Event Highlights: The EU Refugee Crisis and the Changing Paradigm of EU Law (Europe and Law Series)

On April 7, we welcomed Iris Golder Lang, 2016 John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World Organization at Harvard Law School and Jean Monnet professor of European Union law and a UNESCO Chairholder at the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law. Professor Golder Lang delivered the second lecture in our “Europe and Law Series,” an initiative of the Jean Monnet Chair in European Law at Boston University, on the topic of “The EU Refugee Crisis and the Changing Paradigm of EU Law.”

04.07.16a

Iris Golder Lang is the module leader of two Jean Monnet Modules “EU Migration Law and Policy” and “EU Internal Market Law” granted by the European Commission. She holds a UNESCO Chair on Free Movement of People, Migration and Inter-Cultural Dialogue at the University of Zagreb. She has held a number of visiting lectures (LSE, University of Stockholm, University of Vienna, University of Lisbon, Court of Justice of the EU, European Parliament, Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Alpbach Forum Summer School, etc.). She is the editor of three books and the author of a number of articles, chapters in books and a book entitled From Association to Accession: How Free is the Free Movement of Persons in the EU? She is Editor-in-Chief of the Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (CYELP) and president of the Croatian Society for European Law (affiliate of FIDE – International Federation for European Law) and the Croatian representative in the Odysseus Network.

The event began with Caruso’s introduction of Lang, who then outlined her presentation by explaining how she planned to talk about the huge refugee influx in recent years and months to Europe and how it has impacted both current and future EU law, and how she expects the entire European paradigm to shift. Making three distinct points, Lang explained how the refugee crisis has caused a dismantling of multiple EU rules in migration and asylum laws, how the crisis has effected the founding principles and values of the EU, and how the pressures of incoming refugees have brought to the surface existing issues prompting both inadequate and incorrect responses from EU institutions and Member States.

Beginning with a broader perspective, Lang used many statistics to place the European refugee crisis into a more global context, addressing how through the definition established by the Geneva Convention, only 19.5million of the 59.9 million displaced persons internationally were considered refugees. She continued by explaining how 90% of these refugees fled to neighboring developing countries, and she criticized the EU for claiming incapability to integrate and protect the migrants, even though only 1 million of the 19.5 million attempted to enter the EU in 2015.

Lang then briefly summarized the Schengen Border code, explaining the European experiment to create a zone without internal border controls, stating “it was wonderful,” as it positively impacted EU citizens psychologically and economically, as Schengen improved European markets as a result of free movement of peoples and goods. However, Lang explained that the free zone only works if common rules and policies exist at the external borders given the question of visas, asylum applications, and general immigration trends, thus placing nations located at the periphery of the EU under greater stress in handling the influx of refugees in recent years. She described how the potential creation of a Common European External Border Force through a supranationalized institution would not only require massive changes in EU law, but would additionally threaten the sovereignty of European states as they would be required to give up power to the EU. Lang discussed how in the past two years, more than half the Schengen states reinstated some form of internal border security controls in the face of the refugee crisis, and that looking forward she cannot predict whether Schengen will survive the securitization of European borders, as she argued that, while the physical construction of walls and fences are generally unsuccessful at keeping migrants at bay, the psychological fear of the “other” within European communities is rapidly becoming the greatest threat to the European experiment.

Lang then broke down how the Dublin Regulation is the legal instrument which allocates responsibility for processing asylum claims through its “state of first entry” rule, and how this system unnecessarily burdens Member States located at the external borders of the EU, which does not support the concept of European solidarity as it is unfair to nations such as Greece and Italy. She also explained how Dublin relies on the assumption that equal and adequate human rights standards exist across the EU, and how there have already been two human rights cases taken to the highest European courts that have ruled on the failings of Member States in handling the incoming migrants, resulting in several nations (Germany, Austria) suspending transfers of asylum seekers to the states they initially entered (ex. Greece, Hungary). Lang also explained how at the external border of the EU, immigrants are supposed to be identified and registered, but how Member States failed to take fingerprints and successfully process many refugees, exposing a large failing of the Dublin Regulation. Lang then explained the difference between reallocation (person already in EU moved from one Member State to another, within EU borders) versus resettlement (refugee running away from a 3rd country resettles in the EU), and how in 2015 the Member States adopted two controversial decisions agreeing to the reallocation of 160,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece given that several states find these arrangements “contrary to EU law”. Lang noted that only 272 reallocations occurred as of January 2016, and that the EU deal with Turkey is based on the same principle of resettlement as a “safe 3rd country” but how the issue of non-refoulement and the 1 for 1 deal have caused many European to question the agreement, leading Lang stating “the Dublin first entry rule is simply not working, it hasn’t been working for a while, but now it’s simply nonexistent due to the EU Turkey Deal.”

