully deter entry and maintain a high profit. Comparative statics of the theory model can explain the pattern of advertising response to Yelp ratings found in the empirical RDD paper. Intuitively, when the capacity limit of a local business becomes binding, a jump in the display rating will reduce the complementary effect of online reviews on advertising.

Advertising Response to A Better Online Rating: A Regression Discontinuity Design on Local Restaurants

I analyze the advertising spending pattern of local restaurants with different online ratings on Yelp.com. Rating information on Yelp includes the display rating and the distribution of reviews. Surprisingly, although both types of rating information summarize to different extents how consumers like a restaurant, advertising spending responds in entirely opposite directions to changes in display rating and in average rating (i.e. a summary statistic of the distribution). Given the discontinuity in Yelp display ratings that is created by the rounding algorithm, I use an RD design to identify the effect of a higher display rating on local restaurants' advertising spending decisions. I find evidence of a significantly negative effect of display rating on advertising spending for relatively higher-rated (i.e. rated above 3) restaurants. On the other hand, when the display rating is constant, the relationship between local restaurants' ad spending and average rating is significantly positive. The reason for the opposite advertising responses to display rating and to average rating is the capacity limit of local businesses.

Delay in Platform Adoption

(with Marc Rysman)

Our paper proposes a new explanation for adoption failure, or adoption delay, in markets with network effects. In our model, consumers and software providers play a dynamic two-sided adoption game, choosing between two incompatible platforms/technologies. Consumers are allowed to choose to wait in adoption, but firms need to adopt one platform upon entry. We show that, in a parameter space that only has standardization equilibria in a static setting, when we introduce dynamics, there exists a "market split and adoption delay" equilibrium. In this equilibrium, firms split between two platforms, and some consumers choose to wait in period 1 in order to join the turn-out-to-be-dominant platform in period 2. This "split and delay" equilibrium is inefficient since the market would benefit from immediate coordination on one platform or the other. Our model is motivated by the 56K modem market, in which competition between two similar technologies appears to have led to adoption failure, until an industry standard setting organization coordinated the market on an alternative standard.