Lang then addressed the dismantling of EU rules, and how the influx of refugees have brought into question basic human rights, values, equality, and non-discrimination principles expected in Europe, thus underpinning the very foundations of the EU. She continued by reading statements made by EU politicians in recent years to demonstrate the xenophobic sentiments being expressed, contradictory to EU laws, and the “Ping-Pong” game of finger pointing and blame shifting between Member States. Lang then criticized EU institutions for inadequately responding, as they independently established qualifications and directives to deal with asylum seekers, resulting in limited harmonization and Member States failing to respect their obligations. She added that the Commission is still not doing enough, and that the question of implementation under Directives versus Regulations does not matter given the drawn out process such changes would require within the EU legal framework. She then explained some of the options Member States have, including cooperation with 3rd countries to keep migrants from arriving to Europe, quotas for the Balkan states, joint return operations to Africa, and the potential strengthening of the EU border through the establishment of a pan European border patrolling force called the “European Border and Coast Guard” under the authority of FRONTEX.

Lang’s concluding statements on the subject were critical, as she highlighted the insufficiencies of European institutions and called out Member States for failing to share the responsibility by facing this crisis with the solidarity expected under the EU framework, adding that developments in the EU are affecting European law. “We will have a European Union, but a changed European Union… an EU, quite paradoxically, that will be more integrated.” Lang explained how there will be increased integration in the form supranationalization of EU institutions such as FRONTEX, but that the results will reflect “Fortress Europe” and a regression of the past 50 years of European progress. She briefly described the growing European police state, and how increasing internal border checks threaten the Schengen Zone, not only for refugees, but bring into question the rights and identity of EU citizens given the laws regarding surveillance, data protection, and personal privacy, stating “there’s going to be a ‘Big Brother’.”

The event ended with an open discussion and several questions posed to Lang, the first regarding a comparison of the unification seen in the US following the Civil War and the potential emphasis on external borders in Europe leading to reduced internal controls. Lang explained her expectation that the external borders will become increasingly fortified but that Schengen is “up in the air” given the varying issues both at the periphery and within the EU. She briefly mentioned the concept of “benefit tourism” and how EU law is becoming more restrictive. She then shifted toward the impending Brexit referendum, and how that decision will impact a potential amendment to the right of free movement. A question about the arrangements made between EU Member States and MENA countries was answered by Caruso, who went into a long analysis of the Turkey Deal, and how a surface agreement varies greatly from a long-term solution and how the real issue is the question of human rights standards. Lang added that the shift of the migration routes to the East will reshape the arrangements already established within the parameters set by both EU and international law. The two speakers then addressed the question of integration and social mobility for migrants following the asylum application process, as well as the differences between refugees and economic migrants. Lang commented, “it ends up being a matter of luck where you end up being born,” as every national struggles with rules and regulations regarding the varying types of migrants, and that the dream for self-improvement, while idyllic, is not sustainable thus not supported by European or international law. She continued her statements on the huge and diverse waves of migrants around the world by saying, “do we need more rules about it? Do we need to change the Geneva Convention the definition of who we consider a refugee? My answer is no for quite pragmatic reasons.” Lang then delved into several reasons why amending the Geneva Convention would not necessarily be a good idea, but how she believes a “practical and global response” is something the developed world owes the developing world, as many Western states are at fault for many of the issues seen across the globe today, concluding “we are all responsible.”

Listen to the lecture on Sound Cloud!

Event Highlights: Eastern European Democracies and the EU Rule of Law Framework (Europe and Law Series)

On March 17, 2016, under the auspices of the Jean Monnet Chair in European Law and in collaboration with the Center for the Study of Europe, we inaugurated our Europe + Law lecture series. Vlad Perju, Director of the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College and a tenured Associate Professor at Boston College Law School, delivered the first lecture in the series on the topic of Eastern European Democracies and the EU Rule of Law Framework. Perju's primary research and teaching interests include the law of the European Union, comparative constitutional law and theory, international and comparative law and jurisprudence.

03.17.16

The event began with Caruso’s introduction to the European Law Series, addressing the question of whether law can fix the challenges facing the European Union or whether it enabled such issues to develop. After each participant in the discussion introduced themselves, Caruso welcomed Perju, who stated his hope to challenge the way the audience thinks about the EU. Specifically, he explained that he planned to discuss the future of Poland given the recent developments in other Eastern European countries such as Romania and Hungary, as well as the question of potential EU influence on impending Polish transformations. Perju explained how there are many matters that EU institutions need to address, and that the varying dimensions and levels of policymaking in Europe determine the potential reaction and tools made available to resolve these issues. Additionally, Perju outlined what he referred to as the intellectual question facing Europe today, claiming, “European integration is the French Revolution of our time,” forcing citizens to comprehensively think about politics. He explained that everyone should have opinions on these social, economic, and political issues, and EU institutions should reflect these perspectives rather than exclusively those of politicians and intellects in looking toward the future of Europe.

Perju described how the pace of developments in Hungary in 2010 and Romania in the summer of 2012 demonstrated how European institutions were taken by surprise, and how they are currently facing similar fast paced changes in Poland, stating “almost as if time has run out of patience… there is an accelerated rhythm in Eastern European politics.” He continued by explaining how, even in 2007, discussions about the future of Poland recognized that the nation was at a crossroads, either heading in its own direction or continuing the pattern of Eastern European development seen in in other former Soviet states, as there are “similar dangers in post-Communist Europe.” Perju summarized a conversation between two intellectuals analyzing this question, highlighting their recommendation to watch the developments in Russia under Vladimir Putin in recent years, ominously concluding, “there are times when the wind favors what’s mean in us rather than what’s noble.”

Perju explained how the majority of his presentation would focus on Poland, given its contemporary developments, but that he would also analyze Hungary and Romania given the constant changes and profound transformations attempted in each of these states. He further explained how Romania acts as a case study for where EU influence was arguably significant in preventing certain events to unfold. Perju stated that he expects Poland to develop independently from Romania and Hungary depending on where things are for EU institutions. He continued by explaining that profound transformations driven by politicians have been a staple of life in Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism, returning the region to the political organization seen prior to WWI. He explained that a peculiar feature in many Eastern European nations is the “political evanescence”, which results in political parties vanishing after electoral cycles, but he added that in Poland and Hungary resilient anti-communist sentiments have led to more political structuring.

Perju described how citizens in Eastern Europe have been good at throwing out incumbents in regularly scheduled elections, limiting many political parties and leaders from returning to power. However, as Perju explained, from 2002-2010 in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, there were political parties returning to power leading to 8 years of continuity. Similar to problems seen in Western Europe, where many political parties remain in power for longer consecutive periods, these Eastern European states face the issues of building tensions within and between political parties, growing corruption, and severance of connections to their electorates.

Perju explained the challenge for EU institutions by stating, “the EU does not have rules about some unitary form of domestic constitutional regimes – so each country has its own way of arranging its political affairs.” He continued by describing how the varying forms of government have different disadvantages and advantages. Using the example of the Parliamentary system, Perju explained how the structure of a parliamentary government promotes citizen involvement given the limited checks and balances, leading to a quite responsive regime that gains political traction. Perju also explained the disadvantages of Parliamentary systems given the danger of political fragmentation resulting from the necessary formation of coalition governments. He continued by using the example of Hungary in 2010, when the political party returning to power obtained a 68% majority government and had the power to amend the constitution 12 times, pass 800 new laws, and eventually make a new constitution. Perju highlighted the question of pace, addressing how EU institutions were shocked by the rapid changes in the framework of the Hungarian law system.

Event Highlights: The Double Edge Sword of Austerity – European Governance Since the Eurozone Crisis

On Monday, April 11th, we hosted a panel discussion on the topic of European governance during the Eurozone Crisis. The speakers included: Vivien SCHMIDT, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration and Founding Director of BU’s Center for the Study of Europe; Laszlo ANDOR, Professor of European Economic Governance at the Institute for European Studies of the ULB and Former EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion; Mario TELO, Professor of International Relations at the Université Libre de Bruxelles - ULB and at the LUISS Guido Carli di Roma, Emeritus President of the Institute for European Studies of the ULB and Member of the Belgian Royal Academy. The panel was moderated by Daniela Caruso, Jean Monnet Professor of European Law and Boston University Professor of Law.

The event began with an introduction of the panelists by Professor Caruso. Vivien Schmidt then gave her presentation, beginning with a theorization of the roles and of democratic legitimacy in the Eurozone Crisis, particularly in the context of Horizon 2020. She discussed how the Eurozone Crisis was not just the problem of economic of political issues, but instead the broader issue of legitimacy, explaining how “institution actors responded by governing by the rules, and ruling by the numbers.” Rather than responding to the crisis with deep integration policies such as mutualization of debt and Eurobonds, Schmidt explained how EU actors instead doubled down on the rules. She talked about how EU institutional actors began to reinterpret the rules with incremental changes, raising the question “how have EU institutional actors managed to bend or even break legally binding rules while retaining legitimacy through the Eurozone Crisis?” She broke down the necessary levels of building, coordinating, and communications regard the reinterpretations of legitimacy, and explained the different intensities in the crisis: the “fast burning” times of doubling down of rules and interest based decision making versus “slow burning” crisis when there is an ability to dig out and formulate new solutions.

Schmidt then turned toward the question of output and inputs within European studies literature regarding the effectiveness of EU institutional actor policies. She explained that output is the technological non-major actors with technical know-how and economic principles to reinforce legitimacy versus major political actors focusing on the ideas, interest, and values of the elites and the perception and normative principles of the citizens. Input was described as politics, in terms of citizen participation and governmental responses to the demands of the general public. Schmidt explained how input could be distinguished at the national and EU levels, as national input is focused on the government working for the people (leader to participation) while the EU level, various institutional actors link different sources of legitimacy. Schmidt then described the tradeoff between input and output, defining the “black box of governance” as the accountability, transparency, inclusion, accessibility, and ethicacy that institutional actors claim. Schmidt said “I call all of this ‘throughput’. Unfortunately throughput doesn’t work,” adding, “governing by the rules, ruling by the numbers did not work. Throughput did not necessarily provide good output,” and she identified unemployment, deflation, and low growth as the resulting failures of the Eurozone Crisis in this failed tradeoff assumption.

Schmidt then claimed that this situation is what caused the “reinterpretation of rules by self”, as the EU institutional actors only later realized that they had inadvertently trapped themselves in the rules they originally created, so they then go back looking for flexibility under the premise of “they say one thing, do another”. She gave the example of how the European Central Bank was completely redone but claimed its actions were “within its mandate” with the goal that “credibility [would lead] to stability” and continually claiming “we are following the rules” while the mandate was radically reinterpreted. She compared the actions of the European Central Bank to the European Commission, who continually denied changes and derogations to the rules, asking “whether the European Central Bank is the hero or ogre of the crisis?” and whether the Commission members are “the Ayatollahs or austerity?” or “ministers of moderation?”. Schmidt concluded by describing how democratization faces problems of legitimacy, focused on input, muddling through, and resulting in insufficient output.

The next panelist to speak was Laszlo Andor, who spoke about American economists in the late 1990s, who critiqued the Maasricht Treaty and the concept of the Eurozone. Andor described how some Americans predicted a future economic crash and even began theorizing a potential solution to save European economies similar to the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s. He then addressed the Eurozone Crisis, citing the importance of American aid - both direct and indirect - which has been channeled to Europe through institutions such as the IMF in recent years. Andor discussed how the concept of austerity was the center of conversations relating to the Eurozone Crisis, but how the tones of these discussions were dominated by critiques and questions surrounding the definition of austerity. Andor explained how austerity has multiple definitions and is overall both a outcome (of fiscal, monetary, and other policies) and an input (to the extent that in 2011-12 political parties were advocating responsibility and prioritizing stability through deficit limitations) within the institutional structure.

Continuing, Andor defined austerity as the situation when “governments are cutting expenditures, especially wages, but have sacrifices of real economics.” He claimed that, in times of adversity or economic downturn, institutions implement fiscal consolidation instead of economic expansionary policy. He critiqued this definition for being too narrow, as it exempts monetary policy. Andor explained that the problem facing Europe is not whether or not it can recover from the 'philosophy of austerity, but instead faces the problem that the overall architecture of the Maastricht Treaty is better for consolidation rather than growth. He then delved into the question of whether Maastricht needs to be modified or whether the Maasrticht Treaty needs to work through its intellectual failings, claiming that austerity can work in a small open economy but, when applied across multiple unique economies simultaneously, austerity can be counteractive and drain economies. Andor concluded by stating, “the EU is just too polarized, just too vulnerable and, as a result, [is] potentially facing the next economic downturn without the monetary system being repaired or prepared for it.”

The final panelist to speak, Mario Telo, began by identifying the three major challenges facing the U.S. and EU. The first named was the post-Cold War multipolar power structure and the resulting complex global governance which faces new threats that negatively interplay and tremendously affect the Eurozone Crisis. The second problem of enduring global economic uncertainties, after almost a decade of crisis, has been demonstrated by the unsatisfactory growth in the U.S. and EU when compared to the growth rates of the BRICS nations. Finally, Telo identified the challenge of deepening social consequences and the resulting domestic troubles facing Western liberal democracy, specifically citing the rise of populism, “what I call ‘authoritarian temptation’ on both sides of the Atlantic.”

Telo explained how the U.S. has more resources to cope with such issues as a Federal State, versus the EU which is a collection of states. He continued by citing differences between the U.S. and EU in terms of available budgets, ability to attract international investors, and the varying political challenges. For example, Telo described how the U.S. democracy is facing extreme polarization but can cope with these issues by channeling populist sentiments between the state and national levels, while the EU faces multiple independent anti-democratic movements in several Member States. He continued by explaining how Europe, while living through 6 years of economic downturn, has faced multiple other other crises simultaneously: the question of policy (e.g. Brexit, secessionist movements), the refugee emergency, and instability on the Eastern and Southern border given the rise of Islamic terrorism.

Telo discussed his worries regarding the fragility of the Eurozone, specifically its ability to cope with new global clash due to growing international debt, calling for a renewed intensity and prudence in the evaluation of EU policy. He then described the importance of German leadership in leading quantitative easing, adding that there is now a divide in whether a shift back from ultra-liberal economic policy toward the more traditional Keynesian policy is necessary. Telo stated that the parallels being drawn between todays crisis and that of the 30s are “not appropriated,” continuing by explaining how Keynesian economics aided in the under consumption, overproduction problems of the interwar period, but how currently the Eurozone needs new innovative policies. He described that the unequal distribution of debt has brought into question the mix of European policy and public goods, in addition to the role of Germany.

Addressing the emerging future of the EU, Telo identified two major questions Europe must face: what economic policy going forward and how do we democratize the Eurozone? He explained the recent steps backs “after the three democratization waves” and how populist leaders have made their admiration of Vladimir Putin evident in their critiques of the European democratic structure. Telo warned that “manipulation of fears can go very far,” bringing attention to the question of future European democracy in the face of national, protectionist, and authoritarian right wing movements across Europe. He then called for a new proposal for democratization of the Eurozone and new reforms for economic governance focused on national budgetary policy and centralization by the European Parliament to improve both democratization and participating in decision making. He describes the option of creating an annual assembly of national parliaments when the Member States would come together to address major issues focusing on coordination and cooperation, in addition to the establishment of a distinct Eurozone budget and the formation of a European Parliament committee dedicated to the Eurozone, based on his ideal of an EU centered upon a “concentric circle” of institutional architecture.

Prof. Caruso, who moderated the session, opened up for questions from the audience, including further explanation of the European Central Banks violations of its mandate and its potential contribution to the rise of populist movements, the question of who decides the extremity of flexibility and reinterpretations of rules, and the shifting dialogue of the European Commission from “stability is a prerequisite for jobs and growth” toward an emphasis on “jobs and growth are a prerequisite for stability”? While each panelist was given the time to address the questions posed by the audience, Vivien Schmidt asked, “what if we change our idea of EU and Eurozone governance to be less hierarchical, and instead more coordinated, more decent?” continuing by describing the possible model of the European Central Bank setting targets and Member States being given independent goals in the search for a solution to the Eurozone Crisis. Telo ended the discussion with a call to action for Europeans to address the challenges originally faced by Montesquieu, concluding: “without representation of the people and international power, the European project is condemned.”

This activity acknowledges the support of the H2020 RIA research project ENLIGHTEN - European Legitimacy in Governing through Hard Times: the role of European Networks European Commission Project Number: 649456